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Abstract 
 
First World War historians have increasingly sought to move beyond conventional narratives 
of a self-contained Anglo-German conflict. It was, after all, a ‘world war’, reflected in the 
United Kingdom’s four years of nearly continuous fighting against the Ottoman Empire. 
Despite growing interest in cultural representations of this Eastern theatre, the ‘globalising’ 
impulses motivating this scholarship have led historians to overlook the remarkable Germano-
centrism with which such events were discussed in UK newspapers, both provincial and 
national. The Ottoman Empire’s entry into the war was attributed to a campaign of intense 
German intrigue and bribery that, supposedly, brought Constantinople under complete German 
domination. Praise for its soldiers’ ‘gentlemanly’ conduct at Gallipoli served mostly to criticise 
German misconduct by contrast, while condemnation of Ottoman atrocities was directed 
mainly at Germany. Its military defeat was, likewise, valued only insofar as it thwarted German 
war aims. While such claims have not gone entirely unnoticed, they have been unduly 
dismissed as deliberately deceitful propaganda or, otherwise, reflections of condemnable racial 
prejudices regarding the supposed manipulability of ‘backward Orientals’, underserving of 
further exploration. This thesis argues that such press interpretations, though often 
demonstrably false, were based upon considerably more complex (if misguided) reasoning than 
conventionally assumed and gave the Ottoman Empire great, but hitherto unappreciated, 
importance within the press’ Germano-centric conception of the First World War. Claims that 
the previously ‘Unspeakable Turk’ upheld ‘civilised’ British values on the battlefield, where 
Germans did not, deepened the UK’s belief in the righteousness of its ‘just war’ against 
Germany, as did Germany’s alleged complicity in Ottoman atrocities like the Armenian 
Genocide. Likewise, Germany’s supposed dominance in Constantinople, secured to achieve its 
Drang nach Osten towards India, placed the Ottoman Empire at the heart of an Anglo-German 
proxy-war to decide what the press believed was the main issue of the war: whether Britain, or 
Germany, would have mastery of the East. This thesis shows that newspapers viewed wartime 
events in the Ottoman Empire as tremendously important, but only because of their perceived 
relationship to the broader Anglo-German conflict. Paradoxically, therefore, its attempt to 
move beyond conventional Germano-centric narratives into a more globalised view of the 
conflict, in accordance with recent scholarly trends, only highlights the extent to which 
Germany dominated the UK wartime imagination. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis uses newspapers from throughout the United Kingdom to explore how the press 
understood its conflict with the Ottoman Empire from 1914-1918 and, ultimately, the First 
World War in which it was situated. At the heart of this commentary was a tension between 
the global scale of the United Kingdom’s war effort and the press’ continued fixation upon 
their primary enemy, Germany, which offered a constant frame of reference for wartime events 
in the East. Though scholars now desire to move beyond parochial narratives which treat the 
First World War as a self-contained Anglo-German conflict, this thesis shows that 
contemporary press coverage of these ostensibly global events remained remarkably Germano-
centric. For journalists, the war in the East was, in many respects, as much about Germany as 
the war in Europe; both the Ottoman Sultan and the Young Turk Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP), the Ottoman Empire’s de facto rulers, were given only a minor role in this 
commentary. By embracing the Germano-centrism evident within these sources, the thesis not 
only offers new insights into wartime views of the Ottoman Empire, including its atrocities like 
the Armenian Genocide, but also highlights Germany’s dominance over the wartime 
imagination through a hitherto unexamined perspective. It contributes towards the larger 
project of analysing the First World War as a transnational event, fought between global 
empires, by considering how far contemporary media understood the war in these terms. 
 
Historiography 
 
In his study of wartime British politics, John Turner declared that ‘no one writing about the 
First World War can pretend to be treading on ground “hitherto neglected by historians”.’1 
Subject to endless scholarly analysis from seemingly every conceivable angle, it might appear 
there is little novel left to say about the conflict.2 ‘Far from going gentle into the good night of 
historical obscurity’, however, Heather Jones notes that the war’s historiography has matured 
                                                          
1 John Turner, British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict 1915-1918 (New Haven, 1992), 8. 
2 Robin Higham and Dennis E. Showalter (eds.), Researching World War I: A Handbook (Westport, 2003) and 
Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present 
(Cambridge, 2005) hint at the enormous scale of this ever-expanding scholarship. 
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considerably since the 1990s, adopting new approaches which have ‘reinvigorated establish 
debates… as well as revealing previously overlooked themes for scholarly study.’3  
Most notably, First World War scholars have embraced history’s broader ‘global turn’, 
seeking to accommodate the obvious but previously underappreciated fact that the war was a 
truly global conflict – indeed a ‘world war’ – into their research.4 Some simply wish to 
highlight military events beyond the Western Front.5 Others have taken a more sophisticated 
approach inherited from the ‘transnational turn’ in American historiography of the early 1990s. 
Defining a new ‘transnational generation’ in the war’s historiography,6 these scholars analyse 
the wartime experience both ‘beyond and below’ the nation-state.7 Most significantly, they 
have turned their attention towards the war’s imperial character, reconceptualising the conflict 
as one between global empires.8 This ‘imperial turn’ has been especially pronounced in British 
scholarship, where increasing emphasis on ‘Greater Britain’ or the ‘British World’ has 
produced new interest in uncovering the wartime experiences of Britain’s imperial subjects.9 
The nation-state should not be abandoned altogether, however. Despite the ever-expanding 
geographic scope of these analysis, historians must still, as Leonard Smith notes in another 
context, ‘reconcile two unattainable goals, seeing things clearly and seeing them whole’ 
through ‘a unit of investigation large enough to make possible meaningful generalizations, but 
small enough to study intensively.’10 As recent Australian scholarship shows, national histories 
                                                          
3 Heather Jones, ‘As the Centenary Approaches: The Regeneration of First World War Historiography’, Historical 
Journal, 56:3 (2013), 857. See also Alan Kramer, ‘Recent Historiography of the First World War (Part I)’, Journal 
of Modern European History, 12:1 (2014), 5-28 and ‘Recent Historiography of the First World War (Part II), 
Journal of Modern European History, 12:2 (2014), 155-174. 
4 Hew Strachan, ‘The First World War as a Global War’, First World War Studies, 1:1 (2010), 3-14. Notable 
general examples include Hew Strachan, The First World War: To Arms (Oxford, 2001); Jay Winter (ed.), The 
Cambridge History of the First World War, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 2014); Keith Jeffrey, 1916: A Global History 
(London, 2015). 
5 E.g., Ian F.W. Beckett (ed.), 1917 – Beyond the Western Front (Leiden, 2009); Jonathan Krause (ed.), The 
Greater War: Other Combatants and Other Fronts (Basingstoke, 2014). 
6 Jay Winter, ‘General Introduction’, in Winter (ed.), Cambridge History, vol. 1, 6. 
7 E.g. Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert (eds.), Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919 
(Cambridge, 1997) and vol. 2: A Cultural History (Cambridge, 2007); Pierre Purseigle, ‘Beyond and Below 
Nations: Towards a Comparative History of Local Communities at War’, in Jenny Macleod and Pierre Purseigle 
(eds.), Uncovered Fields: Perspectives in First World War Studies (Leiden, 2004), 95-123; Adrian Gregory, 
‘Globalising and Localising the Great War’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 27 (2017), 233-251.  
8 On the necessity of this approach, see Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, ‘The Great War as a Global War: 
Imperial Conflict and the Reconfiguration of World Order, 1991-1923’, Diplomatic History, 38:4 (2014), 786-
800. Examples include Santanu Das (ed.), Race, Empire and First World War Writing (Cambridge, 2011) and 
Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela (eds.), Empires at War: 1914-1923 (Oxford, 2014). 
9 E.g. Richard Smith, Jamaican Volunteers in the First World War: Race, Masculinity and the Development of 
National Consciousness (Manchester, 2004); Timothy C. Winegard, Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions 
and the First World War (Cambridge, 2014); Michael J.K. Walsh and Andrekos Varnarva (eds.), The Great War 
and the British Empire: Culture and Society (London, 2016); Santanu Das, India, Empire, and First World War 
Culture: Writings, Images and Songs (Cambridge, 2018). 
10 Leonard V. Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division during 
World War I (Princeton, 1994), 17. 
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can still contribute meaningfully to this ‘global turn’ by analysing how participants engaged 
with the war’s global, transnational and imperial dimensions.11 This thesis does likewise 
through contemporary depictions of the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire’s campaigns 
in the East. 
The press is well-suited for such a task. Though newspapers do not provide an 
immediate, unfiltered window into ‘public opinion’,12 they nonetheless offer ‘significant 
insight[s] into how societies or cultures came to understand themselves and the world around 
them.’13 As influential promoters of the ‘ideology of empire’, they are also especially valuable 
for analysing Britain’s war against the Ottoman Empire as an imperialist venture.14 Yet, 
newspapers have been greatly under-used by First World War historians, despite considerable 
interest in the war’s cultural history since Paul Fussell’s foundational Great War and Modern 
Memory in 1975.15 Their wartime reputation as recruiting organs which glamourised the war, 
masked the brutal reality of the soldiers’ experience and the associated horrific casualty rates 
from potential volunteers, and demonised the enemy through exaggerated if not outright 
fabricated tales of German atrocities has significantly impeded serious analysis of newspapers 
as meaningful sources of opinion.16  
Undeniably, many prominent press men were directly involved in propaganda. Most 
infamous was the press magnate Alfred Harmsworth (Lord Northcliffe), founder and de facto 
editor of the Daily Mail and, from 1908, proprietor of The Times. Through his fervent advocacy 
                                                          
11 Kate Ariotti and James E. Bennett (eds.), Australians and the First World War: Local-Global Connections and 
Contexts (London, 2017). 
12 See Virginia Berridge, ’Content Analysis and Historical Research on Newspapers’, in Michael Harris and Alan 
Lee (eds.), The Press in English Society from the Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries (London, 1986), 201; T.R.E. 
Paddock, ‘Introduction: Newspapers, Public Opinion and Propaganda’, in T.R.E. Paddock (ed.), A Call to Arms: 
Propaganda, Public Opinion and Newspapers in the Great War (Westport, 2004), 2-3; Simon J. Potter, ’Empire 
and the English Press, c. 1857-1914', in Simon J. Potter (ed.), Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain: 
Reporting the British Empire, c. 1857-1921 (Dublin, 2004), 39-61. 
13 Stephen Vella, ‘Newspapers’, in Miriam Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), Reading Primary Sources: The 
Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth- and Twentieth-century History (London, 2009), 192. 
14 See J.D. Startt, Journalists for Empire: The Imperial Debate in the Edwardian Stately Press, 1903-13 (Westport, 
1991); Simon J. Potter, News and the British World: The Emergence of an Imperial Press System (Oxford, 2003); 
Chandrika Kaul, Reporting the Raj: The British Press and India, c. 1880-1922 (Manchester, 2003); Potter (ed.), 
Newspapers and Empire; Justin Fantauzzo, ‘The Finest Feats of the War? The Captures of Baghdad and Jerusalem 
during the First World War and Public Opinion throughout the British Empire’, War in History, 24:1 (2017), 64-
86. 
15 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York, 2000 [1975]). On this ‘cultural turn’, see Jessica 
Meyer, ‘Introduction: Popular Culture and the First World War’, in Jessica Meyer (ed.), British Popular Culture 
and the First World War (Leiden, 2008), 1-17, which, notably, makes no mention of the press. 
16 See, e.g., Arthur Ponsonby, Falsehood in Wartime: Containing an Assortment of Lies Circulated Throughout 
the Nations During the Great War (London, 1928); Philip Knightley, The First Casualty: From the Crimea to 
Vietnam: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandists, and Myth Maker (London, 1975); Cate Haste, Keep 
the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War (London, 1977); Gerard J. De Groot, Blighty: British 
Society in the Era of the Great War (London, 1996), 180-187; Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (London, 1998), 
ch. 8. 
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for increased propaganda efforts in his papers and his later official involvement as Director of 
the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries at Crewe House, Northcliffe came to 
personify Britain’s entire propaganda enterprise for both critics and admirers alike.17 However, 
wartime propagandists did not consider spreading deliberately manipulative falsehoods as 
within their purview: ‘propaganda’ did not assume its pernicious connotations until well after 
the First World War, being used interchangeably with ‘publicity’, ‘advertising’ and, 
occasionally, ‘education’ in popular discourse even in the late 1920s.18 Indeed, recent 
reassessments have found little basis in the above caricature. In-depth studies of the Liverpool 
press reveal a more truthful picture of military events and soldiers’ experiences than 
conventionally assumed.19 Likewise, Adrian Gregory finds surprisingly few reports on violent 
acts towards civilians in the Daily Mail, supposedly the most rabid purveyor of atrocity stories, 
while what coverage it did provide of Germany’s ‘rape of Belgium’ focused primarily on 
destruction of property.20 This reporting was not always accurate, but it did agree with both the 
imperfect evidence available at the time and the general truth, as revealed by John Horne and 
Alan Kramer, that German soldiers did, in fact, commit widespread atrocities in their invasion 
of Belgium.21 
 Subsequent studies have proved the value of press analysis for what Richard Grayson 
terms ‘military history from the street’. Though coined to describe Grayson’s statistical 
analysis of recruitment data in local newspapers,22 Justin Fantauzzo finds the term equally apt 
for describing recent studies that use the press to interrogate popular responses to the First 
World War.23 Most significant is Catriona Pennell’s A Kingdom United, which examines over 
70 newspapers and, most importantly, 441 diverse ‘historical witnesses’ to discern as complete 
                                                          
17 See Ponsonby, Falsehood in Wartime, 58. Likewise, Adolf Hitler’s admiration for British wartime propaganda 
in Mein Kampf seem to have referred specifically to Northcliffe’s at Crewe House: Ferguson, Pity of War, 213. 
For Northcliffe’s propaganda career, see J. Lee Thompson, Politicians, the Press & Propaganda: Lord Northcliffe 
& the Great War, 1914-1919 (Kent, OH, 1999). 
18 Mariel Grant, Propaganda and the Role of the State in Inter-War Britain (Oxford, 2013), 14-15. On 
propagandists’ belief in the truth of their material, see Hew Strachan, ‘John Buchan and the First World War: Fact 
into Fiction’, in Kate Macdonald (ed.), Reassessing John Buchan: Beyond the Thirty-Nine Steps (London, 2009), 
77-90; David Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda in First World War Britain: The National War Aims 
Committee and Civilian Morale (Liverpool, 2012), 269.  
19 Helen B. McCartney, Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War (Cambridge, 2005), 
103-117; Michael Finn, ‘Local Heroes: War News and the Construction of “Community” in Britain, 1914-18’, 
Historical Research, 83 (2010), 520-538. 
20 Adrian Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War (London, 2008), 51-53. 
21 Gregory, Last Great War, 63-68; John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial 
(New Haven, 2001). 
22 Richard S. Grayson, Belfast Boys: How Unionists and Nationalists Fought and Died Together in the First World 
War (London, 2009),185-198; expanded in ‘Military History from the Street: New Methods for Researching First 
World War Service in the British Military’, War in History, 21:4 (2014), 465-495. 
23 Fantauzzo, ‘Finest Feats’.  
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a picture of ‘public opinion’ in the war’s opening months as historical records allow. This tight 
chronological focus allows for in-depth analysis of a remarkably broad source base and is well-
suited to Pennell’s main task, refuting popular notions of universal ‘war enthusiasm’.24 It does, 
however, afford little space to the Ottoman Empire, which did not become a formal enemy 
until November 1914 and did not become a notable military adversary until much later.25 
How the Ottoman Empire was presented to and understood by the public has not been 
completely neglected, however. Scholars have given much greater attention to Britain’s war 
against the Ottoman Empire than its other non-German enemies.26 The Gallipoli campaign has 
been especially well-covered in Australian and New Zealand scholarship for its place in their 
emerging national identities.27As the most infamous and disastrous diversion from the Western 
Front, both militarily and politically, it also holds a significant place in the UK historiography.28 
Press coverage has also been considered, albeit largely through individual war 
correspondents,29 or as part of the domestic political crisis caused by dissatisfaction with the 
Dardanelles operations.30 Additionally, recent turmoil in the Middle East, in many ways a 
direct legacy of British and French imperialism in the First World War, has excited new interest 
                                                          
24 Catriona Pennell, A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and 
Ireland (Oxford, 2012). See also Adrian Gregory, ‘British “War Enthusiasm” in 1914: A Reassessment’, in Grail 
Braybon (ed.), Evidence, History and the Great War: Historians and the Impact of 1914-1918 (Oxford, 2003), 
67-85; Stuart Hallifax, ‘“Over by Christmas”: British Popular Opinion and the Short War in 1914’, First World 
War Studies, 1:2 (2010), 103-121; Meilyr Powel, ‘The Welsh Press and the July Crisis of 1914’, First World War 
Studies, 8:2-3 (2017), 133-152. 
25 The Ottoman Empire is discussed briefly to highlight Germany’s monopoly on the public imagination: Pennell, 
Kingdom United, 97-98. 
26 On the Salonika campaign against Bulgaria, see Alan Palmer, The Gardeners of Salonika: The Macedonian 
Campaign, 1915-1918 (London, 1965) and, more recently, Alan Wakefield and Simon Moody, Under the Devil’s 
Eye: The British Military Experience in Macedonia 1915-18 (Barnsley, 2011); on British involvement in Italy’s 
war against Austria-Hungary, see George H. Cassar, The Forgotten Front: The British Campaign in Italy, 1917-
1918 (London, 1998); on British perceptions of the Austria-Hungarian enemy, see Harry Hanak, Great Britain 
and Austria-Hungary during the First World War: A Study in the Formation of Public Opinion (London, 1962) 
and Mark Cornwall, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds (London, 2000). 
27 See Jenny Macleod, ‘Decentering Anzac: Gallipoli and Britishness, 1916-1913’ in Ariotti and Bennett (eds.), 
Australians and the First World War, 185-201. 
28 See Fred R. van Hartesveldt, The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography 
(Westport, 1997). Notable recent additions include Tim Travers, Gallipoli: 1915 (Stroud, 2004 [2001]); Jenny 
Macleod, Reconsidering Gallipoli (Manchester, 2004); Jenny Macleod (ed.), Gallipoli: Making History (London, 
2004); Robin Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth (New Haven, 2009); Jenny Macleod, Gallipoli (Oxford, 2015). 
For the Ottoman perspective, see Edward J. Erickson, Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign (Barnsley, 2010). 
29 E.g. Macleod, Reconsidering Gallipoli, 103-146; Fred Brenchley and Elizabeth Brenchley, Myth Maker: Ellis 
Ashmead-Bartlett: The Englishman who Sparked Australia’s Gallipoli Legend (Milton, Qld, 2005); Angela V. 
John, War Journalism and the Shaping of the Twentieth Century: The Life and Times of Henry W. Nevinson 
(London, 2006), 144-153; Ron Palenski, ‘Malcolm Ross: A New Zealand Failure in the Great War’, Australian 
Historical Studies, 39:1 (2008), 19-35. There is, additionally, an enormous scholarship on Australia’s Gallipoli 
correspondent, Charles Bean: see Peter Stanley (ed.), Charles Bean: Man, Myth, Legacy (Sydney, 2017), for an 
introduction. 
30 E.g. Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, vol. 2: The Twentieth Century (Chapel 
Hill, 1984), 274-282.  
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in the Mesopotamian and Palestine campaigns, most apparent in the republication of A.J. 
Barker’s 1967 classic, The Neglected War, as The First Iraq War in 2009.31 As is well-
understood, policy-makers supported these expeditions not for their highly dubious military 
value but for the potential domestic impact of cheap and decisive victories in places of 
historical or religious importance, such as Baghdad and Jerusalem, in boosting morale and, in 
India, quelling potential political unrest following the Ottoman Sultan’s call for jihad.32 Thus, 
new studies especially stress matters of representation and reception, probing official and semi-
official propaganda at length,33 and assessing efforts to draw parallels between the Palestine 
campaign and the Medieval Crusades.34 Nadia Atia’s discussion of press coverage of Britain’s 
Mesopotamian campaigns, though short and limited to a small selection of papers, is especially 
valuable, suggesting that UK newspapers were well aware of the imperial stakes involved.35 
Fantauzzo’s recent examination of ‘nearly 100 newspapers’ from the UK, Dominions and India 
for public responses to the captures of Baghdad and Jerusalem, the most extensive analysis of 
the press material to date, suggests likewise. Regarding this thesis’ central query, he finds 
within this ‘well-informed’ and ‘sophisticated’ commentary clear evidence that ‘both the press 
and public understood that the Great War was, in fact, a world war.’  
However, little appreciation is shown within existing scholarship of the remarkably 
Germano-centric analysis of the Middle East’s significance. Fantauzzo’s suggestion that the 
press ‘paused’ from their regular coverage of European affairs to discuss these events ignores 
the Ottoman Empire’s perceived place within the broader Anglo-German conflict.36 This 
reflects recent desires to analyse the First World War as ‘a whole series of regional conflicts 
and latent antagonisms [which] attached themselves to the central conflict’ but were otherwise 
                                                          
31 A.J. Barker, The First Iraq War, 1914-1918: Britain’s Mesopotamia Campaign (New York, 2009 [1967]). The 
modern political landscape also motivated David Fromkin’s A Peace to End all Peace: Creating the Modern 
Middle East, 1914-1922 (London, 1989). 
32 David French, ‘The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in British Eastern Strategy, 1914-1916’, 
War & Society 5:1 (1987), 45-61; Matthew Hughes, Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East, 1917-1919 
(London, 1999); Nikolas Gardener, ‘British Prestige and the Mesopotamian Campaign, 1914-1916’, Historian, 
77:2 (2015), 269-289; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The First World War in the Middle East (London, 2014). 
33 Sadia McEvoy, ‘The Construction of Ottoman Asia and its Muslim Peoples in Wellington House’s Propaganda 
and Associated Literature, 1914-1918’, PhD Thesis (King’s College, London, 2016); Ahmed K. al-Rawi, ‘Islam 
and the East in John Buchan’s Novels’, in Macdonald (ed.), Reassessing John Buchan, 117-128; David S. Katz, 
The Shaping of Turkey in the British Imagination, 1776-1923 (New York, 2017), ch. 5. 
34 Eitan Bar-Yosef, ‘The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917-18’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 36:1 (2001), 87-109 and The Holy Land in English Culture, 1799-1917 (Oxford, 2005); 
Stefan Goebel, The Great War and Medieval Memory: War Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and 
Germany, 1914-1940 (Cambridge, 2007), 114-126; James Kitchen, “Khaki Crusaders”: Crusading Rhetoric and 
the British Imperial Soldier during the Egypt and Palestine Campaigns, 1916-18’, First World War Studies, 1:2 
(2010), 141-160.  
35 Nadia Atia, World War I in Mesopotamia: The British and the Ottomans in Iraq (London, 2016), esp. 145-147. 
36 Fantauzzo, ‘Finest Feats’, quotations at 85. 
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separate from, not merely an extension of, the war in Europe.37 Such efforts are admirable. 
Contemporary characterisations of the Ottoman Empire as a ‘German proxy’ were wholly 
inaccurate and, according to Hasan Kayalı, their legacy in modern scholarship has impeded 
meaningful historical analysis of the Ottoman Empire significantly.38 However, this thesis is 
less concerned with history as it ‘really’ was than with how contemporaries perceived it. While 
histories of ‘representations’ cannot ignore this reality entirely, and nor does this thesis, truth 
has unfortunately impeded serious interrogation of why these false assertions were made, what 
they meant for press interest in the Ottoman Empire, and where such Germano-centrism placed 
the East within contemporary conceptions of the First Word War itself. These are questions 
that this thesis seeks to answer. 
Previous scholarship has also, too often, reduced the war with the Ottoman Empire 
solely to its military campaigns, at the expense of more important cultural representations. 
Contemporary participants conceived of the First World War as a ‘just war’ in which they were 
defending the principles of civilization from barbarism.39 Numerous studies have stressed the 
role of German atrocities in affirming for those in the UK the righteousness of their cause.40 
Where Ottoman crimes like the Armenian Genocide and its brutal treatment of prisoners of war 
or praise for the chivalrous ‘clean-fighting Turk’ fit into this picture remains unclear, however. 
Existing inquiries into UK responses to the Armenian Genocide centre predominantly around 
Armenophile humanitarians, the nature of their interest in the Armenians and how they 
                                                          
37 Strachan, ‘Global War’, 10. 
38 Hasan Kayalı, ‘The Ottoman Experience of World War I: Historiographical Problems and Trends’, Journal of 
Modern History, 89:4 (2017), 883-884. Important challenges to this narrative include Ulrich Trumpener, Germany 
and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (Princeton, 1968); Donald Bloxham, ‘Power Politics, Prejudice, Protest and 
Propaganda: A Reassessment of the German Role in the Armenian Genocide of WWI’, in Hans-Lukas Kieser and 
Dominik J. Schaller (eds.), Der Völkermord an der Armenien und die Shoah (Zürich, 2002), 213-244; Donald 
Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman 
Armenians (Oxford, 2005), 115-133; Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914 (Cambridge, 2008); 
Mustafa Aksakal, ‘“Holy War Made in Germany?” Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad’, War in History, 18:2 
(2011), 184-199. 
39 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 1914-1918: Understanding the Great War, trans. Catherine 
Temerson (London, 2002), ch. 5. 
40 E.g. Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 291-326; Adrian Gregory, ‘A Clash of Cultures: The British Press 
and the Opening of the Great War’, in Paddock (ed.), Call to Arms, 15-49 and Last Great War, ch. 2; Pennell, 
Kingdom United, 57-67, 92-107 and ‘“Why We Are at War”: Justifying War in Britain, 1914’, in David Welch 
and Jo Fox (ed.), Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and the Modern Age (New York, 2012), 95-108. 
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presented their cause to wider audiences.41 Despite substantial scholarship on the Armenian 
Genocide over the past few decades, including growing interest in its representations in 
international media, its coverage within UK newspapers has not received detailed 
investigation.42 J.M. Read and, more recently, Jo Layock have used the press to some extent, 
although it is not their primary focus and their analyses are confined to The Times and 
Manchester Guardian, elite papers with limited circulation and questionable generalisability.43 
Moreover, the Ottoman Empire’s mistreatment of prisoners of war is nearly completely 
neglected in UK scholarship, despite growing interest from Australian historians.44 For 
example, Jones’ short, comparative treatment of German and British imperial-colonial 
encounters, addresses the curious absence of any notable domestic outcry only briefly.45 The 
nature of press interest or otherwise in these atrocities, their relationship to the ‘just war’ and 
Turkish soldiers’ strangely positive, ‘clean-fighting’ reputation are all crucial aspects of press 
discussions of the Ottoman Empire that remain to be explored. By doing so, this thesis offers 
a fuller understanding of contemporary views of the Ottoman enemy than previously available, 
while also offering new insights into the perceived moral imperative of the First World War.  
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Sources and Methodology 
 
This study provides a more comprehensive survey of the press material than those before it, 
which have considered aspects of its discussion of the Ottoman Empire in relative isolation. 
This has been made possible by the emergence of digital newspaper archives as part of the 
recent ‘digital turn’ in historical scholarship.46 Collections like the British Library’s British 
Newspaper Archive (BNA) expand the sources available to those outside the UK considerably, 
who need no longer rely exclusively on elite broadsheets of dubious representative qualities 
like The Times. Digitisation has greatly alleviated traditional barriers to press analysis, namely 
the extensive time required to conduct ‘anything more than superficial research’ using physical 
and microfilm copies, through keyword searches.47 Keyword searching also presents new 
methodological opportunities beyond conventional ‘top-down’ approaches to press research, 
where historians begin with selected dates where they expect relevant discussion to occur, and 
then select articles based on their headlines. ‘At each stage’ of this multi-step process, Bob 
Nicholson explains, ‘we exclude large quantities of information’, including relevant material 
through incidental references to ‘deeply embedded’ ideas which can be uncovered through the 
‘bottom-up’ approach offered by searching for keywords within the articles themselves, 
beyond their headlines.48 Such unexpected references to the Ottoman Empire and its non-
German allies in discussions of Germany allowed journalists’ efforts to tie events in the East 
to Germany, such as military success at Baghdad already analysed by Fantauzzo, to be placed 
within their broader Germano-centric conception of the First World War in this thesis. That 
such articles were discovered without specifically looking for ‘Germany’ (or its variants) 
reinforced this picture. 
Keyword searching presents its own challenges, however. To retrieve meaningful 
results, historians must select keywords carefully, accounting for contemporary terminology 
and variations.49 My primary keywords thus included not only ‘Ottoman’ and ‘Ottomans’ 
(encompassing ‘Ottoman Empire’ as well), but also numerous alternatives, most importantly 
‘Turkey’ and its variations. Though a Turkish nation-state did not exist until 1923, the Ottoman 
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Empire was routinely referred to as ‘Turkey’, its people as ‘Turks’ (unless referring specifically 
to Ottoman minorities like the Armenians), and so on. Such alternatives were the preferred 
terms. Searching ‘Turkey’ (and its variants) within the ‘Opinion and Editorial’ section of The 
Telegraph Historical Archive between 1 August 1914 and 30 November 1914, for example, 
returned 349 results against only 61 for ‘Ottoman’ or ‘Ottomans’. No matter how well-chosen 
the keywords, however, technological limitations render such searches fallible. Imperfect 
optical character (OCR) recognition risks both false positives and false negatives (where, for 
example, ‘America’ is read as ‘Armenia’ and vice versa), such that articles which do contain 
the selected keywords are omitted from the search results. Additionally, if traditional ‘top-
down’ approaches tend to overlook residual discussions of historical events, ‘bottom-up’ 
alternatives risk ignoring the equally important surrounding ‘peripheral content’, such as 
adjacent articles or advertisements, that shaped readers’ perception of this material. News does 
not occur in a vacuum, yet critics express concern that digital archives encourage historians to 
view newspaper articles in an artificial, isolated format, removed from their proper context. In 
this respect, the digital newspaper fundamentally differs from the original print copy as an 
historical text.50 Fortunately, digital archives also allow newspapers to be viewed as complete 
pages, reflecting their original form. Applying the traditional ‘top-down’ approach to complete 
issues helps mitigate these methodological concerns. This was used alongside keyword 
searches to place important events within their appropriate context and to ensure, as far as 
possible, that relevant articles were not omitted due to poor OCR, as sometimes occurred.  
Effective digital research is, therefore, considerably more time-consuming than it first 
appears. As Nicholson observes, ‘keyword searching’ does not replace ‘the need for extensive 
reading’; instead of ‘searching through irrelevant articles’, historians are now presented with 
‘billions of individual words… at our fingertips.’51 In fact, digitisation has not freed historians 
from navigating extensive irrelevant material either. For instance, The BNA, with its inadequate 
filtering options, returned numerous unhelpful results about Turkish baths and Ottoman stools. 
Thus, it was not practical to examine every single instance where the Ottoman Empire, or 
related topics like the Armenian Genocide, appeared in the examined papers (outlined below) 
over four years. Instead, the research was largely confined to direct sources of opinion, such as 
editorials and letters, to provide immediate access to the most useful material. Exceptions were 
made for August to November 1914, where a fuller picture of the specific reporting was 
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necessary to discern the exact process through which the Ottoman Empire supposedly became 
a German ‘vassal’, examined in Chapter One; and in smaller provincial papers to gather 
soldiers’ letters, used extensively in Chapter Two, which could not be singled out through 
search filters. Otherwise, unfiltered searches in daily papers were confined either to important 
dates or a more specific combination of keywords to supplement the more useful editorial 
material. 
Practical constraints also necessitated confining the research to a smaller, broadly 
representative sample, accounting for varying political viewpoints and target audiences. 
Political considerations are especially important for the UK press. Proprietors of provincial 
English papers, for example, were often politicians who purchased the papers to disseminate 
their party’s political views and would, therefore, editorialise along party lines.52 Others, like 
the Manchester Guardian, were not direct party organs but nonetheless capitalised on their 
political influence. Its editor, C.P. Scott, a Liberal MP from 1895 to 1906, used the paper to 
push Liberal agendas, most notably opposition to the Boer War.53 Metropolitan papers were 
equally politicised and, according to Stephen Koss, acquired ‘new partisan functions’ during 
the First World War. The pretence to a ‘party truce’ between politicians, who supposedly put 
aside their differences to allow for a unified war effort, ensured that these ‘political animosities 
went underground at Westminster, only to surface in Fleet Street.’54 
Also important was a newspaper’s price, which corresponded to the socio-economic 
class of its readers. Northcliffe’s London-based tabloid, the Daily Mail, famously declared 
itself a ‘penny paper for a halfpenny’, supposedly offering the quality of an elite broadsheet at 
an affordable price. Northcliffe recognised that a penny paper was beyond the means of his 
target audience, Britain’s middle class.55 At the same time, their mass-market appeal earned 
them the contempt of upper-class readers. Lord Newton, a Conservative politician, recalled in 
his memoirs: 
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The late Lord Burnham, the proprietor of the Daily Telegraph, told me that Mr. 
Kennedy Jones, M.P., at one time editor of the Daily Mail, had stated that the newer 
halfpenny journals had been instituted in order to cater for those who could not think, 
while the halfpenny illustrated papers were intended for those who could not read. This 
is derogatory, but we all know that many a true word is spoken in jest.56 
 
Thus, a penny paper possessed a wealthier readership, while a half-penny paper aimed at a 
broader audience, a fact that informed editorial opinions and selection of news content. 
Such choices had to be made within the limitations of the existing digital corpus. 
Digitalisation projects are ongoing and, as Nicholson observed in 2013, copyright and other 
considerations have directed their resources principally towards nineteenth-century 
newspapers at the expense of twentieth-century sources. The digital availability of newspapers 
from 1914-1918 has certainly improved subsequently, doubtless accelerated by the recent 
centenary, but it remains comparatively modest in 2019. For instance, the BNA offers only 263 
of the 2,366 newspapers recorded in the Newspaper Press Directory for 1917.57 Amongst the 
more notable omissions are leading metropolitan dailies like Morning Post and Daily News, 
which cease to be available from 1909 and 1912, respectively, and are not available digitally 
through other archives.  
 With these considerations in mind, 21 newspapers from across the United Kingdom 
were selected for principal analysis, with occasional use of further, supplementary newspapers. 
Representing the so-called ‘quality press’ that is such a staple of historical scholarship are the 
liberal Manchester Guardian, the conservative Daily Telegraph and The Times, which, as the 
‘newspaper of record’, claimed political independence.58 Heeding Bingham’s warning about 
the dangers of relying exclusively on these papers, given their elite readership and limited 
circulation, this study also consults the Daily Mail which, with a wartime circulation of about 
one million, was the most widely-read paper during the war.59 Of course, the Daily Mail has 
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its own representational issues, being unapologetically conservative and contemptuously 
middle-class, but this was typical of the ‘popular press’ at this time, which did not seek to 
appeal to working-class sensibilities until the 1930s.60 J.L. Garvin’s weekly Observer and the 
satirical magazine, Punch, round out this metropolitan picture.61 
 The far more numerous and widely-read provincial press also requires attention.62 Since 
it would be impossible to examine all 1,458 newspapers of ‘the English and Welsh 
provinces’,63 the analysis is confined to two case studies of regions which supplied two of the 
most prominent Territorial Forces to fight against the Ottoman Empire, the 42nd (East 
Lancashire) and 54th (East Anglia) Divisions, which, despite its name, included brigades not 
only from East Anglia—Essex, Suffolk and Norfolk—but also from Bedfordshire and 
Northamptonshire in the Midlands.64 Included for Lancashire are the liberal Burnley News, the 
conservative Burnley Express and Clitheroe Advertiser (hereafter Burnley Express), the liberal 
Rochdale Observer (its conservative rival, the Rochdale Times, was unavailable) and, finally, 
the halfpenny Manchester Evening News, which acts as a mass-market, politically independent 
and more localised counterpoint to the Manchester Guardian. Four papers were also selected 
for the ‘East Anglian’ corpus (in reference to the 54th Division rather than its broader 
geographic location): the independent Essex County Chronicle and its mass-market equivalent, 
the Essex Newsman, the liberal Northampton Mercury and the Bedfordshire Times and 
Independent, an ‘Independent-Liberal’ paper which claimed to be ‘read by all classes, and by 
all parties, because of the completeness and impartiality of its news.’65 Major Suffolk papers 
like the East Anglia Daily Times are, unfortunately, not digitised. These local newspapers’ 
perspectives are valuable for not only the special attention provincial papers gave to battles in 
which locals were involved—in this instance, those in the Middle East and Gallipoli—but also 
for the copious amounts of soldiers’ letters they published,66 used extensively in the thesis’ 
second chapter. The contrasting demographics of the two divisions make them especially well-
suited to such an analysis. With the notable exception of working-class Northampton, the 54th 
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Division drew from mostly rural constituencies in the East Midlands and South-Eastern 
England with predominantly middle-class urban centres, whereas those in the 42nd Division 
came from industrial, working-class areas of the North-West.67  
Yet ‘British’ history is not, as it is so often presented, simply ‘English’ history by 
another name: the United Kingdom, J.G.A. Pocock reminds us, is one of ‘four nations’.68 Each 
had their own press industries which remained dominant locally, partly for practical reasons. 
David Hutchison explains that limitations in railway technology greatly impeded the 
circulation of London-based, metropolitan dailies in Scotland, for instance.69 Consequently, 
attention is also given to the newspapers of Scotland, Wales and Ireland within the limitations 
of digital archives outlined above. Four Scottish papers were selected, representing both 
Edinburgh to the south and Aberdeen to the north. Edinburgh’s renowned Scotsman and the 
Aberdeen Daily Journal, both penny papers with correspondingly elite audiences, provide the 
Conservative perspective. It is unfortunate, given Scotland’s strong Liberal voting record and 
its press’ consequent ‘liberal bias’,70 that it was not possible to source digitised liberal papers 
for these cities. Instead, the conservative voices are measured by leading mass-market papers 
which declared themselves politically neutral or independent, Aberdeen’s Evening Express and 
the Edinburgh Evening News. The conservative Western Mail stands as the sole representative 
of the Welsh press; its major liberal competitor, the South Wales Daily News, is not available 
digitally past 1900. Though at odds with Wales’ staunch Liberalism, Chris Williams explains 
that ‘its audience was larger than its politics might have suggested’ and, according to Welsh 
Liberal politician and future wartime Prime Minister David Lloyd George, was even the 
newspaper of choice for many Liberals.71 For Ireland, the study considers both Unionist and 
Nationalist perspectives through the Irish Times and the Irish Independent, respectively, 
reflecting the main political divide in early-twentieth-century Irish politics, which was not 
between Conservative and Liberal but regarding the question of home rule. As ‘the only 
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halfpenny morning paper in Ireland’, the Irish Independent also offers a ‘popular’ counterpoint 
to the elite Irish Times.72  
This is a sample of mainstream press opinion. Consequently, Ireland's more radical, 
‘advanced nationalist’ press is not examined. Several leading seditious newspapers, including 
Sinn Fein, ceased publication in late 1914 due to pressure or compulsion from officials, newly 
empowered under the Defence of the Realm Act. Many remaining ‘advanced nationalist’ 
papers experienced a rapid decline in sales.73 The Labour press’ dire financial troubles indicate 
a similarly diminished wartime appeal. Its leading paper, the Daily Herald, was forced to 
downsize to weekly circulation, while others disappeared entirely.74 These anti-war voices 
remain important, however, and are considered briefly the work of socialist journalist, H.N. 
Brailsford, as a counterpoint to the pro-war consensus. Analysing depictions of the Ottoman 
enemy within ‘advanced nationalist’ papers would certainly be valuable from the perspective 
of Irish history. Keith Jeffrey identifies the failed campaign against the Ottoman Empire at 
Gallipoli as the ‘beginning of a progressive public disillusionment with the war’ within 
nationalist Ireland, a view which was not echoed in the pro-war Irish Independent’s celebration 
of Ireland’s involvement as a valuable recruiting tool.75 Nonetheless, the select sources offer a 
sufficient variety of political, class and regional perspectives to draw general conclusions about 
‘press opinion’ on the war with the Ottoman Empire from which further, more specialised 
studies such as this might be conducted. 
 
Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter One introduces and analyses in depth the 
thesis’ central theme: that the Ottoman Empire was understood as a subservient vassal to 
Germany, which was regarded as Britain’s principal enemy in both East and West. Though 
claims of German dominance are not necessarily a new discovery, no-one has examined their 
origins through press reporting on Ottoman diplomacy during its months of ‘pseudo-
neutrality’, leading to significant misunderstandings. The ostensibly Orientalist interpretation 
of Ottoman-German relations was, in reality, grounded in a series of specific political 
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developments the press, like those in the Foreign Office, believed – falsely, although with 
encouragement by Ottoman officials – to have occurred in Constantinople from August to 
November 1914. Observers perceived a factional dispute between the majority of Ottoman 
statesmen who favoured neutrality and a small faction, led by War Minister Enver Pasha and 
backed by German gold and intrigue, who sought to force a declaration of war for German 
interests. That Ottoman officials proved either unable or unwilling to expel this German 
influence after the Ottoman-German fleet’s unprovoked attack on Russia in late-October 
indicated the final victory of Enver’s ‘war party’, bringing the Ottoman Empire under complete 
German dominance. Subsequent press commentary was, consequently, overwhelmingly 
Germano-centric, with the Young Turk leaders themselves largely fading into the background. 
The following chapters concern the period after November 1914, each focusing on a 
different aspect of the conflict against this ‘Turco-German’ enemy. Chapter Two examines 
representations of Ottoman military conduct at length and, in particular, the contradiction 
between Turkish soldiers’ popular reputation as a ‘clean fighter’ who did not commit German-
style atrocities and the reality of their widely-documented misconduct. It, firstly, explains the 
longevity of the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ trope through its origins in first-hand testimonies in 
soldiers’ letters, chiefly from Gallipoli, disseminated to a broader public through their 
reproduction in the press, building on existing scholarship stressing the unimpeachability of 
the soldier’s story. This allowed Turks’ positive reputation to survive news of both the 
Armenian Genocide and Ottoman mistreatment of Allied prisoners apparently unscathed in the 
public mind. It then places these claims within the context of Britain’s ‘just war’, arguing that 
their main rhetorical effect was to offer the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ as a foil to the ‘Hun’, 
highlighting German ‘barbarity’ by contrast. Ottoman atrocities like the Armenian Genocide 
and the mistreatment of prisoners of war served similar ends, being interesting only insofar as 
they could be used to condemn Germany. 
The final chapter considers why the press believed it mattered to defeat this enemy 
within the British Empire’s broader military strategy. Though the Gallipoli campaign is 
considered, the discussion mainly concerns the Middle Eastern campaigns since, while not 
nearly as famous, this was where war with the Ottoman Empire was mostly conducted. 
Promising little towards victory in Europe, they also allow for better insights into what value 
the press ascribed to defeating the Ottoman Empire specifically. This chapter confirms previous 
work by Fantauzzo and others, stressing the primacy of imperialism, although it argues that 
they have misunderstood against whom this imperialist venture was fought, at least according 
to the newspapers examined here. It was, in short, a war of imperial defence against German 
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expansion towards Egypt and, most especially, India in order to supplant Britain as the world’s 
premier imperial power, which leading pan-German theorists had openly declared to be the 
goal of their alliance with the Ottoman Empire. Commentators both within and outside the 
press believed realising this Mitteleuropa scheme was Germany’s central war aim. This gave 
the Eastern ‘sideshows’ tremendous, and hitherto underappreciated, importance to the broader 
conflict, understood by the press as an existential struggle between the British and German 
Empires fought on a global scale. At the same time, however, the Ottoman Empire itself was 
accorded only a minor role, relevant only because of its apparent subservience to Germany. 
Together, these chapters paint a notably Germano-centric picture of the Ottoman 
Empire and Britain’s war in the East. Present efforts to expand scholarly discussion beyond the 
conventional narrative of a self-contained Anglo-German conflict towards a global history of 
a ‘world war’ are admirable, giving new impetus to studying otherwise obscured aspects of the 
conflict, such as those explored in this thesis. However, whether or not those contemporaries 
following the news at home did so with the globalised, transnational perspective scholars now 
favour should not be overlooked. Indeed, this thesis’ attempt to move ‘beyond the red poppy-
covered corner of a mythic Western Front where Britain sent its sons to die’ into a more 
globalised view of the conflict, as Susan Grayzel suggests is necessary,76 only highlights 
Germany’s centrality to the press’ understanding of the First World War. 
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Chapter One 
The Ottoman Road to War and the Emergence of a German Vassal State 
 
The Ottoman Empire entered the First World War (informally) on 29 October 1914 when its 
fleet bombarded several Russian Black Sea ports without provocation or a formal declaration 
of war. Cardiff’s Western Mail explained this as the culmination of an extended campaign of 
German intrigue and bribery which had been ‘so violent and persistent that Turkey can hardly 
be said to have survived as an independent sovereign state: rather it must be said that she passed 
under the suzerainty of Germany, who dictated both her foreign policy and her military 
policy.’1 Aberdeen’s Evening Express agreed that ‘for the purposes of war Turkey has virtually 
become a German province’.2 Such arguments have not gone unnoticed, although this chapter 
argues that they have been greatly misunderstood. Kayalı suggests that ‘notions that the 
Ottoman were hapless pawns in Germany’s sinister war designs’ emerged from nefarious 
propaganda designed ‘to aggrandize the German menace and denounce German perfidy.’3 
Those who have viewed these assertions as sincere have been equally dismissive. Kate Ariotti 
attributes identical arguments in the Australian press to simple Orientalist stereotypes of 
Turkish ‘backwardness’, which viewed Ottoman statesmen as easily manipulable by a 
‘superior’ European power.4 Claims of German dominance were demonstrably false.5 
However, were they not kneejerk reactions, grounded in little more than racial prejudice.  
 This chapter offers the first serious consideration of why contemporary newspapers 
believed the Ottoman Empire had become a vassal state of Germany through detailed analysis 
of its hitherto unexamined reporting on the Ottoman Porte’s months of formal neutrality from 
August to November 1914. From the outset, press interest in Ottoman affairs was remarkably 
Germano-centric. Confronted with repeated assurances from Ottoman officials of their strict 
neutrality, alongside their increasingly pro-German actions, the press presumed a factional 
struggle within the CUP against German efforts to compel them into the conflict. Its eventual 
decision to enter into hostilities with the Allies was considered so irrational, and so heavily 
opposed by the majority of Ottoman statesmen who supposedly desired peace, that it could 
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only be explained through the complete triumph of German influence over Constantinople. 
Though traditional Orientalist stereotypes perhaps made this narrative easier to accept, giving 
them undue primacy obscures its true significance. This was found in its Germano-centrism 
and implication that Germans, not Turks, were the true enemy in the East, recurring themes of 
press coverage of the Ottoman Empire throughout the war. 
 
Goeben and Breslau 
 
For UK observers, the most pivotal event in the Ottoman Empire’s transition from neutrality 
to belligerence was the entry of two German vessels, the Goeben and Breslau, into the 
Dardanelles on 10 August 1914. International law required the Ottoman Empire, as a neutral 
power, to intern and dismantle the ships within twenty-four hours. Instead, the Grand Vizier 
informed Britain's chargé d’affairs in Constantinople, Henry Beaumont, that the Ottomans had 
‘purchased’ the vessels to replace the two Ottoman dreadnoughts, Reshadieh and Sultan 
Osman, under construction in London, which had been controversially requisitioned for the 
Royal Navy by Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty.6 When the Breslau was 
sunk and the Goeben heavily damaged in the Battle of Imbros on 20 January 1918, the 
Observer’s naval correspondent, Gerard Fiennes, reflected that ‘no two ships in the world’s 
history have ever exercised so malefic an influence on world politics.’ With Germany’s ‘newest 
and most powerful battle-cruiser’ at Constantinople’s gates, the city had come under complete 
German coercion. ‘Imagine the effect of an alien battle-cruiser lying off Westminster Bridge if 
we were a feeble sea Power’, Fiennes explained, ‘and the influence of the Goeben may be 
imagined.’ Finding a direct link from their entry into the Dardanelles to the Ottoman Empire’s 
belligerence and ‘the hecatombs of Gallipoli’, he argued that the Royal Navy permitting these 
vessels to escape from Messina was ‘the costliest mistake we ever made’.7 This interpretation 
was presented with greater levity in a fictionalised letter to the Kaiser from Ottoman War 
Minister Enver Pasha, written in Punch by renowned satirist R.C. Lehmann. Expressing his 
regret for allegedly conspiring with the Germans to embroil the Ottoman Empire in the conflict, 
Lehman’s Enver writes that the Ottoman Empire might have had the respite and recovery it so 
desperately needed after its humiliating defeat in the Balkan Wars, ‘while others endured 
privation and loss’, had it remained neutral. Yet, ‘from the day the Goeben arrived off 
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Constantinople we were doomed. That, indeed, was a master-stroke on your part, but for us it 
has meant misery on an ever-increasing scale.’8 Even Churchill, who was judged particularly 
responsible for the Goeben and Breslau affair for his requisition of the Ottoman dreadnoughts,9 
reflected in his post-war memoirs that the Goeben’s entry into the Dardanelles brought ‘the 
peoples of the East and Middle East more slaughter, more misery and more ruin than has ever 
before been borne within the compass of a ship.’10 
Its diplomatic importance was not lost on the Foreign Office. Concerns about Turkey’s 
possession of these German-manned vessels were expressed in nearly twenty telegrams 
exchanged between the Foreign Office and the British Embassy throughout August.11 It was 
feared that the Goeben and Breslau might serve as vehicles through which Germany could 
strengthen its political presence in Constantinople and, perhaps, attempt a coup d'état, installing 
the pro-German Enver as dictator.12 Aware that Germany was ‘recklessly striving to force the 
Turks into declaring war on Russia’, British Ambassador to Constantinople, Sir Louis Mallet, 
thought that they might also be directed against the Russians, compelling the Allies to declare 
war on the Ottoman Empire and thus bringing them into the conflict on the side of the Central 
Powers.13 In support of these fears, the Goeben and Breslau, despite their new Turkish names 
(Yavuz Sultan Selim and Midilli respectively), retained their German officers and crews in the 
face of repeated insistence by Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey that they be removed. The 
ships thus remained, according to naval commentators like the Daily Telegraph’s Archibald 
Hurd, ‘German in all respects—of German construction and German manned, and responsible 
to the orders of the German Naval Staff at Berlin.’14 
Mallet would be greatly criticised for his general misreading of the diplomatic situation 
in Constantinople, especially his ignorance of the Ottoman-German treaty and his consequently 
misplaced faith in Turkey’s commitment to neutrality.15 In this instance, however, he had 
accurately appraised Germany’s intentions. The sale was wholly fictitious; the reported 18 
million marks never changed hands. The Ottoman-German alliance had been formed on the 
understanding that Turkey would attack Russia to relieve pressure on the Central Powers in the 
east and Berlin had been pushing for such an action to be made in the Black Sea by the Turkish 
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navy, strengthened by the Goeben and Breslau, since mid-August.16 Indeed, Berlin gifted the 
ships hoping that it would strengthen the Ottoman Porte’s uncertain commitment to their 
alliance and, in the German Chancellor’s words, ‘render Ottoman neutrality untenable’.17 
 UK newspapers were not as quick to grasp its significance. Throughout August, only 
The Times gave its diplomatic ramifications serious considerations and its remarks were largely 
theoretical musings on the rights and obligations of neutral states in wartime. Though it 
cautioned that Turkey’s conduct ‘must be watched closely and with some anxiety’, it was 
confident that the Ottoman Empire, guided by the ‘more enlightened Turkish statesmen’, would 
remain neutral.18 Other papers were aware of the specifics of the Porte’s diplomatic faux pas. 
The Times’ legal correspondent’s verdict that the sale was a ‘transparent artifice designed to 
avert [the Goeben and Breslau’s] capture or internment’ undertaken against the ‘generally 
accepted rule as to the transfer of private vessels to neutrals’ laid out in the Declaration of 
London seems to have been widely read, being directly quoted by several newspapers.19 These 
matters were, however, strictly theoretical, as the Foreign Office, which was suspicious of the 
press and consequently ‘chary with its news’,20 ensured that newspapers were unclear as to 
whether the sale had even taken place. The Foreign Office informed Reuters that it had ‘no 
confirmation’ behind the vessels’ presence in the Dardanelles, despite having received 
precisely this confirmation from Beaumont two days prior.21 Meanwhile, the Turkish Embassy 
in London professed complete ignorance of the transaction.22 In the confusion, Ireland’s Cork 
Examiner withheld its commentary, considering it ‘unfruitful to discuss the probable effects’ 
of a sale which, as far as it knew, lacked official confirmation.23 This uncertainty was shared 
across the examined newspapers, with only the Edinburgh Evening News stating definitively 
that the transaction had occurred.24  
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 This recalled the press’ failure to adequately grasp the significance of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand’s assassination which ultimately caused the First World War. Adam James Bones 
shows that, after brief interest in the assassination itself, ‘no coverage of the escalating Austrian 
and Serbian crisis was evident across July’ within British national dailies until Austria-
Hungary’s ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July.25 Bones attributes the press’ apparent indifference 
partly to the Foreign Office’s refusal to inform newspapers of these diplomatic developments, 
seen also in the Goeben and Breslau affair. They were also overshadowed by what were 
considered more pressing affairs, chiefly (although not exclusively) highly contentious partisan 
debates around whether Ireland should be granted home rule.26 Similarly, though not 
overshadowed completely, the press only cared about the Goeben and Breslau affair insofar as 
it related to Britain’s war with Germany, which had begun just 6 days prior.  
Initial coverage was jubilant, celebrating the Royal Navy’s success in cornering the 
German cruisers in the Dardanelles and apparently forcing Germany to ‘sell the vessels [rather] 
than have them lying useless for the rest of the war.’27 ‘So great apparently is the fear which 
the British Fleet inspires’, wrote the Scotsman, ‘that the Goeben and the Breslau, before 
surrendering to Turkey, allowed themselves to be chased by two British cruisers, not equal to 
them in armament strength, rather than risk an engagement.’28 The fact that the Ottoman fleet 
now greatly outclassed its Russian counterpart – Reuters warned that the Goeben was ‘so 
superior to any ship in the Black Sea fleet of Russia that she could easily destroy any of the 
Russian vessels almost without danger to herself’ – did little to dampen their spirits.29 Press 
commentators were confident, given numerous reports stating (falsely) that the Goeben’s 
German officers and crew had departed at the Allies request and would instead be manned by 
Turks,30 that the ships would cause the Allies no harm. For Hurd, it was a ‘matter of small 
consequence’ whether the Turks had acquired the Goeben because he found it ‘difficult to 
imagine a strange crew of Turks taking such a monster triumph of mechanical science to sea 
and using it in the only effective way—in swift offence. It would be like giving a mischievous 
boy a box of fireworks.’31 Prime Minister Herbert Asquith was similarly dismissive. Upon 
learning of the sale in a Cabinet meeting, he wrote to his confidant Venetia Stanley that ‘it 
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doesn’t matter much… as the Turkish sailors cannot navigate [the Goeben] – except on to rocks 
or mines’.32 
Despite its obvious racism, this assessment was not without basis. The Turkish navy 
was in a desperate state, having been disbanded by Sultan Abdul Hamid in the late-nineteenth 
century, while subsequent internal attempts to rebuild the fleet were hampered by corruption. 
Though the Young Turks did invite Britain, the world’s premier naval power, to help reorganise 
their fleet, poor relations between the British Naval Mission and the Turkish Admiralty, 
coupled with numerous German attempts to undermine Britain’s position, meant that for most 
of its duration it achieved very little.33 The Irish Independent recalled that the Ottoman navy 
had refused an earlier offer to purchase the Goeben in 1912 because ‘the Turkish naval officers 
and crew were not sufficiently trained to handle such a vessel.’34 Though the Turkish sailors 
who had been trained in England to operate the Reshadieh and Sultan Osman were free to 
return to Constantinople after the dreadnoughts’ requisition, it was considered doubtful 
‘whether even these men are sufficient in number or in experience’ to manage ‘so complicated 
a piece of machinery as the Goeben.’35 
By the end of August, it became apparent that the sale was more than a desperate 
attempt by Germany to mitigate a humiliating naval defeat. Reports that several hundred 
German troops had been sighted in Bulgaria en route to Constantinople convinced numerous 
outlets that an Ottoman declaration of war was imminent.36 It then became apparent to a 
Scotsman correspondent that the press’ hitherto jubilant and self-congratulatory discussion 
betrayed a fundamental ‘misapprehension’ of the sale’s significance, which would ‘never have 
been contemplated by Germany except as part of her plans for war.’ He recalled that the 
possibility of the Ottoman navy purchasing the Goeben was widely discussed on his visit to 
Constantinople in mid-May, which he took as evidence that Germany had planned to use the 
Goeben to persuade the Porte into a military alliance in preparation for the coming conflict.37 
Turkish newspapers were indeed openly discussing this possibility at that time,38 but it is 
unlikely that that Goeben’s visit to Constantinople in May 1914 carried any such plans. Leaving 
aside the supposition that Germany was preparing to instigate a general European war prior to 
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July 1914, a classic subject of debate,39 it was Enver, not any German official, who first 
proposed the sale, and not until after the war had begun.40 These errors aside, it is clear that the 
Ottoman acquisition of the Goeben and Breslau was of little interest in its own right and only 
concerned UK newspapers when, in late August, they began, like foreign officials before them, 
to situate it within a German plot to assume political dominance in Constantinople and force 
the Ottoman Empire into the war.  
 
Between War and Peace 
 
Unbeknownst to these commentators, the Ottoman Empire had already committed to an 
alliance with Germany. Ottoman statesmen saw in the ‘July Crisis’ of 1914 a unique 
opportunity to free the Ottoman Empire from its diplomatic isolation and establish a strategic 
alliance with one of Europe’s great powers and, having failed to secure an entente with Britain 
and France, the Porte formalised such an arrangement with Germany, after a series of 
negotiations from 22 July to 27 July, on 2 August.41 At the same time, they had no interest in 
jeopardising the Ottoman Empire’s political future by actually entering the war and, 
accordingly, kept their alliance with Germany secret from international observers. The Daily 
Telegraph’s Constantinople correspondent recalled that Interior Minister Talaat Bey and the 
Grand Vizier, alongside other notable Ottoman statesmen (with the important exception of 
Enver) had proudly resisted German propositions for an alliance, backed by concerted 
propaganda efforts, and declared the Ottoman Empire’s strict neutrality before Parliament.42 
This farcical display took place on 2 August, the very day these supposed advocates for 
neutrality signed their alliance with Germany. It remained secret until September 1917 when 
finally revealed through a Greek ‘white book’. Included amongst the assorted diplomatic 
documents was a telegram from the Greek Minister at Berlin dated 4 August 1914, which 
informed King Constantine I that the German Foreign Minister had ‘confirmed to me, under 
the seal of absolute secrecy, the conclusion of an alliance between Turkey and Germany.’43  
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 The Porte’s diplomatic manoeuvres reflected these interests. Mustafa Aksakal likens its 
actions during this period to Penelope’s rouse with her suitors in the Greek epic the Odyssey. 
Just as Penelope promised to choose a new husband after she finished her burial shroud, which 
she unwove every night, so the Ottoman statesmen claimed they only needed a little more time 
before they could join the war on Germany’s side, while taking every step to renege on their 
commitment. It was only when it became clear that Germany would not hold out any longer 
that the Ottoman Empire finally entered the war at the end of October 1914.44 In the interim, it 
sought to both appease Germany and refrain from antagonising Britain and its allies , adopting 
a routine of accompanying their ‘flagrant violations of international law’ with repeated official 
affirmations of neutrality.45 After the attack on Russia seemingly revealed the Ottoman 
Empire’s true intentions, Dundee’s Courier and Argus described the Porte’s foreign policy as 
one of ‘pseudo-neutrality’.46 For Sir Edward Cook, formerly editor of the Daily News and later 
joint director of the Press Bureau, the diplomatic correspondence between the British Embassy 
and the Foreign Office during these months, which was published as a white book in November 
1914, proved this analysis. They revealed ‘a tale on the one hand of great patience and 
forbearance on the side of the Allies, and on the other hand of great duplicity, or at any rate of 
markedly double dealing, on the part of the Turkish Government.’47  
This was an accurate appraisal of the diplomatic situation, but it was not how these 
events were interpreted by press commentators as they unfolded between August and October 
1914. Instead, journalists saw this discrepancy between the Porte’s words and actions as 
evidence of an internal division within the Ottoman Cabinet regarding their foreign policy. On 
the one hand was an anti-interventionist ‘peace party’, comprised of seemingly every Ottoman 
statesmen of consequence, including Talaat, Finance Minister Djavid, Naval Minister Djemal, 
and the Grand Vizier himself. The one exception was Enver who, together with some nameless 
associates, made up the ‘war party’. The Ottoman Empire’s foreign policy was understood to 
be in a state of flux, favouring neutrality or intervention depending on which faction was 
dominant at a given moment. 
Initially, Enver’s faction was believed to be operating entirely independently of external 
German pressure. It was understood that Enver’s ambitions were directed towards Greece for 
the recovery of Salonika, a city on the Aegean coast that had been part of the Ottoman Empire 
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for nearly 500 years before being ceded to Greece in 1912 after the First Balkan War. Salonika 
held particular significance for the CUP as the birthplace of the Young Turk revolution that 
saw their ascension to power. Enver having personally achieved his fame as the ‘Hero of the 
Revolution’ in Salonika, The Times reasoned that it would be ‘intolerable’ for him that this city 
should ‘remain in foreign and in Christian hands.’48 The available evidence seemed to support 
this view. Ottoman forces had mobilised in early August as a ‘precautionary’ measure to defend 
against a potential Greek invasion, with 200-220,000 troops to be stationed at the Empire’s 
Thracian border.49 The Ottoman Ambassador to Paris claimed that the purchase of the Goeben 
and Breslau was another such precautionary step, necessary to achieve step to achieve naval 
parity with Greece.50 That the Breslau was renamed the Midilli, the Turkish name for the city 
of Mytilene, which had also been ceded to Greece after the Balkan Wars, was seen as a less-
than-subtle hint of their intentions.51 Since these objectives were of no obvious German 
interest, the Manchester Guardian ‘did not suppose for a moment’ that they were ‘influenced 
by any sentimental sympathy with Germany’.52 
After press attention moved towards German efforts to disrupt Ottoman neutrality in 
late August, however, the war party and, especially, Enver himself, came to be seen as 
subservient instruments of German imperial ambitions. Germany’s guiding hand in its 
manoeuvres was identified most clearly in an article by the Daily Telegraph’s diplomatic 
correspondent, published on 1 October, warning of imminent Anglo-Turkish hostilities due to 
a ‘very critical situation’ concerning ‘certain British ships of war’.53 Most likely this referred 
to the Porte’s request for Britain’s HMS Odin to leave the Ottoman-controlled Shatt-al-Arab 
river, its presence being declared by a violation of Ottoman neutrality. The Foreign Office’s 
unwillingness to acquiesce, pointing to the hypocrisy of the Porte’s sudden championship of 
the laws of neutrality, led the Vali of Basra to formally demand their removal on 3 October.54 
This was the latest in a series of ‘unfriendly’ acts undertaken by the Porte under ‘the ascendency 
of Enver Pasha’ over the preceding months (following the purchase of the Goeben and Breslau, 
the invitation of German troops into Constantinople, the mobilisation of the Ottoman army in 
Syria, and the closing of the Dardanelles) all of which, it was ‘perfectly obvious’ to the 
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Telegraph, had been urged by German counsel, whose ‘malign influence’ could ‘be seen at 
every step’.55 Similarly, the Porte’s abolition of the ‘capitulations’, a series of treaties granting 
additional rights to Europeans in the Ottoman Empire, struck The Times as especially Germanic 
as an ‘Oriental application of the “scrap of paper” doctrine’.56 This referred to Germany’s 
violation of the Treaty of London through its invasion of neutral Belgium in August 1914 
which, formally at least, brought Britain into the war.57 The German Chancellor’s justification 
for this manoeuvre – that the treaty was a mere ‘scrap of paper’ – featured prominently in early 
British propaganda to show Germany’s disregard for not only international treaties but the legal 
underpinnings of European civilisation itself, before giving way to less abstract atrocity 
narratives.58 
In fact, no dispute between pro-German and pro-neutral factions over the Ottoman 
response to the First World War existed. Djemal’s memoir’s reveal that leading members of 
the supposed peace party, Talaat and the Grand Vizier, had not only approved of the alliance 
with Germany but had in fact taken part prominently in the negotiations.59 Likewise, Djemal, 
who was understood at one point to be the faction’s leader,60 admitted to having voiced no 
opposition to the alliance and, ultimately, ‘entirely approved the new situation thus created.’61 
An ardent Francophile who had unsuccessfully approached Britain and France for an entente 
in July 1914, Djemal saw no other course available for the ‘sick man of Europe’ to secure its 
national security and recovery to prosperity. When asked by Talaat for his thoughts on an 
agreement with Germany, Djemal replied: ‘I should not hesitate to accept any alliance which 
rescued Turkey from her present position of isolation.’62 The press was not simply mistaken as 
to who comprised the two factions. Following Yusuf Hikmet Bayur’s highly influential three-
volume Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi (History of the Turkish Revolution), blame has traditionally been 
placed on the so-called Young Turk Triumvirate of Enver, Talaat and Djemal who supposedly 
acted against the knowledge or wishes of their colleagues. While this interpretation remains 
particular attractive in Turkey, Mustafa Aksakal’s comprehensive analysis of Ottoman foreign 
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policy during this time suggests that support for an Ottoman-German alliance was much more 
widespread than conventionally assumed.63  
This confusion was actively encouraged by Ottoman statesmen themselves, whose 
desires to avoid conflict with Britain and its allies were well-served by blaming Germany for 
their antagonistic foreign policy. Thus, the Grand Vizier did nothing to correct Ambassador 
Mallet’s belief that Constantinople was ‘nothing more nor less than an armed German camp’ 
where all ‘were at the mercy of Liman Pasha and the Minister of War’ but only deepened his 
convictions. He assured the Ambassador that ‘more adherents were joining the peace party 
every day’ and that measures were in place to prevent Enver’s war party from leading the 
Ottoman Empire into war.64 Why, though, were both foreign officials and UK newspapers so 
willing to accept these false claims when so much evidence existed to the contrary? 
 
The Rationale 
 
As noted, where historians have addressed claims of Ottoman subservience to Germany as 
more than simply nefarious propaganda, they have attributed them to Orientalist stereotypes of 
Turkish ‘backwardness’. This casts the above press commentary as less a genuine (if 
misguided) interpretation of Ottoman-German relations than an expression of typical early-
twentieth-century anti-Turkish racism. Though appealing, this reading ignores the identical 
claims made of Germany’s European allies, which place the ostensibly Orientalist narrative of 
German domination within the press’ Germano-centric conception of the Central Powers as a 
whole. As the Daily Telegraph explained, the alliance was believed to be under: 
 
the single intense control of Berlin, unified to the highest degree… the “dear allies” are 
as much the vassals of the Kaiser as the Kings of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemburg 
[sic]. There is but one will, one purpose, one design… minister[ing] to the grandiose 
designs of Germany.65 
 
Claims that leading political figures were but ‘highly-placed agents’ of Germany were also not 
unique to the Ottoman Empire. Cardiff’s Western Mail laid similar charges against Queen 
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Sophia of Greece, Empress Alexandria of Russia and Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, alongside 
various high-ranking politicians in these countries. It also suspected that ‘German agents of 
varying status are probably to be found in every country in the world’; this was an ‘essential 
feature of German tactics… in foreign countries.’66  
Nonetheless, the Ottoman Empire was certainly considered the most subservient 
partner, perhaps for Orientalist reasons. The Times explained that an Austro-Hungarian official, 
as ‘a mere agent’ of Germany without ‘a will of his own’, ‘might almost be a Turk’.67 
Additionally some evidence suggests that Orientalist stereotypes made claims of German 
domination more believable in the Ottoman case. The Daily Telegraph found it ‘just possible 
to believe’ that the naval attack on Russia occurred ‘without authority from the Sultan’s 
Ministers’ because the Ottoman Empire was ‘without any attribute of government but the 
name’.68 Likewise, the European belief that the Turkish ‘oriental mind’ was particularly 
‘susceptible to corruption and sloth’, as discussed by Jeremy Salt,69 clearly influenced the 
novelist-propagandist E.F. Benson’s account of the Ottoman road to war. In his 1918 book 
Crescent and Iron Cross, written at the request of Britain’s War Propaganda Bureau at 
Wellington House, Benson explained that Germany ‘had thoroughly grasped the salient fact 
that to make any way with Oriental peoples your purse must be open and your backshish [sic] 
unlimited’, referring to the Eastern practice of alms-giving which was associated with bribery 
and political corruption.70 Clearly, Orientalism played some role, although it was not the 
guiding consideration as previously assumed. Examining further aspects of the press’ narrative 
which lend themselves especially well to an Orientalist reading demonstrates this, while also 
elucidating the underlying rationale behind this narrative of German domination.  
Firstly, while nearly all Turkish statesmen were considered sufficiently ‘wise’ and 
‘enlightened’ to see that neutrality was in their best interests, these privileging terms were 
applied to them for recognising their own inferiority to Western powers and their consequent 
inability to meaningfully contribute to a German victory. The terror the Turks’ march to the 
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gates of Vienna had spread throughout Europe in the seventeenth century had long abided.71 
By the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had become the ‘sick man of Europe’, a 
crumbling state which owed its continued existence as a political entity to the European powers 
who saw its collapse as a threat to their own international security.72 Racist language abounded 
within contemporary assessments of Turkish martial abilities. Commenting in 1913 on the 
Ottoman Empire’s disastrous defeat in the First Balkan War, the Daily Telegraph’s Ellis 
Ashmead-Bartlett argued that Turks, once a ‘fanatical and courageous race’ bred of the 
‘blending of the warlike autocracy of the Mongols with the religion of the ascetic Arabs of the 
desert’, had dramatically declined in military prowess after settling in Constantinople, where 
they came into contact with ‘the most effete and corrupt civilisation the world has ever seen’, 
the Byzantines.73 While Turks continued to show ‘astonishing courage and endurance’ when 
defending, this meant little, given the ‘cult of the offensive’ which dominated European 
military thought at this time. Ashmead-Bartlett noted that the Ottoman army had been easily 
defeated whenever it ‘essayed an offensive movement of any kind’, owing to poor training at 
both the enlisted and officer levels and a ‘general deficiency of any form of military 
organisation’.74  
The Edinburgh Evening News reiterated these sentiments in November 1914. It argued 
that while, theoretically, ‘the mischief which Turkey can inflict or will attempt to do is 
considerable’, being in a position to cut off Allied trade routes through the Black Sea and the 
Suez Canal, these ‘prophecies of evil have been much abated by the slowness of the Turk.’ 
Given the contemporary belief in ‘martial races’, which attributed military prowess (or, in the 
Turkish case, ineptitude) to racial characteristics, there was little possibility the Turkish army, 
under German instruction, would revise its military fortunes and threaten the Allied position in 
the future. ‘Even German officers’, the paper remarked, ‘will not pull this military rabble 
together.’75 The Young Turks’ pre-war efforts to reform its forces on the Prussian model and 
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Occidentalise the Turkish army had even worsened its reputation for Ashmead-Bartlett. Defeat 
in the Balkan Wars proved that these ‘Oriental Occidentals’ had, through their secularising 
ethos, destroyed the ‘primitive fighting virtues of an Oriental race’ that had ‘so often saved the 
Empire from complete disaster and disruption in the past.’76 Even Lancashire papers were 
complacent. Though the 42nd Division’s deployment in Egypt made ‘the imminence of 
Turkey’s participation in the war’ in early November a matter of ‘special interest for Burnley 
and East Lancashire’, the Burnley Express assured readers that ‘relatives of our Territorials 
need not be anxious’.77 This was not merely to encourage public morale for, as discussed 
below,78 Burnley papers were more than willing to fearmonger about the potentially 
catastrophic effect of Anglo-Turkish hostilities on the local economy. Within the examined 
sources, only an Essex County Chronicle columnist put any faith in the German military 
mission’s ability to improve the Turkish army, warning that Britons would ‘err… if we treat 
the military qualities of the Turks as a negligible quality.’79  
This warning seems prophetic. David French attributes Britain’s disastrous failure to 
best the Turks and capture Constantinople in Churchill’s infamous Dardanelles campaign 
partly to inadequate preparations owing to Asquith and his War Council’s ‘belief in the innate 
inferiority of Asiatic troops.’80 This overlooks, firstly, that racist convictions in the necessary 
superiority of European forces had already been refuted a decade earlier when a European 
power was thoroughly defeated by a supposedly inferior ‘Oriental’ one in the Russo-Japanese 
War. The Times’ military correspondent, Charles à Court Repington, believed that the ‘vain 
and haughty rulers of the mighty Russian Empire’ were victims of their own racial prejudice 
since, by foolishly dismissing the Japanese as merely ‘yellow pagans’ and ‘monkeys with the 
brains of birds’, they had ‘failed to understand the character of her foe’ and the serious threat 
Japan posed to Russia.81 Patrick Porter shows that numerous senior British military officers, 
including the future commander of British forces at Gallipoli, General Sir Ian Hamilton, even 
sought to apply elements of Japanese military doctrine themselves.82 Secondly, Warren 
Dockter stresses that for Churchill, at least, it was not that the Turks’ ‘Oriental’ qualities 
rendered them necessarily inept in warfare (Churchill was himself a Turcophile), but rather that 
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Turkish forces had been easily defeated in their first engagements with Britain in late 1914 and 
early 1915.83  
In the recent Balkan Wars, too, the Ottoman Empire suffered approximately 340,000 
casualties, over three times those of its adversaries in the Balkan League and, more 
humiliatingly, ceded all its land in Europe except for a small section of Eastern Thrace to the 
various Balkan states, amounting to 60,000 square miles and nearly 4,000,000 subjects.84 This 
reflected especially poorly on the German military mission, which was so ridiculed in Britain 
for its role in training these forces that Field Marshal Colmar von der Goltz, Germany’s chief 
military advisor in Constantinople, wrote to England’s Fortnightly Review seeking to absolve 
himself and his colleagues of responsibility.85 One such lampooning from September 1913 was 
reproduced in Punch shortly after the Ottoman Empire entered the war. Captioned ‘the decisive 
defeat of the Turk by the Greeks and their Allies is a bitter blow to Germany’, it depicted a 
smirking Greek King informing an embarrassed Kaiser that ‘our success was, as you know, 
entirely due to you’, referring, as the Kaiser explains to the reader, to ‘our organisation of the 
Turkish army.’ Through its title, ‘Deutschland ueber Alles’, it presented the Ottoman Empire’s 
defeat in the Balkan Wars as a repudiation of Germany’s own nationalistic boasts of greatness 
present in the Deutschlandlied: ‘Deutschland über Alles, über Alles in der Welt’ (Germany 
above all, Germany above all in the world).86 The poor regard in which the above commentators 
held the Turkish army and their scepticism regarding the success of the German military 
mission, for all their clear and objectionable racist overtones, were not unreasonable in light of 
its recent military performance. 
Importantly, it was believed that the predicted attack on Greece would amount to a 
renewal of the Balkan Wars in which the Ottoman Empire and the German military mission 
had been so humiliated. It was expected that numerous Balkan states, if not a fully reformed 
Balkan League, would join the Allies in order to prevent a resurgent Ottoman Empire in the 
Balkans and to seize the remaining Turkish territory in Europe.87 It is impossible to know 
whether a Turkish incursion into the Balkans would have elicited this response, but, as very 
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little left of Turkey’s European possessions remained to take, it seems unlikely. Bulgaria and 
Romania were, instead, concerned with national unification and were willing to join whichever 
side would give them the land required to consolidate their national borders. Thus, Bulgaria 
joined the Central Powers in October 1915 because they were offered the immediate annexation 
of all Macedonia, while Romania joined the Allies in August 1916 because the Romanian-
populated lands of Austria-Hungary were more desirable than the economically-undeveloped 
region of Bessarabia held by Russia. Only for Greece, who desired the Greek-populated regions 
of Western Anatolia, did these nationalist ambitions oppose them to the Ottoman Empire, yet 
a powerful faction led by King Constantine I, nonetheless, opposed an alliance with the Entente 
and it was not until June 1917, following an Allied-backed, pro-Entente coup, that they 
declared war on the Central Powers.88 Regardless, the Daily Telegraph’s Constantinople 
correspondent believed that it was precisely this reasoning that prompted the Ottoman 
Government’s initial declaration of neutrality: ‘Experience has shown them that their Balkan 
enemies, for the moment divided among themselves, would probably end by reconstituting 
their alliance and falling on the Turks, and agreeing among themselves as to the partition of 
Turkey in Europe.’89 In these circumstances, The Times advised neutrality as ‘the only course 
[that] is possible’ for the Porte, ‘so manifestly and so imperiously do her interests dictate it.’90 
Its ‘wanton intervention’ on the side of the Central Powers could only end in the Ottoman 
Empire’s ‘dismemberment and ruin’ and the expulsion of ‘the Turk’ from Europe.91 This was 
even more true in late October, when the Ottomans finally joined the war. Following a series 
of Russian victories in the East and the liberation of Antwerp in the West, Allied victory 
seemed all but inevitable. Joining the Central Powers at this juncture was ‘a preceding of which 
words can scarcely describe the folly,’ and one from which Germany was the only clear 
beneficiary.92 
Germany’s success in bringing the Ottoman Empire into the war nonetheless was, 
supposedly, through a concerted propaganda conveying a false impression of the Central 
Powers’ prospects for victory. On 7 September 1914, for example, the Northcliffe press 
discovered reports in Turkish newspapers of a speech by dissenting Liberal MP John Burns 
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expressing serious doubts about Britain’s prospects for victory against German industrial 
might. The Times believed this was ‘obviously composed for Turkish consumption’ by 
Germany, having previously appeared in numerous German papers, and the Daily Mail quickly 
determined its fraudulence by simply questioning Burns himself.93 The Daily Telegraph’s 
Constantinople correspondent recalled hearing similar ‘wild rumours’ disseminating from the 
German embassy when the war began, including ‘that M. Poincare had been assassinated, that 
civil war had broken out in France, that the Germans had entered Belgium triumphantly, and… 
that the German and Austrian armies would very soon be both in Paris and Warsaw.’94 The 
Manchester Guardian believed these false stories created an environment wherein Turkey’s 
foreign policy debates were conducted ‘under a general impression that German arms were 
easily carrying the day and that there would be a bad time after the war for anybody who had 
not been Germany’s friend’.95 It was thought that any Turkish declaration of war would, given 
the apparently overwhelming likelihood of an Allied victory, be attributable to this German 
propaganda. ‘It would be a curious tragedy’, wrote the Guardian, ‘if, after all the vicissitudes 
of its long, wonderful history, the Ottoman Empire in Europe were to die of false news.’96 
This did not, as might first appear, simply express further Orientalist stereotypes of 
Turkish credulity. Instead, they pointed to broader concerns, predating the war, about official 
German efforts to compete with London-based international news outlets like Reuters to ensure 
that pro-German narratives appear in foreign newspapers.97 This included an attempt to arrange 
a deal with Reuters whereby all news pertaining to Germany would be obtained exclusively 
through a company established by leading German industrialists for the ‘conveniently vague 
purpose’ of ‘furthering the German industrial prestige abroad’.98 Reuters’ allegiances were 
considered highly suspect during the war given its owners’ German origins, even though its 
present owner, Baron Herbert de Reuter, had lived in Britain his entire life and supported the 
war unequivocally as necessary to destroy ‘the unspeakable blight of German military 
tyranny’.99 Ironically, its claims to objectivity in its wartime reporting were undermined in 
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precisely the opposite direction through its inclination to support official British narratives and 
its possible connections to government propaganda.100 Unfounded though these criticisms 
were, they reveal broader fears concerning the influence such ‘fake news’ exercised over which 
faction these neutral powers were likely to join, including European nations. Only two days 
after the fabricated defeatist speech was found in the Turkish press, Lindsay Bashford, the 
Daily Mail’s Milan correspondent, found similarly false reports from Berlin of a ‘complete 
German victory’ over a British position in Belgium ‘in every edition of every newspaper in 
Italy.’ These were left unchallenged for four days before the correct account, wherein ‘the 
English troops had defended their position with superb courage against an enormously superior 
force’, was received from Britain, leading Bashford to fear that this ‘frantic campaign of lies’ 
might compel Italy, then neutral, to join the Central Powers. ‘Telegrams from England take 
four days to reach us’, a similarly concerned Italian newspaper recorded; ‘telegrams from 
Berlin take two hours.’101 
For all the above rationale, it remains that the press accepted the Porte’s self-serving 
narrative with remarkably little critical reflection. Curiously, the correct, and perhaps more 
obvious, reading of the reports emerging from the Ottoman Empire, suggesting an Ottoman-
German alliance, was given little consideration. There was doubtless an element of simple 
wishful thinking involved. Officials’ willingness to tolerate the Porte’s repeated violations of 
neutrality for three months shows how greatly they desired the Ottoman Empire to remain out 
of the conflict. These concerns were relayed to press editors and journalists by the Foreign 
Office, who emphasised, via the Press Bureau, ‘the diplomatic importance of allowing nothing 
to appear in the press which is likely to produce an unfavourable impression in Turkey.’ 
Reminding them that ‘the preservation of the neutrality of Turkey is… a paramount British 
interest’, the Foreign Office instructed newspapers to take a ‘friendly’ line in discussing 
Turkish affairs and, in particular, to express ‘sympathy… with Turkey in her efforts to cope 
with the pressure… with which Germany is attempting to influence the exercise of her free 
discretion.’102 This ‘suppression of matter likely to prejudice Turkish neutrality’, as the Press 
Bureau called it, remained in place for the remainder of the Ottoman Empire’s neutrality, being 
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cancelled on 13 November 1914 when made redundant by the outbreak of Anglo-Turkish 
hostilities.103  
Newspapers were not always receptive to these notices, but they do seem to have taken 
this request seriously. They made remarkably little of an assassination attempt made on Liberal 
MP and President of the Balkan Committee Noel Buxton and his brother, Charles Roden 
Buxton, on 15 October 1914 by a Young Turk ‘political enthusiast’ (in co-ordination, Noel 
Buxton later suggested, with Ottoman and German officials who sought to thwart his mission 
of securing Bulgarian neutrality).104 This occurred at a time when it was becoming especially 
clear that ‘the Turkish war party, in tow of the Central Powers, is taking a growing and active 
interest in the Pan-European struggle’, as the Daily Telegraph warned the next day.105 Yet, 
while it certainly did not pass unnoticed – such a major event could not be completely omitted 
from the press and, consequently, it featured in every daily newspaper examined to some 
degree – coverage was confined to short Reuters telegrams. None mentioned the Buxtons’ 
attempted assassination in their numerous articles and editorials discussing the Ottoman 
Empire’s impending belligerence.106 Though, any discussion of editors’ reasoning is 
necessarily speculative without access to their private deliberations, this curious oversight 
seems likely the consequence of the Foreign Office’s above instructions. 
Lancashire papers were especially apprehensive about war with the Ottoman Empire. 
On 17 August, the Manchester Guardian cautioned the government against ‘press[ing] the 
whole strength of its case against Turkey’ after the illegal acquisition of the Goeben and 
Breslau, for ‘forcing Turkey into war… would be a serious blow to Lancashire’.107 The 
Ottoman Empire had long been a key importer of Lancashire cotton, including, by 1914, 
approximately one-third of all cotton produced in Burnley.108 This was the backbone of the 
local economy. Charles Macara, founder of the International Federation of Master Cotton 
Spinners and Manufactures, wrote in 1916 that he could not ‘too strongly emphasise the fact 
that cotton trade is the mainstay of all who make their living within a radius of 40 miles from 
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Manchester, no matter what their occupation may be.’109 The Burnley News prophesised, even 
before Britain entered the war, that it would be ‘the most disastrous and far reaching in its 
effects’ on the cotton trade since the American Civil War.110 A perceived ‘cotton famine’ 
caused by the Union’s blockade of the Confederate States ensured that, by the end of 1862, 
employment in the cotton industry dropped from the customary six days per week to two and 
a third, requiring one-fifth of Lancashire’s total population to draw relief. 111 The crisis was so 
dire that Abraham Lincoln thanked the ‘workingmen of Manchester’ for their sacrifice, which 
he regarded as ‘an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not been surpassed in any 
age or in any country.’112 When hostilities with the Ottoman Empire seemed inevitable in late 
October, the Burnley News gloomily reflected that ‘it would almost seem that everything that 
takes place, operates adversely to Burnley’s interests.’113 
The Scotsman appears to have sought any evidence that the Ottoman Empire would 
remain neutral. Sir Edwin Pears, the Daily News’ famed former Constantinople correspondent 
and the UK’s leading expert on Ottoman affairs,114 recalled in 1915 that it was clear to all ‘by 
the middle of October that Turkey was drifting into war.’115 The situation certainly looked 
bleak. Following reports that the Breslau and Goeben had already entered the Black Sea with 
a ’80 to 90 per cent’ German crew, The Times’ naval correspondent suggested that the ‘Turkish 
(ex-German) admiral’ hoped to engage the Russian fleet and ‘force the hand of the Ottoman 
Government and launch the Turks into the war.’116 Meanwhile, £1,000,000 worth of gold was 
said to have arrived in Constantinople from Berlin,117 and Turkish papers, ‘inspired by German 
diplomacy’, were publishing apparently false stories of British misrule in Egypt ‘for the 
purpose of blackening Great Britain in the eyes of the Moslem world.’118 Against all this 
looming evidence, a Scotsman correspondent took comfort in reports that Sultan Mehmet V 
had pronounced Prince Yusuf Izzeddin Generalissimo of both the army and navy in an effort 
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to curtail the pro-German War Minister’s influence, a ‘welcome sign’ that Enver’s ascendancy 
was at an end.119 These hopes only increased over the coming days. Reports of anti-German 
demonstrations at Adrianople proved that ‘the ordinary Turkish people, who are all 
Anglophil[e] and German haters are beginning to assert themselves.’ Only three days before 
the attack on Russia, the correspondent proudly declared that ‘there is a movement in Turkey 
which Enver Pasha has not yet succeeded in stifling, and that movement is Anglophil[e].’120 
The conflicting reports from the Ottoman Empire allowed press observers to overlook the 
correct, and perhaps more obvious, interpretation of an Ottoman-German alliance in favour of 
a more palatable conclusion.  
There was, therefore, much more behind these arguments than simple racial prejudice, 
though this was certainly present. The apparent irrationality of the Ottoman Empire entering 
another war so soon after its catastrophic defeat in the Balkan Wars, broader suspicions 
surrounding German propaganda initiatives in neutral countries, and an overly generous 
acceptance of Ottoman officials’ profession of neutrality against German intrigue all combined 
to suggest that the Porte entered the war, against its own wishes, as a subservient vassal of 
German interests. 
* * * 
 
When the Ottoman fleet finally launched its attack on Russia in late October, newspapers were 
primed to interpret it as an underhanded measure taken by Enver and his German backers who, 
having failed to persuade the Ottoman Parliament to issue a declaration of war, sought to force 
the Allies’ hand into declaring war on the Ottoman Empire themselves. Though the moderate 
Ottoman statesmen, who ‘worked hard to preserve neutrality’, had succeeded for a time, the 
provocation signalled to the Daily Mail’s Lovat Fraser that they had been ‘swept aside by Enver 
Bey and the Committee of Union and Progress’, who had ‘been bought by German gold’.121 
Accordingly, when the Grand Vizier issued a formal apology to Russia on 2 November the 
press was generally willing to accept it. Provided that Russia was adequately compensated for 
the damage done to their ports and all German influence – including the Goeben and Breslau, 
Liman von Sanders’ German military mission, and Enver’s pro-German war party – be 
expelled from Constantinople, the attack was not taken to preclude further cordial diplomatic 
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relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire nor to nullify Britain’s commitments to 
upholding Ottoman territorial integrity. As late as 4 November, the day before Britain finally 
declared war, the Irish Times believed there was ‘still time for the easy-going Turkish 
statesmen who have been dragged at the heels of this [German] intrigue to assert themselves’ 
and return the Porte to its former state of neutrality.122 Its belligerence was only confirmed with 
the announced resignation of ‘several of the more responsible members of the Turkish 
Government, who were understood to be strongly against the war.’ The peace party thus 
defeated, Constantinople became ‘wholly in the hands of the Young Turk Party and the German 
officers.’123 
This remarkable willingness to forgive the wholly unprovoked attack on Russia 
reinforces the points argued in this chapter. Clearly, claims of German dominance were more 
than either cynical propaganda or an unthinking application of conventional racist stereotypes 
regarding the presumed power imbalance between a ‘backward’ Eastern power and its 
European allies, as previously assumed. Rather, it was the culmination of a coherent narrative 
of German intrigue and Ottoman resistance, formed over the preceding months from an 
understandable (if misguided) reading of the available evidence, which blamed Germany for 
the Ottoman Empire’s descent into war. False though it was, this interpretation carried 
important consequences. Supposedly, all opposition within the Porte had been either crushed 
or converted to mere servants of German interests. By November 1914, the Ottoman Empire 
had become a vassal state of the Kaisserreich with Enver as ‘Germany’s Pro-Consul in 
Turkey’.124 Subsequently, the Young Turk leaders themselves faded into the background. 
Germano-centrism continued as the press’ dominant interpretive framework throughout the 
war, as will be explored in the next two chapters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
122 ‘Turkey’s Choice’, Irish Times, 4/11/1914, 4. See also ‘Campaign Points’, Edinburgh Evening News, 
3/11/1914, 4; ‘Germans’ Awful Losses in Flanders’, Northampton Mercury, 6/11/1914, 5. 
123 ‘Prospects of Success’, Irish Times, 5/11/1914, 4. See also ‘Marching to Death’, Burnley Express and Clitheroe 
Division Advertiser, 4/11/1914, 6. 
124 Our Former Berlin Correspondent [Frederic William Wile], ‘Germany Day by Day’, Daily Mail, 6/7/1918, 2. 
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Chapter Two 
Fighting ‘Like a White Man’: Genocide, Death Marches and the Curious 
Case of the Clean-Fighting Turk 
 
His success we must acknowledge; he has massacred, pillaged, outraged for two years 
and a half[,] he has broken every convention, maltreated our prisoners, killed our 
wounded, held our women hostages, but he remains the ‘clean fighting Turk.’ 
          
So concluded a lengthy tirade against ‘the Turk’ and his ‘spurious reputation as a clean fighter’. 
Pointing to widely-documented Ottoman atrocities, this Times article, written anonymously by 
Sir Mark Sykes, sought to alter the Turkish soldiers’ chivalric image within the UK as part of 
Wellington House’s ‘Turk Must Go’ campaign.1 As Justin McCarthy observes, the notion that 
‘Turks were “clean fighters,” who fought well and treated their British captives properly’, was 
an ‘undesirable image for an enemy.’2 McCarthy finds in such anti-Turkish propaganda 
initiatives evidence that British officials, whom he dismisses as promoters of ‘untrue or half-
true history’, fabricated accounts of Armenian massacres to further their goal of ‘painting the 
Turks in the worst possible light’.3 In fact, ample evidence exists that the Ottoman Empire 
really did commit genocide against its Armenians, a reality challenged only within the ‘bad 
faith disputes’ of ‘deniers and obfuscators’.4 Combined with their brutal treatment of British 
and Indian prisoners, most infamously those captured at Kut-al-Amara, Robin Prior credits the 
Ottoman Empire with ‘the dubious distinction of carrying out the first genocide of the twentieth 
century and inventing the death marches as well.’5  
                                                          
1 [Mark Sykes], ‘The “Clean-Fighting Turk”’, The Times, 20/2/1917, 7. For the article’s propagandist background 
and its authorship by Sykes (who identified himself only as ‘a distinguished authority on Oriental affairs’), see 
Justin McCarthy, The Turk in America: The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice (Salt Lake City, 2010), 219-222; 
McEvoy, ‘Construction of Ottoman Asia’, 122-125. 
2 McCarthy, Turk in America, 219. 
3 Sykes’ article is discussed within a chapter seeking to establish the Armenian Genocide as propagandist fiction: 
ibid., 208-248, quotations at 222. 
4 Bloxham, Great Game, 20. For useful discussions of Armenian Genocide denial, see Richard G. Hovannisian 
(ed.), Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide (Detroit, 1999); Fatma Müge Göçek, Denial 
of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789-2009 (Oxford, 
2014); Geoffrey Robertson, An Inconvenient Genocide (Sydney, 2014). 
5 Robin Prior, ‘The Ottoman Front’, in Winter (ed.), Cambridge History, vol. 1, 314. This is not strictly true: the 
first ‘honour’ belongs to Germany, who committed genocide against the Herero and Nama people of German 
South West Africa from 1904-1908. However, this does not detract from the atrociousness of Ottoman wartime 
conduct. 
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 With the curious contradiction between the ‘representation’ and the ‘reality’ of Turkish 
military conduct in mind, this chapter analyses the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ from two perspectives. 
Firstly, it considers the evidence upon which this favourable image was based. Rather than 
continuing traditional nineteenth-century Turcophilism, its genesis is traced to the first-hand 
testimonies of rank-and-file soldiers, chiefly at Gallipoli, which were further distributed 
through local newspapers. This bottom-up dissemination into public discourse was crucial for 
the endurance of the Turks’ chivalry reputation despite their misconduct elsewhere. Given the 
reverence attached to the ‘soldiers’ story’ as the definitive account of the war,6 not even anti-
Turkish critics were willing to doubt its veracity. Secondly, the chapter examines where these 
perceptions placed the Turkish enemy within the UK’s conviction that it was fighting a ‘just 
war’. This discussion is divided into two sections, examining Turkish ‘gentlemanly’ conduct 
and misconduct respectively. The frequent contrasts between chivalrous Turks and barbarous 
Germans in the sources suggest that the principle rhetorical and ideological effect of the ‘clean-
fighting Turk’ was to highlight the comparative savagery of Britain’s primary enemy and 
reinforce the popular image of the German ‘Hun’ at the centre of its ‘just war’. Criticisms of 
Turkish misconduct served the same ends. Atrocities like the Armenian Genocide were mainly 
of interest insofar as they could be tied to Germany and provide further moral justification for 
Britain’s war in Europe. Like the diplomatic developments examined last chapter, the Ottoman 
enemy was viewed with remarkable Germano-centrism. 
 
The Soldier’s Story 
 
Nadia Atia suggests that the chivalrous image of the Turkish enemy had its roots in ‘long-
entrenched attitudes’ of Turcophilism.7 This was certainly the case for Orientalists like Ellen 
Whishaw, an historian of Muslim Spain. Drawing on her pre-existing interpretation of Islam 
as a benevolent, peaceful religion and historical precedent from thirteenth-century Spain, 
Whishaw declared it a ‘very grave injustice’ to compare the ‘Saracen knights of the Age of 
Chivalry’ to the ‘German barbarians of to-day’, as the New York Times had done, for ‘the 
                                                          
6 On the ‘soldier’s story’ dominance during the war, see McCartney, Citizen Soldiers, 102. On its enduring legacy, 
see Samuel Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War (New York, 1997), 1-2; Janet S.K. 
Watson, Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory, and the First World War in Britain (Cambridge, 2004), 
185-218. 
7 Atia, World War I in Mesopotamia, 83. For discussions of this Turcophilism, see Reinhold Schiffer, Turkey 
Romanticized: Images of the Turks in Early 19th Century English Travel Literature: With an Anthology of Texts 
(Bochum, 1982) and Dogan Gürpinar, ‘The Rise and Fall of Turcophilism in Nineteenth-Century British 
Discourses: Visions of the Turk, “Young” and “Old”’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 39:3 (2012), 
347-372. 
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armies of Mahomet did not make war on women and children nor destroy defenceless cities’ 
like the Germans. She presented the Ottoman army, comprised predominantly of Muslim 
Turks,8 as following in the same tradition.9 This does not, however, account for the apparently 
broad appeal of the ‘clean-fighting Turk’. Turcophilism was previously the purview of the 
political, particularly Conservative, elite.10 Much as rank-and-file soldiers seldom saw 
themselves as crusaders, an image ‘closely associated with a very distinct, and very privileged, 
social group’,11 it is unlikely that this upper-class romanticism of ‘the Turk’ held much popular 
resonance.  
The reception of William Gladstone’s pamphlet exposing the ‘Bulgarian horrors’ of 
1876, the brutal suppression of an uprising in which some 15,000 Bulgarians were massacred 
by Ottoman authorities, supports a disconnect between upper-class Turcophilism and broader 
anti-Turkish sentiments before the war. Gladstone’s racist assertion that the Turks were ‘upon 
the whole, from the black day when they first entered Europe, the great anti-human specimen 
of humanity’ was controversial in political circles, being condemned by one Conservative 
opponent as a ‘caricature… without the shadow of a shade of foundation in fact’ and opposed 
by leading members of his own party.12 However, the widespread circulation of his pamphlet, 
which sold 200,000 copies in its first month alongside further distribution through newspapers 
and ‘pirated copies’,13 suggests that the UK public were more receptive to anti-Turkish racism 
than their political representatives. According to Victor Kiernan, Gladstone successfully 
‘revived half-forgotten memoires of older Ottoman savagery’ to be encapsulated in the popular 
phrase the ‘Unspeakable Turk’,14 recalling the enduring literary trope of the ‘Terrible Turk’.15  
                                                          
8 Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War (Westport, 2001), 
xv-xvi. 
9 [Ellen M. Whishaw], Letter: ‘Huns and Saracens’, The Times, 13/8/1915, 7, responding to ‘The Influence of Sea 
Power’, The Times, 2/8/1915 6, which quoted from ‘The Reckoning’, New York Times, 1/8/1915, 14; on her pre-
war views on Islam, see Bernhard and Ellen M. Whishaw, Arabic Spain: Sidelights on Her History and Art 
(London, 1912), where Muslim-Christian relations in Muslim Spain are characterised as one of ‘the fullest 
measure of toleration’ (17). Though the letter is signed only as ‘One of the Authors of “Arabic Spain”’, it must 
have been written by Ellen Whishaw since her co-author, Bernhard Whishaw, died the previous year.  
10 Gürpinar, ‘Rise and Fall’. 
11 Bar-Yosef, ‘Last Crusade’, 94. See also Kitchen, ‘Khaki Crusaders’. 
12 William Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (London, 1876), 9; Henry Munro-Butler-
Johnstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East: A Letter Addressed to the Right. Hon. W.E. Gladstone, 
M.P. (London, 1876), 5; Marvin Swartz, The Politics of British Foreign Policy in the Era of Disraeli and 
Gladstone (London, 1985), 41-43. 
13 H.C.G. Matthew, Gladstone, 1875-1989 (Oxford, 1995), 31. 
14 Victor Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes to Other Cultures in the Imperial Age (London, 
2015 [1969]), 116. 
15 Patrick Brantlinger, ‘Terrible Turks: Victorian Xenophobia and the Ottoman Empire’, in Marlene Trump, Maria 
K. Bachman and Heidi Kaufman (eds.), Fear, Loathing, and Victorian Xenophobia (Columbus, 2013), 208-229. 
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 Even amongst political elites, Sultan Abdul Hamid’s proclivity for massacring his 
Christian subjects rendered Turcophilism increasing untenable. Roy Douglas asserts that, when 
the ‘Red Sultan’ ordered the massacre of some 200,000 Armenians twenty years later, ‘a thrill 
of horror ran through the land, without distinction of party or social class.’16 Accordingly, 
Turcophilism, while not entirely eradicated, had become ‘restricted to a few conservative 
circles’ by the turn of the twentieth century.17 It did see a brief resurgence following the 
disempowerment and later dethronement of Abdul Hamid, the embodiment of the 
‘Unspeakable Turk’, by supposedly modernising Young Turk reformers in 1908 and 1909, 
respectively.18 However, as Ashmead-Bartlett reflected in 1913, massacres of Armenians at 
Adana in 1909 and Albanians in 1911 revealed the Young Turk regime to be a disappointing 
continuation of the ‘racial animosities’ and ‘government by “atrocities”’ which characterised 
Abdul Hamid’s misrule.19 
 Such was the dominant image of ‘the Turk’ upon the commencement of Anglo-Turkish 
hostilities in November 1914. Speaking at a recruiting rally at London’s City Temple on 10 
November, Lloyd George, then-Chancellor of the Exchequer, resorted to a characteristically 
Gladstonian denunciation of Britain’s new Turkish enemy, which he declared a ‘human cancer, 
a creeping agony in the flesh of the lands which they governed’ who had contributed nothing 
to ‘culture, art, or to any aspect of human progress’.20 Similarly echoing pre-war anti-Turkish 
rhetoric, Punch republished 24 cartoons from 1876 to 1914 as a supplemental to its 16 
December 1914 issue, seemingly to remind readers of who the Turks were, under the title ‘the 
Unspeakable Turk’. This title did not accurately reflect the content of this collection (only 9 of 
these cartoons on the Ottoman Empire offered any commentary on Turkish misrule in Europe) 
but indicated that ‘the Turk’ continued to be defined by these atrocities.21 
 The Irish Times noted that the popular admiration for the Turkish enemy was instead a 
new phenomenon, entirely divorced from its decidedly negative pre-war reputation. 
                                                          
16 Roy Douglas, ‘Britain and the Armenian Question, 1894-7’, Historical Journal, 19:1 (1976), 117. His 
conclusions are supported by Michelle Tusan’s more recent and in-depth study: Tusan, British Empire, 57-89. 
17 Gürpinar, ‘Rise and Fall’, 364. Cf. Allan Cunningham, Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century: Collected 
Essays (London, 1993), 230, who instead attributes Turcophilism’s demise to a decline in Russophobic sentiments 
which, he asserts, were ‘the true foundation of Turcophilism’. 
18 See, for example, the Young Turks’ depiction as enlightened liberal reformers throughout Charles Roden 
Buxton, Turkey in Revolution (London, 1909) and E.F. Knight, The Awakening of Turkey: A History of the Turkish 
Revolution (London, 1909). 
19 Ashmead-Bartlett, With the Turks, 46-47. 
20 ‘The Need for Recruits’, The Times, 11/11/1914, 10. 
21 See ‘Unspeakable Turk’, Supplement to Punch, 16/12/1914, 1, 5-8, 10-11, 13, 18. Though Richard Scully 
suggests that Punch supplements conveyed false impressions of the varied themes present within earlier cartoons, 
their use here is to demonstrate the prevailing negative stereotype of ‘the Turk’ in 1914. See Richard Scully, 
British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism and Ambivalence (Basingstoke, 2012), 309-315. 
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Previously, ‘the Turk’ was held to be ‘demoralised and unscrupulous, treacherous and cruel. 
With his mixture of Oriental and Western traits, he was, in the popular conception, something 
worse than heathen.’ By September 1915, however, images of a ‘modern Atilla’s horde’ had 
been replaced by that of ‘a doughy fighter, an honourable opponent in the field, and a chivalrous 
captor—in sum, to use a word which would appeal to those who are fighting him, a “sport.”’22 
Press material reveals that this change was not facilitated top-down from traditional Orientalist 
circles but rather bottom-up from the testimony of rank-and-file soldiers who fought at 
Gallipoli. A pseudonymous letter to The Times claimed that ‘the men in the first landing on the 
[Gallipoli] Peninsula, north or south, the soldiers of Suvla, the heroic forces that attempted to 
relieve Kut as well as those men who held it, the men who fought against overwhelming odds 
at Katia’ all testified that ‘on the whole, the Turk has fought like a white man.’23 Even 
Whishaw’s admiration for the Turk, though consistent with her pre-war views of Islam, was 
based specifically on letters from her nephews, serving at Gallipoli, ‘warning me not to believe 
all I hear about the “degenerate Turk, for he is a fine fighter.”’24  
The ‘clean-fighting Turk’ narrative’s dissemination into public discourse was 
facilitated primarily through provincial newspapers, which acted as a ‘communication 
network’ between soldiers at the front and their local communities at home.25 These papers 
published copious letters from local soldiers and conducted interviews with those convalescing 
at home so that their readers would better understand what their loved ones at the front were 
experiencing. They formed a significant part of wartime provincial newspapers, which 
requested their readers forward any letters they received for republication. The Bedfordshire 
Times began its ‘Letters about the War’ section with a reminder that ‘the Editor will be glad to 
receive for publication news of Bedfordshire men serving in the Navy or Army’.26 Helen 
McCartney notes that this communication network went both ways. In addition to providing 
civilians with information from the front, the local press also served as ‘a forum, through which 
soldiers could present their ideas to a wide audience.’27 Some territorials, clearly bitter that 
their community dismissed them as mere ‘Saturday night soldiers’ and resented them for being 
allowed to remain home while their professional counterparts had to leave for Europe, sought 
                                                          
22 ‘Turks and Armenians’, Irish Times, 16/9/1915, 4. The significance of this sporting language is discussed below 
at 67-68. 
23 X., Letter: ‘The Clean-Fighting Turk’, The Times, 21/2/1917, 5. 
24 Ellen M. Whishaw, Letter: ‘Huns and Saracens’, The Times, 13/8/1915, 7. 
25 See McCartney, Citizen Soldiers, ch. 5. 
26 E.g. Bedfordshire Times and Independent, 13/8/1915, 5. 
27 McCartney, Citizen Soldiers, 115. 
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to use their letters to improve the territorial force’s reputation.28 Others, like Private T. Jones, 
a Rochdale mill worker serving at Gallipoli, wanted to let ‘the people of my native town … 
know the sort of men we are fighting.’29 
Jones’ letter was prompted by a cartoon in an unidentified English paper depicting ‘a 
British Tommy giving a wounded Turk a drink of water, when, in return, the Turk shot him.’ 
He found this an inaccurate and unfair characterisation of the Turks, who, in his experience, 
had been especially kind to UK soldiers. Jones claimed that some of his wounded comrades, 
rather than being captured or killed, were ‘actually bandaged up’ by Turkish soldiers and ‘sent 
back into our trench unmolested’ with their water bottles refilled. 30 He was not alone in making 
such remarkable claims of Turkish chivalry. Naval Lieutenant F.H.M. Savile, agent to the 
Marquis of Northampton, assured a Northampton Mercury reporter that the Turks were ‘decent 
people’ who ‘fight very cleanly… like gentlemen’, citing a similar, apparently typical 
anecdote: ‘Suppose we took a trench and had not sufficient men to hold it, and were forced to 
retire to wait for our reserves, when we were reinforced and retook the position we should find 
our wounded attended to and bandaged.’31  
Not all soldiers saw Turks so favourably. Private C. Smith of the Lancashire Territorials 
wrote home that he relished ‘getting a shot at the swine, for they are a very cruel race, the 
Turks. I would shoot myself rather than be taken prisoner’.32 For others, Turks were 
practitioners of underhanded military tactics. A sailor on the HMS Canopus noted that ‘one of 
their favourite tricks is for a fort to pretend to be out of action, and then, when the ships are 
least expecting it, break out afresh with a full broadside.’33 Likewise, several soldiers, from the 
battles at Suez, through to Gallipoli and beyond into the campaigns in Mesopotamia, 
condemned Turkish soldiers for engaging in ‘white flag treachery’, the practice of feigning 
                                                          
28 ‘The Dardanelles Fighting’, Rochdale Observer, 12/6/1915, 7; ‘“Never Better in My Life”’, Rochdale Observer, 
14/8/1915, 5. John Power, Letter: ‘A Tribute’, Rochdale Observer, 7/7/1915, 4, admitted to holding these views 
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30 Ibid. 
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Western Mail, 21/6/1915, 5. 
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53 
 
surrender only to fire upon the approaching captors once their guard was down.34 According to 
Simon Popple and Joe Kember, the Boers’ reported use of identical tactics against Britain in 
1900 became a staple of ‘literary, pictorial and cinematic narratives which focused on British 
decency and the Boer abuses.’35 In the First World War, however, anti-Turkish testimonies 
from British soldiers made little impact, being seemingly fringe sentiments. A Press 
Association correspondent who questioned numerous officers as to ‘the alleged atrocities 
committed by the Turks’ concluded that ‘the majority aver that the Turks are fighting most 
fairly.’36 Henry Nevinson, the Manchester Guardian’s Gallipoli correspondent, made the same 
observation, finding ‘no evidence of hatred between the [UK and Turkish] forces. Though 
never much of a Turcophil[e], I recognise the general opinion that the Turk is “fighting 
clean.”’37 
Critics of the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ narrative seldom referred to soldiers’ accounts of 
Turkish misconduct on the battlefield and, instead, pointed to greater, systematic atrocities like 
the Armenian Genocide. For example, James Bryce and Arnold Toynbee’s Treatment of the 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, a parliamentary ‘blue book’ exhaustively documenting the 
Armenian Genocide, published in December 1916, was advertised in the Burnley News in 
October 1918 as revealing that the Turk was a ‘gentleman’ much in the same way that Edgar 
in Shakespeare’s King Lear had called ‘the Prince of Darkness’, the devil, a ‘gentleman’.38 
That it continued to be advertised in this manner nearly two years after its initial publication, 
and three years after the Armenian Genocide had supposedly become a ‘national’ cause through 
Bryce’s October 1915 speech in the House of Lords exposing the atrocity,39 indicates that the 
copious evidence of Ottoman atrocities towards Armenians had failed to alter popular pro-
Turkish sentiments. Indeed, Toynbee complained shortly before this advertisement was 
published that ‘it has been hard to kill the superstition that the Turk is a gentleman and his 
subject race curs’,40 a view the Armenian Bureau continued to challenge even after the war’s 
                                                          
34 Respectively, ‘The Treacherous Turk’, Burnley News, 3/4/1915, 7; ‘White Flag Treachery’, Western Mail, 
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conclusion through its pamphlet, The “Clean-Fighting Turk”: Yesterday, To-day, and To-
morrow.41  
Though these contradictory examples of Turkish military conduct occurred 
simultaneously – the Armenian Genocide began the day before the Gallipoli landings and 
proceeded precisely when British soldiers were writing home about the Turks’ ‘gentlemanly’ 
conduct – news of the Armenian Genocide did not filter into public consciousness as quickly. 
‘Quality’ papers like The Times and the Manchester Guardian reported on the initial Armenian 
deportations almost immediately, but only in passing and without any awareness of their 
significance until the Allied governments’ public condemnation of the crime on 24 May.42 The 
full weight of the available evidence, presented in Bryce and Toynbee’s Treatment of the 
Armenians, would not arrive for another year, a delay which allowed for a rigorous and 
exhaustive report, featuring 149 documents over nearly 700 pages, but also ensured that, 
domestically, Armenophiles were fighting an uphill battle against well-established pro-Turkish 
sentiments. Though much less impenetrable than the typical Foreign Office blue book – it was 
not ‘a mass of documents unsorted and without introduction or explanatory matter’, noted the 
Manchester Guardian, but ‘something that is capable of being read from cover to cover’ – such 
a dense tome had little hope in countering more positive testimonies of those actually fighting 
the Turks.43 For ordinary people, the soldier’s story offered the most authentic account of the 
war and, when presented with a contradiction between the information relayed to them by their 
loved ones at the front and official narratives, those at home accepted precisely the sorts of 
first-hand testimonies from which the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ emerged.44  
The reverence attached to soldiers’ accounts and the role the bottom-up dissemination 
of the Turks’ chivalric image played in its resilience is perhaps most apparent in critics’ similar 
unwillingness to doubt the authenticity of soldiers’ experiences. Anticipating a hesitation to 
accept the Armenian Genocide for its apparent disagreement with these testimonies, the 
conservative Edinburgh Evening News explained that there was no contradiction: ‘the Turk’ 
had been ‘a clean fighter’ against UK soldiers, just as they had described, but ‘turned like a 
wild beast on the Armenians… simply because the Armenians, unlike our soldiers, are 
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helpless.’45 Even the liberal Manchester Guardian, perhaps the UK’s most ardent Armenophile 
paper, helmed by a pro-Armenian editor who published appeals on behalf of organisations like 
the Armenian Relief Fund in his editorials,46 sought to accommodate both the Armenian 
Genocide and soldiers’ claims of Turkish chivalry into its condemnation of ‘the Turk’. It did 
so with difficulty; ‘the student of race characteristics’, it opined, would struggle to find ‘a 
knottier problem than the Turk.’ He was ‘a Jekyll to his equals and a Hyde to those he considers 
his inferiors’, a man who would ‘scorn to purloin a wounded British soldier’s kit’ but ‘drown 
a shipload of Armenian women and children without a qualm.’47 On balance, the Turk’s Hyde 
was taken to overshadow his Jekyll. His chivalric qualities expressed themselves only in the 
personal, face-to-face dealings with the enemy that had become increasingly irrelevant in 
modern war, now comprised of ‘collective forces, principles, and systems’. At this more 
abstract level, the Turk revealed himself through his ‘bestial’ solution to the ‘Armenian military 
problem’, born of his ‘fundamental political incapacity and viciousness’, to be ‘the least 
scrupulous and most blood-thirsty of fighters.48 The Guardian ultimately rejected the broader 
‘clean-fighting Turk’ narrative, but its refusal to doubt the soldiers’ testimonies upon which it 
was based meant that it could only do so with a rather convoluted analysis of the Turkish 
character. 
It is doubtful whether ordinary people sympathised with the Armenians enough to 
engage in such mental gymnastics. As Trevor Wilson observers, there was no shortage of 
humanitarian crises for Britons to support. The plights of Belgian, French, Italian, Polish and 
Serbian civilians all attracted numerous competing relief funds, including at least 69 different 
UK charities for Belgium alone.49 Within the Ottoman Empire, too, the Armenian refugee crisis 
that resulted from the Genocide was preceded by humanitarian disasters in Baghdad, Jerusalem 
and Beirut.50 Faced with these competing crises, Keith Watenpaugh suggests that humanitarian 
sympathies, during the First World War as today, were contingent on those giving aid (the 
humanitarian subject) believing those to whom they give aid (the humanitarian object) to be 
worthy of their help. This judgment was not based on objectives measures of comparative 
suffering but on whether, the humanitarian subject identifies with the humanitarian object ‘to 
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the point of being envisioned as an extension of the self or community of that subject.’51 For 
Armenophiles like Toynbee, the belief that the Armenians, despite residing in the East, were 
‘in the closest personal touch with Western civilisation’ was based principally on the 
Armenians’ Christianity.52 They were following in the Gladstonian Liberal tradition which, 
since the Bulgarian horrors of the 1870s, had considered it Britain’s moral and religious duty, 
as the world’s premier Christian empire, to champion the cause of persecuted Christian 
minorities.53 This was a thoroughly nineteenth-century worldview that survived only amongst 
a small group of Liberal elites and, Michelle Tusan argues, had limited purchase amongst the 
broader public in a time of ‘total war’.54 
Materially, David Monger shows that charitable donations to UK Armenian relief funds 
were minuscule compared to their American counterparts. While the American Committee for 
Armenian and Syrian Relief raised nearly $6.9 million, its largest UK equivalent, the Armenian 
Refugees (Lord Mayor’s) Fund, had raised a meagre £88,400 by February 1918.55 Additionally, 
there is evidence within the press of overtly anti-Armenian sentiments. According to the Irish 
Times, there were ‘men well versed in affairs of Turkey’ who responded to the widespread 
reports of Armenian massacres by ‘say[ing] quite bluntly that the Armenians as a race, have 
laid themselves open to ill-treatment from the Turks.’56 In May 1918, a letter to the Rochdale 
Observer scorned the Armenians for offering an apparently un-Christian resistance to their 
Turkish assailants rather than allowing themselves to be properly martyred. Drawing on the 
popular British anti-Semitism of the time, he declared that the Armenians were ‘more Jewish 
than the Jew’.57 His views did not go unchallenged, being lambasted by another reader as the 
height of hypocritical ‘Pecksniffianism’.58 Neither, however, were they considered too 
reprehensible for the Rochdale Observer to publish.  
 For those without any humanitarian interest in the Armenians, like Charles Bean, it was, 
perhaps, easier to simply dismiss the genocide altogether. As Australia’s official Gallipoli 
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correspondent, Bean helped popularise the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ not only in Australia but also 
in the UK.59 His brother, who also served at Gallipoli with the Australian Imperial Force, 
defended his impression of the Turks as ‘very chivalrous, good and clean fighters’ before a 
‘crowded audience’ in Brentwood, Essex, with explicit reference to Bean’s reporting, which 
failed to find ‘one single authentic case of an atrocity committed by the Turks’ on British 
soldiers.60 Bean was well aware of the Armenian Genocide, having reported on the ‘endeavour 
to wipe out the Armenian nation’ in Perth’s West Australian in December 1915.61 Yet in a 1916 
poem about the Turks, entitled ‘Abdul’, he explicitly dismissed their cruelty to the Armenians 
because it did not agree with his experiences at Gallipoli: 
 
So though your name be black as ink 
For murder and rapine, 
Carried out in happy concert 
With your Christians from the Rhine, 
We will judge you, Mr. Abdul, 
By the test by which we can— 
That with all your breath, in life, in death, 
You’ve played the gentleman.62 
 
Both the cultural unimpeachability of these first-hand experiences, discussed above, and the 
Armenian Genocide’s apparent failure to reverse the Turks’ reputation suggest that Bean’s 
preference for anecdotes of Turkish chivalry over accounts of Armenian massacres would have 
been typical. 
If the Turks’ ‘gentlemanly’ image was based primarily on their interactions with UK 
soldiers, its staying power is most remarkable given that, reportedly, nearly a third of the 16,483 
British and Indian soldiers captured by the Turks died in captivity from horrific mistreatment.63 
The Armenian Bureau seemingly believed, not unreasonably, that these atrocities would 
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capture the public imagination more successfully than the Armenian Genocide. Doubtless 
recognising the limits of British sympathies for the distant Armenians and, perhaps, recalling 
that a Daily Mail correspondent had previously determined that ‘the Turks are not naturally 
cruel, confining their atrocities to the Armenians only’,64 the Armenian Bureau’s “Clean-
Fighting” Turk pamphlet devoted considerably more space to the mistreatment of British 
prisoners than it did to the Armenians. This was despite its stated goal being to reveal ‘the true 
character of Turkish rule’ so as to prove the necessity of Armenian independence.65 Curiously, 
however, Turkish atrocities towards British prisoners had also failed to alter pro-Turkish 
sentiments. When the Report on the Treatment of British Prisoner of War in Turkey detailing 
the cruel fate of those captured at Kut-al-Amara was published as a white paper on 20 
November 1918, the journalist G. Ward Price hoped that it would finally dispel the inclination 
of Englishmen to view ‘the Turk as a clean fighter and not a bad fellow at heart’.66 Given 
Price’s prominent association with and open admiration for Adolf Hitler later in his career,67 
his chastisement of the public for being insufficiently anti-Turkish might be attributed to 
presumed racist convictions on his part. However, the liberal Manchester Guardian drew the 
same lesson, titling its article on the report ‘Turkish Cruelty. Terrible Story of Kut Prisoners. 
No “Chivalrous Foe.”’68 Indeed, this seems to have been the intended message of the report, 
which noted on its first page that ‘the rank and file [prisoners]… have had small reason in their 
helplessness to regard the Turk as the chivalrous and honourable foe of whom we have 
sometimes heard.’69 
Though Jones notes that there was ‘ample verifiable first-hand evidence’ of Ottoman 
mistreatment of British prisoners,70 this was not available for some time; the ‘pitiable state’ of 
these prisoners was not, as the Daily Telegraph claimed on 25 July 1918, ‘abundant from the 
first’.71 As noted in the parliamentary report on the subject, for most of the war outside 
observers were forced to rely on ‘fortunate chances and the careful collation of news which 
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filters through by various channels.’72 It was thus with great difficulty that the press first learned 
of the conditions of Kut prisoners. The story did not break until March 1917, eleven months 
after their capture, when a Times correspondent succeeded in penetrating ‘the veil of secrecy 
which envelops mysterious Turkey’ through ‘various underground channels, leading through 
several European countries, and through the capital of the United States’. He was suitably 
shocked by what he learned. The Apostle Paul’s ‘severe persecutions’, wrote The Times’ 
correspondent, ‘were slight in comparison with what the British prisoners have undergone. 
Hungry, insufficiently clad or sheltered, they have suffered unspeakably.’’73 Yet, the article 
was not nearly as damning as it claimed and was very light on specifics. In addition to vague 
remarks about the destitution of the Kut survivors like the above, it accused the guards of being 
generally ‘cruel’ and inflicting ‘countless humiliations’ upon the soldiers, with no elaboration 
as to what these were. Moreover, while it condemned the Turks for forbidding nearby 
American missionaries to share with the soldiers ‘the comforts of the Christian religion’, they 
do appear to have allowed them medical care. The article’s source claimed to ‘know one 
American who is himself in a hospital in Asia Minor as a result of his day and night labours 
for the British prisoners who were passing through.’ Though it noted that the captives had been 
‘driven from Lower Mesopotamia to Anatolia, a distance of nearly 1,000 miles’, no mention 
was made of the horrific result casualty rate.  
Information about the conditions of the Ottoman camps themselves were impeded by 
the Porte’s continued refusals to allow inspections by neutral observers. The first inspection 
was not conducted until October 1916 when delegates of the International Red Cross were 
permitted limited access to certain pre-selected camps.74 Although their findings were 
summarised in a bulletin upon the inspections’ completion in January 1917, they were not 
published in full until April 1917.75 The Red Cross report was, unsurprisingly, neither 
comprehensive nor especially critical. It did stress ‘the expediency of repatriating to Europe all 
sick persons’ because they were in poor health from ‘the marches across the desert’ and their 
recovery significantly hampered by ‘an insufficient diet’ and undertaking labour ‘not in 
proportion with their power of resistance’. However, it also attributed the prisoners’ poor 
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conditions to ‘exceptional circumstances’ which ‘implie[d] no blame upon the Turkish military 
authorities’. The report found no malice in their mistreatment of Allied prisoners since it 
accorded with the typical living conditions of Ottoman soldiers, who ‘are content with very 
little, endure the greatest privations, and are accustomed to the smallest amount of 
nourishment.’76 Such observations were in perfect agreement with accepted international law. 
The Hague Convention of 1907 required only that prisoners ‘be treated… on the same footing 
as the troops of the Government who captured them.’77 Naturally, these findings were treated 
with scepticism. The Manchester Guardian later remarked that the conditions of the remaining 
camps could be ‘judged sufficiently from the refusal of the Turkish Government to allow 
neutrals to inspect them.’78 Yet the restrictions imposed on the inspections, as suspicious as 
they were, were not concrete proof of mistreatment. The Scotsman noted that it was until the 
white paper’s publication in November 1918 that the fate of these prisoners was told ‘with full 
and authentic detail.’79 
For most of the war, people relied on anecdotal evidence in the form of letters from the 
prisoners themselves. As with the accounts from the front that first formed the ‘clean-fighting 
Turk’ narrative, these letters were overwhelmingly pro-Turkish and suggested that the Turks 
were, in fact, treating their prisoners remarkably well. For example, Private S. Sutcliffe of the 
Lancashire Fusiliers wrote to his mother from captivity in Constantinople that ‘the Turks are 
very good to us, and you would not think we were prisoners. They treat us just like their own 
men.’ His positive assessment of his Turkish captors, published in both the Rochdale Observer 
and Burnley News in September 1915,80 continued to be repeated in prisoners’ letters 
throughout the war. Later in June 1917, after both The Times’ exposé on the conditions of those 
captured at Kut and the Red Cross report, a Burnham woman received a letter from her son, 
published in the Essex Newsman, assuring her that he and his fellow prisoners ‘are being very 
well treated, so please do not worry in the least about me.’81 Such testimonies were so 
ubiquitous that the government apparently sought to censor them. Whereas the Press Bureau 
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published three separate D Notices – one in February 1915, another in June, and yet another in 
May 1916 – discouraging newspapers from reporting the maltreatment of British prisoners in 
German captivity for fears that this would provoke German reprisals,82 the Manchester 
Guardian claimed that censorship authorities had ‘recommend[ed] the suppression of many 
reports of chivalrous treatment of our soldiers [in captivity] by the Turks.’83  
There are two possible reasons for the inaccurate representation of Turkish captivity in 
these letters. Firstly, the fact that Turkish captors treated their prisoners cruelly as a rule does 
not mean there were no exceptions. Since the Porte was so concerned to keep the mistreatment 
of its prisoners out of the public eye (it was not until December 1917 that it bowed to 
international pressure and finally allowed full inspections of all its camps),84 they undoubtedly 
would have prevented negative accounts from reaching home. In support of a possible selection 
bias, it is telling that the only account from the Kut prisoners featured in the provincial press 
was from an officer held at Kastamouni, where conditions were significantly better than the 
camps holding rank-and-file soldiers, who professed to be ‘quite well’.85 
Secondly, these soldiers might also have been self-censoring. Though McCartney 
argues that soldiers’ letters were not as sanitised as commonly believed, they were still prone 
to ‘exaggeration and even straight out lying’, as Glyn Harper’s examination of letters from 
Gallipoli reveals.86 In particular, Edwardian conceptions of masculinity led British soldiers to 
conceal worrying details, such as danger or illness, from their mothers, identified by Michael 
Roper as the primary recipients of letters sent from the front by unmarried men. According to 
Roper, protecting one’s mother in this manner ‘was itself thought to be a sign of manliness.’87 
This appears to be the case in a letter received by a Wolverton mother describing her son’s 
experiences of Turkish captivity, summarised by the Northampton Mercury:  
 
Mrs. Pass, Green-lane, Wolverton, has received a letter from Private Russell to say that 
they [he and her son, Private Alec Pass] are both prisoners of war with the Turks being 
captured on Easter Sunday [23 April 1916]. Private Pass was wounded in both hands 
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and the shoulder by a bomb dropped by one of our aeroplanes, but is going on well. 
Private Russell says that the Turks are treating them more like guests than prisoners.88 
 
Though Pass claimed to be ‘going on well’, he was so seriously wounded that he was unable 
to write the letter himself. As medical personnel, both Pass and Russell would have understood 
the severity of his injuries. Pass, like many other soldiers writing home, likely deliberately 
misrepresented the reality of his situation.89 Claims that Turks were treating him and his 
comrade benevolently might have been motivated by similar concerns. They are certainly 
suspect since Pass died in captivity on 2 August, less than four months after his capture.90  
Despite their representational issues, these positive accounts were generalised as 
typifying the experience of a prisoner in the Ottoman Empire. Even the Manchester Guardian, 
whose advocacy for the Armenians made them staunchly anti-Turkish, conceded in September 
1915 that ‘the accumulating evidence’ from prisoners’ letters suggested that ‘the Turks are 
treating their prisoners from the Gallipoli fighting with humanity and even kindness.’ The 
paper believed that this evidence would ease the anxieties of the friends and relatives of the 
missing Manchester soldiers believed to be in Ottoman captivity.91 For most of the war, 
therefore, the typical experience of these prisoners was seen not to contradict the Turks’ 
chivalric image but rather to reinforce it.  
When the cruel treatment they actually received became known later in the war, papers 
were much less willing to distinguish between Turks’ massacres of Armenians from their 
otherwise ‘gentlemanly’ conduct towards UK soldiers. On 3 August 1918, the Irish Times, 
which had previously written positively of the treatment of these prisoners, suggested that they 
were ‘to all intents and purposes… in slavery to the Turks.’92 Lord Newton, Controller of the 
Prisoners of War Department, was fiercely criticised for his failure to secure their repatriation 
back to the UK. For the Daily Mail, this was a matter of life and death: 
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‘They have been dying by scores and hundreds for more than two years… at least 70 per cent 
of the British rank and file who were taken at Kut are dead or untraceable. The winter is coming 
on. Are we to wait until they are all dead?’93  
  
Since the Daily Mail was the UK’s widely circulated newspaper, the public response to its 
leader provides useful insights into why this information apparently did not compel most of the 
public to revise their previously positive assessment of Turkish military conduct. While it did 
prompt significant reader engagement, with the paper receiving fourteen letters in September 
1918 from throughout the nation, including Devon, London, Coventry, Liverpool and 
Edinburgh, they were primarily written by friends or relatives.94 This was also true of 24 of the 
35 letters published on the topic in The Times in 1917 and 1918.95  
In these papers, condemnation of Ottoman atrocities towards UK prisoners was 
correlated with a personal connection with the victims.96 The Rochdale Observer noticed a 
similar phenomenon in Lancashire where these atrocities were reported to have ‘stirred the 
public mind’ in Lancashire because, the paper emphasised, they were committed ‘against… 
helpless fellow citizens.’97 Major Arthur Haggard highlighted this personal component in a 
letter to The Times. Haggard found it unfair that advocates for repatriating UK prisoners in 
Ottoman captivity focused predominantly on those captured at Kut at the expense of others, 
like his son, who had been captured earlier in the Dardanelles campaign. ‘It is not only prisoners 
from Kut—though no doubt they have suffered terrible hardships—to whom consideration is 
due,’ he wrote, ‘ but to all; and there are many, both officers and men, whose lot has been 
extremely hard since early 1915.’98  
It is unsurprising that their suffering was, seemingly, less important to most UK 
citizens, whose relatives were imprisoned in Germany, not the Ottoman Empire (43,719 against 
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2,299 according to a December 1917 estimate).99 It was there that their attention would have 
been drawn: hence, F.T. Gardner, writing to the Essex County Chronicle to promote the Essex 
Regiment Prisoner of War Fund, only mentioned the prisoners in Germany (where all but one 
of the 560 Essex Regiment prisoners were held), whose pleas for aid stood as ‘the saddest of 
all the cries for help in this terrible war.’100 In one disgruntled relative’s view, those in Turkish 
captivity were ‘apt to be forgotten by the general public’ because they were not captured in 
‘the chief theatre of war’. 101  
Perhaps for the same reason, the Daily Mail’s fervent criticism towards Newton (and, 
less prominently, his colleague Sir George Cave) for mishandling the repatriations focused 
overwhelmingly on those in German captivity.102 This was seemingly typical of the vitriol 
Newton received. He followed the public response closely, concluding his diary entry for 5 
June 1918: ‘Parting shot at [Director of the Prisoners of War Department Herbert] Belfield and 
myself in The Times this morning.’103 On 29 May 1918, seizing ‘the opportunity of dealing 
faithfully with… the portentous and pretentions of the egregious Northcliffe’, Newton publicly 
charged the Daily Mail owner-editor and Times proprietor in the House of Lords with spreading 
false suggestions, with ‘mischievous intention’, that the plight of UK prisoners in Germany 
had been worsened ‘on account of the imbecility, incompetence, and callousness of his 
Majesty’s Government’.104 After the war, Newton successfully sued the Daily Mail for libel 
for a false assertion that he had joked about ‘the tragic suffering of our prisoners’ in a wartime 
speech and was awarded £5,000.105 Consequently, Newton gave special attention to this ‘trying 
time when I was assailed with great bitterness in the press and in other quarters’ in his 
memoirs,106 yet failed to recall a single instance where he was criticised for his inability to 
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repatriate the ‘heroes of Kut’ such as the Daily Mail’s above leader.107 He cast the controversy 
as being entirely about the prisoners in Germany. Overshadowed by German crimes elsewhere, 
the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ remained (at least according to critics) the dominant image of the 
Turkish enemy in the popular imagination. 
 
The ‘Clean-Fighting Turk’ and the German ‘Hun’ 
 
UK soldiers held a broadly similar view of their German enemy. The famous 1914 ‘Christmas 
truce’ was not a unique occurrence; Richard Holmes argues that those on the Western Front 
‘generally had a high regard for the Germans’ and ‘rarely felt a high degree of personal hostility 
towards them’.108 This was despite assertions by General Henry Horne and Sir John French 
that German atrocities had stirred an enduring anti-German bloodlust within the UK forces, 
especially those which occurred or were uncovered, in rapid succession, in late April and early 
May 1915.109 Reports that the Germany used poisonous gas on UK soldiers at the Second Battle 
of Ypres bred widespread condemnation of Germany’s atrocious wartime conduct.110 This was 
shortly followed by the German navy’s sinking of a civilian cruise liner, the Lusitania, off the 
coast of Ireland on 7 May, killing some 1200 civilians. Only five days later, when details of 
the Lusitania atrocity were still emerging, the ‘Bryce Report’ was published, proving 
allegations of mass German atrocities during its invasion of Belgium.111 Holmes concedes that 
Germany’s misconduct, particularly its use of poisonous gas at Ypres, did provoke reprisals 
from British forces towards German prisoners, but suggests that this was the exception rather 
than the norm and did not compel them to reject their otherwise favourable impression of their 
German adversaries.112 
The pro-German sentiments Holmes ascribes to UK soldiers were, for a time, shared 
domestically. Malcolm Brown shows that those at home responded approvingly to the 
Christmas truce, citing, for example, Ashmead-Bartlett’s declaration in the Daily Telegraph on 
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New Year’s Day, 1915, that the affair proved ‘the assertion that the German soldier is a good-
hearted peace-loving individual once he is outside the influence of the Prussian military 
machine.’113 Gregory notes that it was still possible as late as March 1915 to find ‘laudable 
examples of German behaviour’ in even the UK’s most notoriously Germanophobic 
newspaper, the Daily Mail. By May 1915, however, Gregory argues that the above atrocities 
insured that the dehumanisation of the German enemy as the barbaric ‘Hun’, initially formed 
in response to their pillage of the historic Belgian town of Louvain and the destruction of Reims 
Cathedral in August and September 1914, became all-encompassing, with positive 
representations of Germans no longer publicly acceptable.114 The sinking of the Lusitania 
proved to be the final straw, coming, as noted in the Manchester Guardian History of the War, 
at a time when ‘the tide of popular feeling in this country against Germany and German 
methods of war had been steadily rising to a height never before reached’.115 Regarded by UK 
contemporaries as the defining atrocity of the war,116 it provoked an especially visceral public 
response. Nation-wide riots against actual or suspected German residents, resembling, in 
Panikos Panayi’s view, ‘a Russian pogrom with the native population attempting to clear out 
aliens’, caused hundreds of thousands of pounds in property damage and saw thousands of 
participants arrested.117  
That pro-German testimonies from soldiers on the Western Front were rejected due to 
their incompatibility with Germany’s broader military misconduct shows that the public’s 
apparently sustained belief in the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ despite similar atrocities cannot be 
wholly attributed to its origins within soldier testimonies. Yet, paradoxically, the German 
atrocities that rendered pro-German sentiments so unacceptable also imbued tales of Turkish 
chivalry with special ideological significance. It is widely acknowledged that atrocities like the 
‘rape of Belgium’ and the sinking of the Lusitania, occurring within what Catriona Pennell 
describes as ‘a battle for the ideas that underpinned the Allies’ and Central Powers’ sense of 
identity and moral purpose’,118 reinforced the perceived righteousness of the ‘just war’ between 
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‘civilised’ British values and the ‘barbarism’ of Prussian militaristic Kultur.119 In this context, 
the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ offered a foil to the barbaric German ‘Hun’, emphasising how 
Germany had abandoned the norms of civilised warfare by (occasionally racially tinged) 
contrast. 
Comparisons between Turkish ‘gentlemanly’ conduct and German misconduct 
certainly abounded within the soldiers’ testimonies from Gallipoli featured in the press. Savile, 
the Northampton officer introduced above, emphasised that ‘one would not expect’ the 
gentlemanly conduct he witnessed at Gallipoli from German soldiers, while Second Lieutenant 
Leslie Grant of the 4th Royal Scots praised the Turks’ apparent refusal to adopt ‘German 
methods’ such as poison gas despite the presumed orders of their German officers.120 Some 
even excused certain atrocities that they did see Turks commit on the basis that their conduct 
was still better than Germany’s. When Private J. Bowlett, wounded at Gallipoli and 
convalescing in Cardiff, told the Western Mail that the Turks were ‘“clean” fighters’, he was 
promptly reminded by a comrade, also present at the interview, that the Turks had bombarded 
a hospital. Yet Bowlett retained his admiration for the Turks since ‘they were not guilty of the 
barbarities practised by the Germans elsewhere.’121 Private David Lock, convalescing in 
another Cardiff hospital at the same time, was not as dismissive of Turkish misconduct, but, 
nonetheless, attributed it to German compulsion rather than the Turks themselves: ‘They played 
the game till the German officers came on the scene. Then there was no mercy.’122 This was, 
apparently, a typical sentiment. William Ewing, a chaplain attached to the British forces in 
Gallipoli and Mesopotamia, found that the ‘average soldier’ respected the Turk as ‘a stout and 
honourable foe’ while simultaneously reserving his ‘wrath and contempt’ for the Germans, the 
‘“Pigs” who do not “play the game”.’123 
These sporting allusions evoked ‘athleticism’, a ‘genuinely and extensively held belief’ 
within Victorian and Edwardian pedagogy that sporting games ‘inspired virtue’, ‘developed 
manliness’, and ‘formed character’.124 J.A. Mangan notes that the above phrase, ‘play the 
game’, was ‘by far the most popular moralistic exhortation’ of athleticism, encapsulating, by 
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way of cricketing analogy, all the virtues of the public school gentleman.125 The ‘clear 
relationship between militarism and sport in the British public schools’ evident through ‘the 
special value attributed to team games in training the essential qualities of the officer and 
leader’ ensured athleticism’s relevance during the First World War.126 Recruiters sought to 
shame readers into voluntary service by insisting that those who did not ‘come forward with 
the Colours’ were ‘not playing the game of Englishmen’.127 Athleticism was amongst the many 
aspects of British ‘civilisation’ with which Germany was deemed to be incompatible: it was 
asserted that German soldiers, unlike their UK counterparts, did not ‘play the game’.128  
As seen in the above quotations, UK soldiers made their claims that Turkish soldiers 
abided by this sporting ethos in pointed contrast to German misconduct; their admiration for 
the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ went hand-in-hand with contempt for the German ‘Hun’. These 
comparisons can seldom have been based on personal experience of German conduct. While 
there was a German presence at Gallipoli, A. Candan Krişci notes that it ‘did not extend to the 
lower ranks’ and, consequently, ‘did not have much visibility in the affair’.129 Moreover, within 
the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, only those in the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division and one 
of the 29th Division’s twelve battalions had fought against Germany previously.130 Most of the 
territorial forces represented by the provincial papers examined in this study were, however, 
still in the UK during May 1915, the formative period of anti-German sentiment.131 The 42nd 
(East Lancashire) Division, which arrived in Gallipoli between 5 May and 14 May,132 precisely 
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when most details of the German atrocities appeared in the press, still would have remained 
informed via their local papers, which were available (although doubtless with significant 
delay) at the front.133 Thus, these soldiers appear to have been drawing upon, and constructing 
their admiration for the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ against, the popular image of the German ‘Hun’ 
outlined above.  
The press, likewise, showed great interest in how the Turks’ supposedly gentlemanly 
conduct, both as soldiers and captors, emphasised German barbarity by contrast. Believing that 
those in Ottoman captivity had ‘in the majority of cases… been treated with chivalrous respect’, 
the Daily Telegraph stressed to its readers that ‘it is the German alone who has broken not only 
every Convention and Treaty bearing on the treatment of prisoners, but every dictate of 
humanity and every instinct of decent feeling.’134 Likewise, when the Kut garrison was 
captured in April 1916, the Burnley Express was ‘thankful… that the heroes who survive have 
passed into the hands of captors who are at least humane and honourable by comparison with 
their temporary military masters, the modern Huns’. Unaware, of course, of the cruel fate which 
would befall these prisoners, the paper expected that the Turks, unlike the Germans, would 
give them ‘the honour which is their due’.135  
These assessments seem to have been less about praising Turks than offering a standard 
for gentlemanly conduct which Germany, Britain’s primary enemy both militarily and 
ideologically, had failed to match, presenting a variant of the common wartime trope of what 
Allen Frantzen calls ‘reverse chivalry’, whereby Germany was criticised for ‘claiming to be 
knights but failing to practice chivalry’.136 This was certainly the case for one critic of the 
Independent Labour Party’s allegedly pro-German sympathies writing to the Burnley Express. 
To prove that ‘the typical Prussian is borne brute and bully’, the author noted not only the 
‘terrible excesses’ of ‘German “Kultur”’ in both the First World War and the Boxer Rebellion 
but highlighted its contrast with the civilised military conduct of the ‘half-civilised or backward 
races’ who had ‘played the game’ in earlier conflicts Boer, Russo-Japanese and Balkan 
Wars.137 Given the notorious record of atrocities that had hitherto defined the ‘Unspeakable 
Turk’, its new chivalric image was especially well-suited for this purpose. A.J. Hoover notes 
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that clergymen supporting a ‘just war’ against German barbarity drew particular attention to 
their ‘scientific animalism’ in Belgium.138 For Reverend J.H. James, providing just such a 
sermon at a Methodist rally in Manchester in September 1915, the clearest evidence the First 
World War provided of modern science’s moral failure was that ‘the most scientific nation on 
the face of the earth had shown itself to be also the most brutal, so that even the unspeakable 
Turk was a gentleman compared with the “kultured” German.’139  
 
Ottoman Atrocities 
 
The great irony of the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ as a justification for the UK’s righteous crusade 
against German barbarity through claims that even the ‘Unspeakable Turk’ would not resort to 
German-style atrocities was that Turkish conduct was, in fact, considerably more atrocious 
than the German ‘frightfulness’ against which it was measured. In particular, Horne and 
Kramer stress that the Ottoman Empire’s genocide of the Armenians ‘was by far the worst case 
of violence against civilians during the war, on a wholly different scale to the invasions of 
1914.’140 While Germany killed 5,521 civilians in its widely condemned ‘rape of Belgium’,141 
the Armenian Genocide claimed over a million of the Ottoman Empire’s roughly two million 
Armenian inhabitants.142 The contemporary estimate given by Bryce in his address to the 
House of Lords was more conservative at a still astronomical 800,000.143 Though only a 
‘minority, current in the literature on enemy “atrocities”’ given a correspondingly ‘minor place 
in Allied accusations’ against the Central Powers,144 it did not pass without considerable 
condemnation from the press. For Cardiff’s Western Mail, it was a crime ‘eclipsing in tragedy 
and in barbarism the worst that has happened in Belgium.’ ‘Tamburlaine the Great’, added the 
Daily Telegraph, ‘no longer must stand… as the superlative butcher of his or any other age’, 
for that honour now belonged to ‘those who carried out this policy of bloodshed.’145 The 
Scotsman averred that the Armenian Genocide, ‘unprecedented… both in number and 
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bloodshed’, must ‘feature prominently on international notice’ and ‘be kept in mind when the 
day of reckoning comes’.146 While disgruntled anti-Turkish critics felt that neither these 
Armenian massacres nor the Turks’ mistreatment of UK prisoners had any noticeable domestic 
impact, it is still instructive to consider what place these Turkish atrocities were accorded 
within the UK’s ‘just war’. If praise for Turkish ‘gentlemanly’ conduct served mainly to 
criticise Germany, as suggested above, what about their misconduct? 
According to Laycock, the Armenian Genocide operated as an ‘Ottoman atrocity’ 
which contrasted ‘civilised Britain, protecting innocent people, and a barbaric, amoral enemy, 
which massacred its own population without mercy.’147 This was certainly true for the 
Aberdeen Daily Journal. Writing in September 1915 amidst criticism of the Gallipoli 
campaign’s value, the paper argued that the possibility of liberating the Armenians and other 
Ottoman minorities from Enver’s ‘intolerable tyranny’ presented ‘not the least cogent reason 
for extending the most strenuous support to the Dardanelles adventure.’148 It also provided a 
useful moral argument for dismantling the Ottoman Empire against criticism from the left that 
doing so would turn the war from a noble endeavour to one of imperialist annexation. Such 
arguments from officials have been dismissed as a cynical attempt to mask their imperialism 
in a humanitarian façade, not an unreasonable interpretation given the British government’s 
swift abandonment of its commitments to upholding an independent Armenian nation state 
once the war was won.149 However, they also had popular appeal amongst some conservatives 
in Burnley. Several letters appeared in the local conservative paper, the Burnley Express, 
criticising the ILP’s defence of Ottoman territorial integrity with explicit reference to the 
Armenian Genocide.150 
Yet the Ottoman Empire’s violent oppression of its Christian subjects was hardly a 
revelation. As the Manchester Guardian noted when they were made public, ‘it cannot be said 
that the massacres in Armenia… have come as a surprise.’ The Young Turks’ massacre of some 
20,000 Armenians in Adana had already revealed that ‘the tyranny of Abdul Hamid did not 
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disappear with his deposition’ but only ‘become more open and cynical’.151 Though their 
unprecedented scale and systematic (what would now be described as genocidal) methods were 
shocking, these Armenian massacres were an unsurprising continuation of the earlier atrocities 
which had cast the ‘Unspeakable Turk’ from the ‘civilised’ world into the realm of ‘barbarism’ 
long before the First World War. As an ‘Ottoman atrocity’, its ideological value was limited. 
The Turks were but a ‘junior partner’ and, as Horne and Kramer observe, ‘“atrociousness” 
denoted the importance of the enemy, not the crime.’152 
Thus, the most ‘atrocious’ aspect of the Armenian Genocide from the UK perspective 
was that the Ottoman Empire’s Christian allies refused to intercede on the Armenians’ behalf. 
H.A.L. Fisher explained the charge against Germany and Austria-Hungary in his endorsement 
of Bryce and Toynbee’s Treatment of Armenians: 
 
In view of the fact that the representations of the Austrian Ambassador with the Porte 
were effectual in procuring a partial measure of exemption for the Armenian Catholics, 
we are led to surmise that the unspeakable horrors which this volume records might 
have been mitigated, if not wholly checked, had active and energetic remonstrances 
been from the first moment addressed to the Ottoman Government by the two Powers 
who had acquired a predominant influence in Constantinople. The evidence, on the 
contrary, tends to suggest that these two Powers were, in a general way, favourable to 
the policy of deportation.153 
 
While neither power attempted to restrain their Turkish ally, Germany was believed to be ‘the 
one Power which might have intervened effectively’.154 According to the Burnley Express, ‘the 
governing fact in the case’ against Germany was stated most succinctly by Irish MP T.P. 
O’Connor: ‘Germany is to-day the master of Turkey; she equips and commands the armies of 
Turkey; she finances Turkey, and she bribes Turkish ministers; and she has but to lift her little 
finger and there would not be another Armenian touched.’155 Since ‘a word from the Kaiser 
would have stopped all this carnage’, he was ‘as much responsible for the murder of these 
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800,000 Armenians as he is for the unspeakable horrors that have been committed by his hordes 
in Belgium, in Poland, in France, and in Russia.’156 
 It was claimed that Germany approved the Young Turks’ methods as they echoed its 
own disregard for civilian life in pursuit of military victory. Despite their noted precedent in 
Ottoman history, the press found something characteristically German in the execution of these 
particular Armenian massacres. In a detailed exposition of the atrocity, over three thousand 
words long and spanning six columns, a Times correspondent noted that whereas the ‘Red 
Sultan’ was content with mere massacre, the Young Turks followed this by ‘a crueller system 
of persecution’ characterised, most notably, by deportations.157 ‘The idea of deporting people 
en masse’, wrote American Ambassador to Constantinople Henry Morgenthau, was considered 
‘exclusively Germanic’, a staple of ‘the literature of Pan-Germany’.158 Consequently, as soon 
as it became clear that the deportation of Armenian elites from Constantinople was part of a 
deliberate policy of extermination, the Manchester Guardian immediately found parallels with 
Germany’s own deportation of Belgian and French civilians to the front lines for forced labour. 
‘The theory underlying this conduct’, it wrote, ‘is, of course, the same which governs the 
terrorist methods of the Germans in their occupied territories.’159 In this respect, The Times 
claimed that the Armenian Genocide bore only ‘general resemblance’ to previous Armenian 
massacres and was, perhaps, better understood as an effort to ‘outdo’ Abdul Hamid by adopting 
‘an act of policy, as deliberate as the exercise of German “frightfulness” in Belgium and 
France.’160 These similarities were not considered coincidental. For the Scotsman, the Young 
Turks’ systematic massacre of (as contemporaries believed) 800,000 Armenians was only the 
‘development of [Germany’s] own methods… the true and natural fruit of grafting the new 
plant of scientific frightfulness on the old stock of Turkish barbarism.’161 Thus, Ottoman 
atrocities did not only provide further opportunity to comment on German atrocities in Europe; 
they were considered yet another manifestation of the German Kultur against which Britain 
fought. In their atrocities, ‘the Prussian and the Turk are fit companions’ and ‘consistency 
would demand… that Prussia should regard her ally with admiration as the fine flower of 
Prussian Kultur.’162 
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The press’ presentation of the Armenian Genocide as a quasi-German atrocity has been 
previously dismissed as a cynical effort to distort the crime in coordination with official 
propaganda initiatives to convince the United State to enter the war on Britain’s side.163 This 
argument perhaps makes sense under the traditional presumption that UK wartime newspapers 
were propaganda mouthpieces, seemingly without any independent views of their own. 
Wellington House did, indeed, employ atrocity stories liberally in their efforts to convince 
American observers of its ‘just war’ narrative, presenting German ‘barbarism’ against shared 
Anglo-American values, which specifically targeted American newspapers.164 Foreign Office 
records show that Germany’s apparent role in the Armenian Genocide was also used for this 
purpose.165 Yet, it is highly doubtful that the numerous provincial papers condemning Germany 
in this regard were doing so under the expectation that their words might be read by American 
opinion-makers.  
Of course, this was also valuable for recruiting purposes in a society which did not yet 
have conscription. In October 1915, Lord Shuttleworth, Lancashire’s Lord Lieutenant, 
reminded potential volunteers that they were: 
 
face to face with new and horrible forms of that “frightfulness” of which we 
have seen far too much in this war. I need only, as recent examples, speak of 
those atrocious and vast Armenian massacres and of the shocking murder of 
Nurse Cavell. If those things do not stir us I do not know what will.166 
 
The later domestic propaganda of the National War Aims Committee, tasked with re-
mobilising the public in the wake of plummeting support for the war, also drew attention to 
Germany’s failure to intervene on the Armenians’ behalf.167 Some of this propaganda appears 
to have found its way into the press. On 2 November 1918, an article by author A.A. Milne 
criticising American President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points for not being sufficiently 
punitive towards Germany appeared in the Essex Newsman. The proposed alternative, 
‘Civilisation’s Fourteen Points’, included ‘Germany’s complicity in the Armenian 
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massacres.’168 This was one of only four times the Newsman made reference to the Armenian 
Genocide during the war. The remaining three were brief notices on local fundraising efforts; 
no details of the atrocity, nor any explanation of what it was, ever appeared in the paper.169 
Combined with Milne’s employment with MI7(b), a branch of the Directorate of Military 
Intelligence responsible for preparing and distributing military information, including to the 
press,170 this was likely placed propaganda content. However, this does not mean that the above 
criticisms, appearing mostly in newspaper editorials, carried similar propagandistic intentions. 
 Questions of propaganda are separate from the more important matter of whether these 
commentators genuinely believed Germany to be responsible, though the two are often 
erroneously conflated.171 For Donald Bloxham, the clearest evidence that these assertions 
‘emerged from a propaganda campaign’ seems to be the lack of evidence that Germany had 
any role in forming the genocidal policy or that German influence over its Turkish ally was 
sufficient to prevent its execution, as the above wartime critics claimed.172 Arguments 
otherwise by Vahakn Dadrian and others are attributed to their failure ‘to break down the rather 
rudimentary wartime propaganda of the Entente.’173 That these historians could find ample 
evidence to suggest a German role, regardless of the validity of their interpretations, suggests, 
at least, that contemporary critics might also have been sincerely mistaken about German 
culpability. Indeed, as Hans-Lukas Kieser points out, German officials might not have been 
able to prevent the genocide, but neither did they make the effort. ‘Once it understood the 
extermination’, writes Kieser, Germany ‘worked only to limit damage to prestige, to refuse 
accusations of guilt and, in the same perspective, to facilitate some humanitarian assistance.’174  
Press criticisms, if extreme, were hardly unreasonable given the unwillingness of the 
German press, under an oppressive system of government censorship, to condemn the 
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Armenian Genocide.175 As ample examples from The Times’ column ‘Through German Eyes’ 
proved, German newspapers also frequently defended the official Ottoman narrative.176 Most 
controversial was the widely quoted anti-Armenian diatribe of far-right journalist Count 
Reventlow. Aptly called ‘Reventlow the Frightful’ by the Daily Mail’s former Berlin 
correspondent, he affirmed ‘not only the right but the duty’ of Turkish authorities ‘to proceed 
with violence against the unreliable, blood-sucking, and revolutionary Armenian element’, for 
‘in war it would be nothing short of a crime to treat such an element with kid gloves.’177 
Reventlow’s words convinced the press that ‘the Kaiser and his Ministers are ready to 
acquiesce in and even to approve of cold-blooded murder.’178 Bryce, on the other hand, doubted 
this particular article’s representative qualities. He warned Toynbee about relying too heavily 
upon Reventlow, who was ‘only the [Leopold] Maxse or “Globe” of Germany’, referencing 
the far-right UK press.179 Yet he still believed that Germany was culpable in the way the press 
described. Repeating his claim made in his House of Lords address of October 1915 that only 
Germany could compel the Turks to cease the massacres, also implied by Bloxham to be a 
propagandist move,180 in private correspondence, he advised Toynbee to downplay any explicit 
suggestion of German responsibility in his forthcoming pamphlet, Armenian Atrocities: The 
Murder of a Nation, because ‘we want to get the Germans to stop the massacres + to try to 
make them responsible is not the best way to do that.’181 
For Sykes, the belief that the Armenian Genocide was, effectively, a German atrocity 
accounted for the longevity of the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ in the public imagination. It made it 
possible to distinguish the ‘good old Turk’ of romantic Orientalist literature from the ‘Young 
Turk with a German uniform, a German parade voice, and German technical education’ who 
had learned ‘ruthless action and inflexible tyranny’ from his ‘German professors’. It was the 
latter, not the former, who mistreated UK prisoners and massacred Armenians.182 Lacking any 
study of UK public opinion on the Armenian Genocide, it is impossible to know how far these 
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sentiments were shared, but a critical letter written by a veteran who fought against the Turks 
in response to Sykes only confirmed his point. While he accepted that the Armenian massacres 
were ‘as ruthless as anything that men have done for several hundred years’, he contested 
Sykes’ refutation of the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ narrative not only with reference to his personal 
experiences of Turkish chivalry, reinforced by the soldiers’ accounts discussed above, but by 
noting the apparent ambiguity as to who was responsible for the massacres: ‘History will decide 
how the blame is to be apportioned between Turk, German and Kurd.’183 The press was not so 
willing to absolve the Turks from responsibility, yet the fact that the Genocide was perpetrated 
by the Young Turks was somewhat obscured within their Germano-centric criticisms. Its 
primary rhetorical and ideological significance was not in justifying the righteousness of 
Britain’s war not against the Ottoman Empire but against Germany. Paradoxically, therefore, 
accounts of both Turkish ‘gentlemanly’ conduct and atrocious misconduct served the same 
ends. 
This provides further explanation for the surprisingly muted public response to the 
suffering of UK prisoners captured at Kut and elsewhere. Unlike the Armenian Genocide, there 
was no obvious German connection to warrant attribution to Prussian influence or 
acquiescence. The Scotsman was the only paper to blame Germany for the crime and it did so 
in only the most abstract sense: since the Kaiser had caused the war, he was the ‘arch-criminal’ 
responsible ‘for all the suffering that the war has caused’, including the deaths of UK prisoners 
in Ottoman captivity. This was merely an attempt to highlight the relevance of this atrocity, 
like all others that occurred during the First World War, to post-war discussions of how the 
Kaiser should be dealt with. Yet, the Scotsman was careful to stress that the UK’s ire should 
be directed principally at Ottoman officials. It was not, through these criticisms, absolving them 
of guilt or advocating ‘extenuating the punishment which they have richly deserved’.184 As 
Horne and Kramer noted above, however, atrocities were valued based not on the atrociousness 
of the crime itself but on the significance of the enemy it condemned. Since the Turks were the 
exclusive culprit for this atrocity, the muted public response is, perhaps, unsurprising.  
One readers’ response to the Manchester Guardian’s condemnation of Turkish officials 
is particularly revealing of the Germano-centric lens through which these atrocities were 
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viewed. Commenting on the recently published Treatment of British Prisoners, the paper 
wrote: 
 
In part the explanation is utter indifference to human life and human suffering, but such 
indifference does not excuse, it merely stamps the Turkish government as outside the country 
of nations. In part it was deliberate, conscious wickedness, a brutal nature and a brutal system 
expressing themselves.185 
 
In a letter attacking George Bernard Shaw’s claims of moral equivalency between the UK and 
Germany, Herbert Pike substituted ‘German’ for ‘Turkish’ in the above passage to describe 
German, not Ottoman, atrocities.186 For Pike, the main value in these words was not in what 
they revealed about atrocities committed towards the Kut prisoners but in providing a general 
description which could be adapted to condemn Germany. 
 
* * * 
 
In stark contrast to the demonising image of the barbaric German ‘Hun’, Turkish soldiers 
apparently enjoyed a remarkably positive reputation as sporting gentlemen who upheld all the 
‘civilised’ values which Germany so threatened. Constructed around claims that Turks did not 
commit German-style atrocities, its longevity despite widely documented atrocities against 
Armenians and UK prisoners was curious. Besides corroborating previous scholarly assertions 
as to the cultural impeachability of soldiers’ testimonies, from which the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ 
emerged, this popular view of ‘the Turk’ provides useful insights into how Britain and Ireland 
viewed their war with the Ottoman Empire. Whether admiring the Turks’ ‘gentlemanly’ 
conduct at Gallipoli or condemning their atrocities, the analysis was, at all times, focused on 
Britain’s chief enemy both militarily and ideologically, Germany. As shown in the next and 
final chapter, this Germano-centrism was just as prevalent in determining the value of Britain’s 
military campaigns against the Ottoman Empire. 
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Chapter Three 
‘For the Empire of the World’: The Ottoman Empire in British War 
Strategy 
 
Lamenting the Gallipoli campaign’s failure, due, in its view, to insufficient government 
support, and fearing a similar fate for the Mesopotamian campaign, the Manchester Guardian 
prophesied in April 1916 that ‘to the future historian it will be one of the paradoxes of this war 
that the country as a whole was so strangely indifferent to the importance of the war in the 
East.’ Had Britain remained on the defensive in Western Europe in 1915 and fully committed 
to an assault on Constantinople, the paper argued, it would have not only brought the Ottomans 
to surrender but, in so doing, ‘ensure[d] the defeat of Germany’s Eastern ambitions’ and 
secured the British Empire’s position as the ‘greatest of Eastern powers’.1 Historians have only 
recently began to consider such imperialist arguments for an ‘Eastern’ strategy. Keith Jeffrey, 
for example, suggests that the strategic debates between so-called ‘Westerners’ and ‘Easterners 
was less about how to defeat Germany than a broader difference in perspective, pitting a 
‘relatively limited, local and European mindset’ against ‘a more expansive, “imperial mind”, 
embodying an imperturbable sense of global reach’.2 Fantauzzo’s recent analysis of press 
commentary on the captures of Baghdad and Jerusalem places the press firmly in the latter 
camp.3 However, the Guardian’s characterisation of Britain’s Eastern campaigns as an imperial 
proxy-war against Germany, though widespread in the press, has received only passing notice. 
 This chapter considers the Ottoman Empire’s place within Britain’s global strategy, as 
understood by the press. Chapter Two explored press discussions of Ottoman military conduct 
at length, and war correspondents’ reports on the battles themselves, especially at Gallipoli, 
have been well-covered elsewhere.4 Instead, this chapter discusses why the press believed 
fighting the supposedly ‘Turco-German’ enemy, established in previous chapters, was 
necessary. First, it establishes the perceived value of an Ottoman surrender through strategic 
debates surrounding the Dardanelles (later Gallipoli) campaign. This was greatly desired, 
although only insofar as it hastened, and did not jeopardise, the final victory in Europe against 
Germany. Though undoubtedly Britain’s most famous (and infamous) Eastern venture, 
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Gallipoli was anomalous in this respect. Campaigns against the Ottoman Empire were largely 
fought in the Middle East, where victory would not cause an Ottoman collapse and, 
consequently, promised little towards Germany’s military defeat. Here, the imperialist 
interpretation, outlined above, took precedence. For the press, the Middle Eastern campaigns’ 
main value was in thwarting Germany’s empire, now stretching from ‘Berlin to Baghdad’, from 
reaching Egypt and India. Supposedly the principal object for which Germany went to war, 
this gave Britain’s conflict with the Ottoman Empire hitherto unrecognised importance, 
although, once again, only insofar as it related to Germany. 
 
The Dardanelles Campaign 
 
On 22 February 1915, the Manchester Evening News saw ‘the chief interest in this cruel war 
move from one quarter of the globe to another’—from the Western Front to the Ottoman 
Empire.5 Two days earlier, the Admiralty announced to the press that an Anglo-French fleet 
had commenced ‘an attack upon the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles’.6 The telegram 
gave no indication that this bombardment would be followed by further operations and, as 
Christopher Bell emphasises, certainly did not officially confirm that the Allies ‘intended to 
force the [Dardanelles] Straits’, as Lloyd George later recalled.7 This omission was, doubtless, 
intentional. The War Council had approved Churchill’s plan for a naval attack on the 
Dardanelles on the premise that it could be easily retracted should the bombardment prove 
ineffective and success unlikely.8 Nonetheless, within the ‘imagination of military and naval 
writers’ the ‘plain and simple tale’ of ‘comparatively small operations’ contained in the 
Admiralty’s telegram was read as ‘the prelude to one of the greatest feats of arms in all of 
history’.9 As The Times explained, the Royal Navy was before ‘the gates of the East’ and, for 
British imperial prestige, ‘whenever operations are begun in the East, there must be no failure 
and no going back.’10  
Since the Admiralty’s telegram did not officially announce the Dardanelles campaign, 
it obviously did not present the press with its rationale. Nonetheless, newspapers easily 
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discerned the strategic objectives of Churchill’s plan.11 The Times’ military correspondent, 
Repington, later amongst the campaign’s most fervent press critics, found it ‘scarcely necessary 
to point out’ the value of forcing the Dardanelles.12 This was not primarily in the expected 
Ottoman surrender. Though certainly desirable, given how ineffectual their offensives had been 
thus far, suffering serious defeats against British forces in Mesopotamia and around Suez and 
against Russia in an unsuccessful winter offensive in the Caucasus,13 it hardly justified the 
Observer’s assertion that ‘reopening the Dardanelles’ would ‘transform the whole character of 
the struggle to the fatal disadvantage of the Central Empires.’14 Its importance was instead in 
its broader political and economic consequences. Forcing the Dardanelles would demonstrate 
Allied military prowess sufficiently to remove the Balkan States’ apparent hesitancy to declare 
war on the Central Powers, originally expected to be an immediate consequence of the Ottoman 
Empire’s belligerence, as previously discussed. ‘With the possibility before them of another 
readjustment of boundaries at the expense of Turkey’, the Irish Independent explained, the 
Balkan League would reunite behind the Allied cause.15 With the Dardanelles reopened, British 
and French ships would also regain year-round access to Russia’ warm-water ports in the Black 
Sea. According to the Aberdeen Daily Journal, its most ‘immediate attraction’ was in allowing 
Russia to export large quantities of grain to Britain through the Dardanelles, which would cause 
a substantial reduction in domestic food prices.16 Indeed, the Essex County Chronicle’s only 
mention of the Dardanelles bombardment for February was in a market report.17 Militarily, 
however, it would decide the ‘economic war’ of blockades in the Allies’ favour and grant 
Russia a reliable stream of much-needed supplies and, most importantly, munitions.18 With all 
this before them, the Edinburgh Evening News observed that ‘hardly any other event of the war 
has been received so approvingly or aroused such interest in London as the fleet attack on the 
Dardanelles’.19 If the Dardanelles campaign were successful, Asquith expected the war in 
Europe to be won by July 1915.20 
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This consensus broke after the Gallipoli landings in April 1915, which coincided with 
the Second Battle of Ypres. For the Daily Mail, this was a ‘titanic battle for Belgium and the 
coast’ in which, the Daily Mail explained, ‘we are fighting for our very lives.’ Whatever victory 
at Gallipoli would contribute to Allied success in Europe, ‘Defeat at Ypres would bring 
Germans to Calais and Dunkirk. It would bring England to the bitterest extremity of peril.’21 
Faced with this crisis in Europe, The Times charged Asquith’s government with ‘divert[ing] 
our strength… from the critical battlefields in the West’, while the Daily Mail called for all 
available men and munitions to be redirected from Gallipoli to Flanders on 27 April 1915, only 
two days after they had landed.22 These critics were soon vindicated when, on 9 May, British 
forces failed to capitalise on a breakthrough achieved at Aubers Ridge because ‘the want of an 
unlimited supply of high explosive was a fatal bar to our success’, as the Times’ military 
correspondent, Repington, famously declared.23 
These criticisms’ political ramifications are well-known. Repington’s exposé 
contradicted Asquith’s public declaration to Newcastle munitions workers that the advance in 
Europe was not impeded by insufficient munitions and, writes George Cassar, implied that the 
Prime Minister was ‘guilty of criminal deception.’24 The resulting ‘shells scandal’, coupled 
with the First Sea Lord’s resignation from the Admiralty to protest the Dardanelles campaign 
the following day, forced Asquith to rapidly form a new wartime coalition for his own political 
survival. As one American journalist concluded of Repington’s article, ‘never before perhaps 
in the history of the world, certainly of war, have sixteen words in a newspaper produced such 
epoch-making results’, an assessment Repington happily reproduced in his own memoirs.25 As 
a result, however, they appeared to many newspapers more as highly inappropriate efforts to 
discredit Asquith’s Liberal Government than genuine concerns over military strategy. Their 
substantive points were, accordingly, largely ignored. Even the Unionist Irish Times, which 
had previously expressed similar concerns that Gallipoli would jeopardise the Allies’ position 
in Western Europe, opted not to discuss ‘the wisdom, or otherwise, of the operations on which 
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the Morning Post bases its criticism’ and instead devoted its editorial response to condemning 
these ‘unfair and unpatriotic’ personal attacks.26  
Nonetheless, the substantive debate (where it existed) reveals much about the Ottoman 
Empire’s perceived relevance within war strategy. This was one between ‘Easterners’ and 
‘Westerners’, that is, between those who advocated redirecting the war effort towards 
Germany’s weaker allies and those who favoured concentrating all forces, as far as possible, 
on the decisive point. David French rejects these conventional labels as obscuring the true 
division over British strategy which, he suggests, was not about geography but rather ‘time’. 
For policy-makers, this was between supporters of a ‘business as usual’ approach, wherein 
Britain would play a largely supporting role and leave the actual fighting to Russia and France, 
and those who recognised that a greater military commitment on the Continent was necessary 
show support for Britain’s allies.27 Though the war’s geographic direction might have been a 
peripheral concern amongst the policy-making elite, contemporary press observers clearly did 
not appreciate the distinction, writing explicitly of competing ‘Easterner’ and ‘Westerner’ 
schools of thought.28  
The Manchester Guardian’s ‘Student of War’ supported the Dardanelles campaign on 
‘Easterner’ grounds. The author suggests that the above political and economic factors would 
coalesce in a potentially decisive new Hungarian front opened by the newly belligerent Balkan 
States. The author regarded Hungary not only as the ‘strategic centre’ of the Eastern Front, but, 
as the ‘weakest area in the German military system of defences’, the ‘key to the military 
deadlock’ of the Western Front as well. Given Germany’s strengthening of the Hungarian 
position through reinforcements and other ‘counter-preparations’ such as diversionary 
manoeuvres in East Prussia, the reopening of the Dardanelles would be essential for the 
presently ill-equipped Russian army ‘to produce serious results against Hungary’ and hasten 
Germany’s defeat.29 The Times, on the other hand, adhered to the ‘familiar maxim that in war 
blows should be concentrated upon the decisive point’ which defined ‘Westerner’ thought. 
Though suspicious of such offensives outside the decisive theatre in Western Europe, it agreed 
the Dardanelles offensive contained ‘that touch of imagination which has of late been 
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conspicuously lacking in the war’ because of its value to both the Eastern, and especially 
Western, theatres.30 
The liberal Burnley News was, therefore, inaccurate in charging critics with a parochial, 
British-centric conception of Allied strategy, blind to the Dardanelles’ value.31 Indeed, the 
Morning Post’s chief charge against Churchill in its 23 April leader, which initially sparked 
the controversy over the Gallipoli campaign, was that a combined-arms offensive against the 
Ottoman Empire had not been launched sooner. His failing was in not recognising what was 
immediately obvious to the press, that ‘the Straits could only be forced with a joint naval and 
military expedition in concert.’32 Forcing the Dardanelles remained a desirable objective. As 
Repington declared a week before initiating the ‘shells scandal’, ‘no one denies or can deny 
the importance of the military and political objects which we have in view’ at Gallipoli.33 Nor 
did proponents deny Gallipoli’s subservience to the war in Europe. For the conservative Daily 
Telegraph, it was ‘no minor operation of the war’ precisely because its ‘political and economic 
results’, outlined above, meant that success at Gallipoli was ‘bound to effect the whole course 
of the war in Europe’.34 This was also true for the Manchester Guardian, whose editor, C.P. 
Scott, had been personally convinced of the ‘far greater possibilities of the Eastern Front’ by 
Churchill and the self-described ‘Gallipolist’ Lloyd George.35 Against the ‘doctrine of 
concentration’ espoused by Westerner critics, the Manchester Guardian asserted that ‘sound 
strategy’ required ‘attack[ing] the enemy not where his lines are strongest but where they are 
weaker.’ The perhaps ‘100,000 or 150,000 men’ needed for success at Gallipoli would, 
therefore, be ‘more usefully employed’ there than in Belgium.36 Its value was not, however, 
‘separate from the operations in the Carpathians and in Flanders’, but as ‘the beginning of the 
rolling up of the German flank in Austria and Hungary.’37 Thus, ‘the whole case for this 
Dardanelles campaign’ assumed that it would not ‘weaken our defensive strength in 
Flanders’.38 
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Though the Gallipoli campaign continued into early 1916, the basic strategic 
disagreements were established by May 1915.39 Both ‘Easterners’ and ‘Westerners’ within the 
press agreed that an Ottoman collapse carried tremendous value. Their disagreement was in 
whether this was feasible without jeopardising success in Europe. As it was ‘impossible to 
conduct two large wars at once’, a choice had to be made between whether the East or the West 
would take precedence.40 Likewise, neither desired an Ottoman defeat for its own sake, but for 
its potentially war-changing contributions towards the war in Europe and ultimate victory over 
Britain’s chief enemy, Germany. Even at its most strategically viable, therefore, the war with 
the Ottoman Empire was subordinated to the Anglo-German conflict. 
As ‘the only eastern scheme’ to carry such war-altering promises, according to Briton 
Cooper Busch,41 or even reasonable prospects of an Ottoman collapse, Gallipoli was an 
anomaly. As Matthew Hughes explains of the later Palestine campaign, however, ‘short of 
[General] Allenby marching his army hundreds of miles across Palestine, Syria and the 
Anatolian heartland to threaten Istanbul, Turkey was going to stay in the war.’42 However, 
obscured by the more tangible steps towards Germany’s military defeat was an additional, 
imperialist objective of the Dardanelles campaign: ‘the final overthrow of Germany’s designs 
in the Near East.’43 For the press, this was the principal consideration of Britain’s Middle 
Eastern campaigns, most evident through the curious, albeit brief, advocacy of a grand Middle 
Eastern offensive by The Times’ military correspondent. On 24 November 1915, Repington 
relayed to Conservative leader Andrew Bonar Law his plans for an ‘active war of attack upon 
the whole of the Turkish-Syrian coasts from the Dardanelles to the Sinai desert inclusive’, 
requiring 500,000 troops and to be directed by Kitchener himself. The plan was much against 
his strategic instincts as a self-proclaimed ‘confirmed Westerner’ who ‘believe[d] that the 
decision of the war is to be sought on the principal fronts.’44 He did not hold this conviction 
lightly. In January 1918, when he heard rumours that the ‘Versailles soldiers’ of the Allied 
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Supreme War Council intended to redirect the Allied offensive towards the Ottoman Empire, 
Repington implored Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times, to use his paper to ‘stop these mad 
Eastern schemes’ by ‘attack[ing] the War Cabinet without mercy’ or allowing him free rein to 
do so himself.45 When Dawson refused his request, Repington resigned as military 
correspondent, ending his 15-year career at The Times.46 Repington believed, at least for a time, 
that an extensive offensive in the Middle East was necessary nonetheless for matters of imperial 
defence: ‘the German Drang nach Osten must be met somewhere’.47 Before turning to press 
commentary on the Middle Eastern campaigns themselves, it is, therefore, necessary to explain 
the perceived challenge Drang nach Osten posed to the British Empire. 
 
Germany’s Drang nach Osten and the British Empire 
 
Despite its German rendering, Drang nach Osten’s first attested use was by a Polish author, 
Julian Klaczko, to describe Germany’s aggressive eastward expansion in his 1849 polemic, 
Die deutschen Hegemonen (The German Hegemony). This was typical of its future use, too, 
the expression appearing most frequently in non-German sources, especially those of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Accordingly, Torsten Leuschner suggests that Drang nach Osten was less 
an expression of actual German policy than an articulation of ‘a feeling of being threatened by 
Germany on the part of the latter’s Eastern neighbours… suggesting a permanent dichotomy 
of impulse-driven perpetrator and victim’.48 The phrase served a similar function in Britain, 
where Harry Hanak suggests it had entered standard political jargon by 1914, referring to an 
historical mission of German eastward expansion towards the heart of the British Empire, 
India.49  
The Ottoman Empire had been a battleground for competing interests between Europe’s 
great powers for decades prior to the First World War.50 For its part, Britain sought to keep the 
‘sick man of Europe’ alive despite considerable domestic criticism, discussed last chapter, as a 
bulwark against Russian expansion towards India, the proverbial jewel of its empire.51 By 
1907, Britain had neutralised the historic threats to Egypt and India through an entente with 
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France and Russia, sectioning off mutually-agreed-upon spheres of influence; at the same time, 
Germany emerged as Britain’s chief rival in the region, whose expansion not only competed 
with the British Empire but, arguably, directly sought to supplant it.52  
The apparent goal of Drang nach Osten was the establishment of Mitteleuropa. As a 
major topic of intellectual and political debate in Germany since the turn of the nineteenth 
century, the term denoted numerous different and often contradictory political projects. For 
liberals like Friedrich List, it meant a unified free-trade zone under German dominance (a 
mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftszone); for socialists like Rosa Luxemburg, it was an alternative 
to chauvinist nationalism which, through the absorption of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
Empires, promised a new Central European communist federation.53 Its geographic boundaries 
were similarly contested. In its most conservative interpretation, Mitteleuropa referred to only 
a small region around the German states. For others, it extended to Estonia in the north and 
Constantinople in the south.54 However, it was its use by German imperialists in connection 
with Weltpolitik that, alone, captured Britain’s attention. For the press, Mitteleuropa was 
synonymous with the formation of a continuous empire stretching ‘from Berlin to Baghdad’. 
Hence, Friedrich Naumann’s book Mitteleuropa, which bore only a superficial connection to 
the imperialist interpretation,55 was immediately misread as advocating the German Empire’s 
expansion ‘from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf’. When made available in English translation in 
1916, the Manchester Guardian warned readers that the project Nauman supposedly 
advocated, if successful, ‘would make Germany beyond all comparison the dominant Power of 
the world.’56 
German encroachment into the East was principally associated with Deutsche Bank’s 
Berlin-Baghdad Railway. Its plans were more ambitious than its name suggests, extending 
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from Hamburg, via Berlin and Baghdad, to the ports of Basra on the Persian Gulf.57 British 
officials had long recognised the value of this route. In 1902, Foreign Secretary Lord 
Lansdowne advocated financing the Berlin-Baghdad Railway’s construction with British funds 
so as to place the Baghdad Railway under British control in order to prevent Russian, rather 
than German, expansion towards India. Lansdowne’s proposal was ultimately rejected by 
Arthur Balfour’s cabinet on 22 April 1903 due to significant backlash from Viceroy of India 
Lord Curzon and several leading newspapers, grounded largely in suspicions of German 
intentions.58 These were well-founded. In Die Bagdadbahn, published in 1911 to promote the 
Berlin-Baghdad Railway as well as general German economic investment in the Ottoman 
Empire, Paul Rohrbach asserted that Germany’s efforts to gain influence over the Porte through 
such commercial ventures had ‘no other object but the desire to effect an insurance against the 
danger of a war with England.’ If Germany could secure an Ottoman attack on Egypt, it ‘would 
mean for England not only the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal, and of her connections 
with India and the Far East, but would probably entail the loss also of her possessions in Central 
and East Africa.’59 These were not fringe views. Sean McMeekin, echoing Fritz Fischer before 
him, places the Berlin-Baghdad Railway at the centre of German efforts to become a ‘world 
power’ at Britain’s expense, for which he considers Die Bagdadbahn a ‘classic pan-German 
primer’.60  
Everyman editor Charles Saroléa also saw Rohrbach as ‘one of the most authoritative 
exponents of German foreign policy’.61 He therefore found in Rohrbach’s book an official 
admission that the Berlin-Baghdad Railway was but a vehicle for Germany’s Drang nach 
Osten, a ‘gigantic scheme of commercial and political absorption of three empires, from the 
Upper Danube to the Persian Gulf’ into an expansive German Empire which threatened ‘the 
Imperial future of Britain’ by providing Germany access to both India and Egypt. Thus, Saroléa 
expected that its completion would cause a conflict which, because of the many competing 
interests in the Ottoman Empire, ‘must needs involve all the European powers, must force the 
whole Eastern Question to a crisis, and, once begun, cannot be terminated until the map of 
Europe and Asia shall be reconstructed.’ In short, he predicted the outbreak of a general 
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European war beginning not in Sarajevo but in Baghdad.62 Rohrbach’s remarks were also 
reported with concern in several newspapers and, in March 1911, brought before Parliament 
by Conservative MP Lawrence Dundas. For Dundas, the Berlin-Baghdad Railway’s clearly 
stated challenge to the British Empire made it imperative for officials ‘to do what they could 
to counter the advance of German influence… in the regions where our own interests were of 
paramount importance—the region south of Baghdad.’63 For the press, this was also the guiding 
principle behind Britain’s four-year-long military engagement with the Ottoman Empire in the 
Middle East in the First World War. 
 
The Middle Eastern Campaigns 
 
The Ottoman Empire’s entry into the war as an apparent German vassal state, outlined in 
Chapter One, was considered a remarkable step forward in the Mitteleuropa project. It was 
believed that all Ottoman military activity in the East was directed by Germany towards its 
completion. The attack on Suez in January 1915 was attributed to ‘the political prophets of 
Germany’s all-world policy [Weltpolitik]’, doubtless in reference to Rohrbach and Friedrich 
Bernhardi, another well-known Pan-German figure who advocated an Ottoman-German 
alliance for precisely this purpose.64 Ottoman forces invading Persia were also ‘undoubtedly 
acting under German instigation’, with the apparent purpose of ‘bringing the area of the war a 
little nearer Afghanistan and India, which is one of her [Germany’s] objects.’65 In reality, 
Germany exercised no such control over Ottoman military strategy, which was dictated nearly 
exclusively by Enver, whom Edward Erickson charges with the often-poor performance of the 
Ottoman Army for his ‘amateurish strategic vision’ and ‘continual insistence on offensive 
operations and optimistic plans.’66 Ottoman soldiers were, nonetheless, considered unwilling 
servants of German imperialism, ‘shamelessly sacrificed … to help realise Germany’s dream 
of an empire stretching from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf.’67 
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At the same time, however, this presented British forces with an opportunity to thwart 
Germany’s designs in the East through military action. For the press, this was the principal 
value of Britain’s capture of Basra on 21 November 1914. The Times admitted that it did ‘not 
quite understand the motive of this particular campaign’ from a purely military perspective 
beyond being a merely diversionary exercise to relieve pressure on Russian forces in 
Transcaucasia and assisting in the defence of the Suez Canal.68 This was hardly a cause for 
much celebration since the Ottoman threat to Suez was routinely, and not unreasonably, 
dismissed at this time, as discussed previously. More important was Basra’s place within 
Mitteleuropa. As the Scotsman reminded its readers, Basra was not only ‘the chief Ottoman 
port and emporium of the lower Euphrates’ but also ‘the designated terminus of that much-
discussed German enterprise, the Baghdad Railway’ designed ‘with the object of ousting our 
commerce and influence from the Middle East.’69 From this imperial perspective, The Times 
heralded news of Basra’s capture as a ‘stirring announcement’ which would be received with 
much regret in Berlin: ‘It means that the dreams and schemes of twenty years, the ripening 
fruits of the “world-policy” which began when the Kaiser paid his memorable visit to Abdul 
Hamid, have crumbled to dust and ashes.’70  
It was expected that success at Basra would secure and even expand Britain’s imperial 
reach in the region by increasing its ‘prestige’. As French explains, ‘prestige’ referred to the 
belief that Britain’s imperial position was based on Britons being perceived as ‘morally, 
racially and military superior to those they governed’.71 Lovat Fraser, former editor of The 
Times of India, agreed that the popular view of the British Raj in 1911, ‘visible in every grade 
of society, from the highest to the lowest’, was one held together ‘by bayonets rather than by 
the merits of our rule.’72 Thus, the Times’ ‘chief consideration’ was the potential for the 
exemplary performance of Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ in the operation to rouse public 
opinion in India in support of the war. Additionally, as a demonstration of British military 
power, Basra would appeal more to an Eastern audience than ‘vague stories of distant conflicts’ 
in Europe for its renown ‘in the annals of the East’.73 ‘From the point of view of prestige as 
affecting Afghanistan, the North-West Frontier hill tribes, and others,’ the Edinburgh Evening 
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News declared the victory at Basra ‘essential.’74 The Daily Telegraph expected this increase in 
prestige to be permanent. While it was inevitable that Britain would suffer some reverses in the 
future, this would do little to alter its image in ‘Oriental lands’ where ‘it is the first hard hit 
which counts.’ For the Telegraph, the Ottoman Empire’s belligerence was a welcome 
opportunity for expanding British imperial influence throughout the East. Far from lamenting 
the recent expansion of Mitteleuropa, the paper actually found ‘reason for thankfulness that the 
Porte succumbed to the machinations of Germany’s agents.’75  
These celebrations were premature. Humiliating defeats at Gallipoli and, most 
especially, Kut, where General Charles Townshend was captured along with approximately 
10,000 predominantly British-Indian troops after a 143-day-long siege, had supposedly 
shattered Britain’s prestige. Officials believed that further operations in the Middle East were 
necessary to atone for these failures and stave off potential rebellion from Muslim subjects, a 
particular concern given the Ottoman Sultan’s proclamation of jihad in November 1914.76 
Newspapers were equally concerned about Britain’s lost prestige.77 However, their continued 
comparisons between the Palestine Campaign and the Crusades,78 despite numerous D Notices 
stressing the danger such ‘references which might be interpreted as implying that this is a war 
of Christian versus Moslem’ could cause for Britain’s positions in India and Egypt, suggests 
that they gave much less credence to fears of a Muslim revolt.79 More important for the press 
was the strength these failures supposedly gave to the Drang nach Osten. Prestige was a zero-
sum game; as the Irish Times explained, it was not simply lost after Gallipoli, but ‘transferred 
to Germany.’ Thus, victory at Baghdad provided more than a general demonstration to the 
Eastern world of the martial prowess upon which Britain’s authority supposedly lay. It also 
offered ‘proof to all Asia that Germany’s pretensions were fraudulent, that she cannot now 
keep faith with any of her dupes, that she is dragging the Turkish Empire to certain downfall. 
British-Indians, not Turco-Teutons, now occupy Bagdad, and they have come to stay.’80 
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This was not the only thread of press discussion, but neither was it simply one point 
among many, as Fantauzzo’s brief paragraph suggests. As the titular terminus of the Berlin-
Baghdad Railway, the city’s connections with German imperialism were well-known. Its 
historical splendour, though apparently undying in the East as the former global centre of 
learning during the Abbasid Caliphate, had declined considerably over time in the West. Even 
travellers drawn to the region for its romantic past were disappointed to discover its ‘barbarous’ 
contemporary state.81 According to one Daily Mail contributor, it was only because of its 
‘association with German schemes of conquest by railway’ that Baghdad re-entered popular 
consciousness.82 Like most papers examined here, the Mail identified the significant reverse to 
Germany’s Drang nach Osten as the most salient victory. Chandrika Kaul highlights the 
importance of headlines in the Mail’s presentation, which ‘introduced the topic and summed 
up its main features’ for quick digestion by the reader.83 For its editorial on Britain’s capture 
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of Baghdad, these were: ‘Maude in Baghdad. A heavy blow to German ambitions.’84 A cartoon 
published in Cardiff’s Western Mail the following day (see figure 1) showed this point visually. 
Titled ‘“A Place in the Sun”’, a quotation from Bernhard von Bülow’s famous articulation of 
Weltpolitik as Foreign Minister in 1897, it depicted Kaiser Wilhelm II looking aghast at the 
Union Flag raised over Baghdad, the plans for the ‘Great Baghdad Railway Scheme’ in hand 
and the ‘Germanisation of Asia’ discarded by his feet. The cartoon suggested that, by capturing 
the city, British forces had frustrated all these ambitions in one fell swoop. The lone reference 
to the Ottoman Empire was the presence of Sultan Mehmet V, who appeared only to assure the 
Kaiser that he was not witnessing a mirage.85 
German imperialism also featured prominently in other topics of discussion., Baghdad 
was steeped in historical memory, its ‘very name… open[ing] the portals of Eastern fancy and 
romance.’86 It was prominently associated with the Thousand and One Arabian Nights, a text 
so widely circulated in Europe that its influence upon western literature is, according to Robert 
Irwin, akin to that of the Bible.87 The Scotsman took pride that it would be Britain, not 
Germany, that would restore the ‘city of the “Arabian Nights”’ to its former glory and fully 
realise its commercial potential. By freeing Baghdad from supposed German suzerainty, 
‘Germany will not be permitted to take, as she had planned to do, this development under her 
care. With her troops and Generals her influence is ebbing out of Asia.’88 More interesting was 
the Evening Express’ analysis of Baghdad’s place within the Allies’ ‘just war’. It was for ‘his 
own selfish and ambitious aims… and particularly the Bagdad Railway project’ that the Kaiser 
had, since the 1890s, refused to condemn Armenian massacres. As shown last chapter, 
Germany’s alleged complicity in the Armenian Genocide was used to further claims that the 
Allies were fighting a ‘just war’ against Germany. At Baghdad, too, British forces were 
avenging the Armenians not only by ‘dealing a deadly blow at the foulest system of 
misgovernment to be found anywhere to-day’, the Ottoman Empire, but by repudiating the 
callous indifference to human suffering responsible for Germany’s present influence in 
Constantinople. Dismantling Germany’s Mitteleuropa scheme, therefore, went beyond 
‘maintaining the “prestige” of Great Britain in the East’; it was also a moral imperative.89 
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Uniting this commentary was a conviction that the ‘heaviest blow which Turkey has 
received during the war’ would, the Northampton Mercury stressed, be felt ‘scarcely less in 
Berlin than in Constantinople.’90 This continued to motivate press interest in the Middle 
Eastern campaigns until their conclusion, as Germany’s challenge to British imperialism in the 
East was not expelled wholesale by the capture of Baghdad. The Rochdale Observer warned 
against such complacency, reminding readers that ‘the German menace’ was not concentrated 
solely in Baghdad. Through the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, Germany also sought to encompass 
all lands in between. Baghdad was, in this respect, the beginning rather than the end of the 
proxy-war in the Middle East. The paper encouraged further operations under the principle that 
‘neither Baghdad nor a single square mile of the desert between the city and the head of the 
Persian Gulf ought ever again to be surrendered to Turkish control now that the German plot 
to strike at India through Turkey in Asia has been revealed.’91 Thus, the victory in Palestine 
later that month ‘blasted the German hopes in that region’ while Damascus was claimed in 
October 1918 not ‘because we want it for ourselves’ but because ‘it was one of the stages of 
the German dream of advance towards the dominion’ of the Near East.92 
 
The Ottoman Empire and the ‘Great European War’ 
 
Establishing Mitteleuropa was considered Germany’s central ambition not only in the East. As 
contemporary historian George Prothero explained in 1916, it was also the ‘essential object’ of 
Germany’s entire military operations: 
 
the attack on France and Russia was but a preliminary step, masking the real aim. This 
could not be attained without the overthrow of those Powers, but such a victory would 
be, after all, only a means to an end. The frontiers on either hand once secured, the 
forces of Germany – military, economical, and financial – could, without let or 
hindrance, flood the Nearer and Middle East. From this point of vantage, with 
enormously increased resources and heightened prestige, the final challenge might 
safely be issued to Great Britain for the empire of the world.93  
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Prothero’s book was celebrated by Lovat Fraser for highlighting ‘the fundamental fact that the 
ultimate object for which Germany went to war was to gain control of the Near and Middle 
East’.94 There was, however, little novel in this observation. The Irish Times observed that 
there was ‘no secret of these grandiose aims of German strategy’, which had been openly 
espoused by Rohrbach and others before the war, as noted above. ‘They were the avowed aims 
of her diplomacy in peace. They are, of necessity, the aims of her arms in war.’95 
 Thus, military events elsewhere were viewed in similar terms. For example, the Daily 
Mail explained the Central Powers’ invasion of Serbia in October 1915 through a map of the 
Berlin-Baghdad Railway’s route, titled ‘The Road to India’ (figure 2), heralded by Fraser as a 
‘gallant attempt’ to ‘explain Germany’s war aims to the populace’.96 Bold borders around 
Germany and Austria Hungary, on the one side, and Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, on the 
other, presented the Central Powers as a single political unit, with Serbia as the missing link in 
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Germany’s Mitteleuropa scheme and its path ‘to Suez & India’.97 The Irish Times put the 
warning implicit in this map more directly: Serbia’s defeat would amount to ‘the extension of 
German supremacy from Hamburg to Bagdad, an attack on Egypt, the disruption of India – in 
short, the dissolution of the British Empire.’98  
 Since Mitteleuropa was considered but a precursor to a future war for India and Egypt, 
it was obviously imperative for British imperial interests that it be destroyed. The Manchester 
Guardian accordingly criticised Wilson’s ‘Peace Note’ for failing to appreciate ‘what 
Germany’s Eastern ambitions really mean.’99 Following the US entry into the war in April 
1916, Wilson rebuked other calls for negotiated peace on the same grounds. Addressing the 
American Federation of Labor in November 1917, Wilson noted that one only needed to 
consult a map to see ‘the bulk of German power inserted into the heart of the world. If she can 
keep that, she has kept all that her dreams contemplated when the war began.’100 The Daily 
Mail, who provided just such a map two years earlier, reported with great satisfaction that 
Americans were finally learning that ‘Belgium might be freed and Alsace-Lorraine restored 
and still the Allies would have lost the war … the political and economic ambitions of Germany 
in the Near and Middle East are… the kernel of the war.’101 The Western Front was, in this 
respect, a sideshow to the true question of the war: whether Britain or Germany would attain 
mastery of the East. It was a chiefly imperialist enterprise in which the Ottoman Empire played 
a central role, hitherto unappreciated by later historians, although, once again, solely through 
its perceived subservience to Germany.  
The Ottoman Empire’s centrality to press conceptions of the First World War reflected 
the press’ faithful adherence to the ‘ideology of empire’.102 Within the Conservative press, the 
influence of Alfred Milner, the former South African colonial administrator and ‘embodiment 
of right-wing imperialism’,103 loomed large. James Startt finds Milner’s influence upon The 
Times’ editor especially ‘difficult to overstate’. During his time in the South African Civil 
Service, Dawson belonged to Milner’s famous ‘kindergarten’, where Milner’s ideas about 
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‘imperial consolidation, and the mission of Empire in world affairs’ were imparted upon him.104 
Undertaking military action in the Middle East to thwart Germany’s Drang nach Osten was a 
natural extension of Milner’s insistence that Britain’s ‘Dependent Empire’, such as India, be 
protected from any potential rivals.105 Indeed, Nigel Keohane suggests that, after 1916, many 
Conservative politicians came to support such operations not only because they had become 
dissatisfied with progress in Western Europe after the breakthrough promised by offensives 
like the Somme Offensive failed to materialise, but also from their belief in ‘Milnerite 
imperialism’.106 Support for these Eastern ventures was not an exclusively right-wing 
phenomenon, however. As noted above, the liberal Manchester Guardian was perhaps the most 
fervent advocate for the East’s importance. Kaul shows that concern for India was widespread 
within the press, regardless of political affiliation.107  
 The East’s primacy was also recognised by anti-imperialist critics like H.N. Brailsford, 
a prominent socialist journalist and leading member of the anti-war Union of Democratic 
Control (UDC).108 In his 1916 pamphlet, Turkey and the Roads to the East, published by the 
UDC, he observed that: 
 
as each month passes, the Eastern purposes, alike of the Entente and of the Central 
Empires, assume an overwhelming relative importance among the many issues of the 
war… We are less obsessed by the East than are Russia and Germany, but even to us 
the campaigns round Salonica and in Mesopotamia seem vital, because they touch “the 
road to India.”109 
 
Unlike his imperialist colleagues, Brailsford did not share these concerns. F.M. Leventhal notes 
that Brailsford’s anti-imperialism rendered him strangely sympathetic to Germany’s 
Weltpolitik, believing that ‘as long as imperialism was the name of the game, Germany had a 
right to be included among the players.’110 It was to the East’s primacy, however, that he 
attributed the war’s unfortunate and, supposedly, unnecessary prolongation. If the war were 
exclusively, or even primarily, about Western Europe, Brailsford believed that a reasonably 
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amicable conclusion could be found ‘to-morrow’. Rather, ‘it is in the East that all is fluid and 
uncertain.’111 
Whether those outside the press shared this imperialist interpretation is doubtful. The 
Manchester Guardian decried the ‘apparent indifference of English people to our Eastern 
campaigns’, noting that ‘public opinion is in need of education on British Imperial interests in 
Asia.’112 Though the public had apparently shown great interest in the fate of the besieged 
soldiers at Kut-al-Amara, even at the expense of the German Offensive at Verdun, this was 
supposedly atypical, reflecting the ‘dramatic interest which always belongs to a comparatively 
small beleaguered force holding out against heavy odds’ rather than an appreciation for 
Mesopotamia’s significance.113 Attempts to provide this instruction were apparently 
unsuccessful. As late as September 1918, after nearly four years of fighting in the Middle East, 
The Times claimed that the public was still ‘far from understanding’ the Palestine campaign’s 
relevance and found it necessary to spend nearly 600 words outlining it again at length. Though 
subordinate to the principal task of defeating Germany in Europe, such Eastern ventures were 
necessary for ‘the future security of our position in the East’.114  
These papers offered no evidence for these assertions, making it difficult to judge the 
reasonableness of their comments on public opinion. Given, however, that the press usually 
credited itself with the ability to directly mould public attitudes,115 their atypical observations 
merit some consideration. The cause of this apparent indifference was disputed. The 
Manchester Guardian charged the War Office with deliberately limiting news from 
Mesopotamia, supposedly fearing that it would divert public attention from the Western Front. 
The ‘average Englishman’ was assumed to possess such ‘romantic and historical fascination’ 
with the region that any genuine lack of interest was inexplicable.116 Fraser felt that the Daily 
Mail’s above effort to explain the Berlin-Baghdad Railway’s importance had been similarly 
frustrated by pubic rebukes from Home Secretary Sir John Simon in the House of Commons.117 
More likely was The Times’ suggestion that a popular preoccupation with Western Europe led 
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the public to ignore events elsewhere. It commended the ‘sound general instinct of our people’ 
to ‘translate all these victories over Germany’s allies into the degree in which they weaken 
Germany’. Apparently lost on the public was the great meaning that newspapers’ Germano-
centric interpretations, seen throughout this thesis, gave to the war’s Eastern events. The press 
was not simply presenting otherwise uninteresting news items in a manner more appealing to 
their readers. Stories of Ottoman chivalry and alleged German complicity in their atrocities 
contained significant implications for the perceived righteousness of the UK’s war against 
Germany, as did its supposed dominance in Constantinople for the necessity of defeating 
Germany, by proxy, in the East. By apparently dismissing the Eastern campaigns as irrelevant 
and harmful diversions from the Western Front, The Times charged the public with an overly 
parochial understanding of the First World War which overlooked the Ottoman Empire’s 
important place within it.118  
 
* * * 
 
The press ascribed campaigns against the Ottoman Empire great importance. If fully defeated, 
as promised by the Gallipoli campaign, profound consequences were expected for the war in 
Europe. With Russia adequately supplied through the Dardanelles and the Balkan States on the 
Allied side, final victory over Germany would come swiftly. Militarily dubious Middle Eastern 
campaigns were also considered highly significant for thwarting Germany’s Drang nach Osten, 
an historic mission of Eastward expansion designed at supplanting Britain as the ‘empire of the 
world’. Considered Germany’s central war aim, this placed the East – and the Ottoman Empire 
– at the heart of the conflict. It was, as the Daily Mail put it, the ‘kernel of the war.’ The 
preferred contemporary title for the conflict, the ‘Great European War’, implied more than the 
intra-European ‘civil war’ suggested by Hew Strachan.119 Neither, however, was press interest 
in the war beyond Europe an acknowledgement that the conflict was a ‘world war’, as recently 
claimed by Fantauzzo.120 Where they were not believed to directly affect the balance in Europe, 
military operations in the region were seen as part an imperial conflict between European 
powers undertaken for the same reason that Asquith had justified fighting in Europe: to secure 
Britain’s pre-eminence among the Great Powers.121 If the press’ characterisation of the war 
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was much less geographically Eurocentric than generally assumed, it remained thoroughly 
Germano-centric. As with previous chapters, the Ottoman Empire was important not for its 
own sake, but for its place within an expansive and imperialist interpretation of the Anglo-
German conflict. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated that the wartime UK press viewed the Ottoman Empire as an 
extension of Britain’s primary enemy, Germany. Discussions of the political developments 
responsible for its entry into the war, its soldiers’ supposedly ‘gentlemanly’ conduct, its 
wartime atrocities, and the strategic value of defeating the Ottoman Empire militarily were all 
remarkably Germano-centric. These were not simply cynical attempts to relate otherwise 
uninteresting news from a peripheral theatre to more important events in Europe, however. As 
this thesis has also shown, such Germano-centric discussions gave the Ottoman Empire 
tremendous importance within the press’ broader conception of the First World War. 
Chapter One argued for the sincerity of press claims that the Ottoman Empire entered 
the war as an effective vassal of Germany. Though such assertions have been recognised 
previously, their demonstrable falsehood has prevented historians from viewing them as 
anything more than deliberately deceitful propaganda or articulations of traditional racial 
prejudices regarding the necessary power imbalance between supposedly ‘backward Orientals’ 
and a ‘superior’ European power. Though such Orientalism was certainly present, it has 
received undue primacy, masking the more complex reasoning behind these claims, evident 
through the hitherto unexamined press reporting during the Ottoman Empire’s months of 
‘pseudo-neutrality’ before its intervention in late-October 1914. Apparent inconsistencies in 
Ottoman foreign policy following the July Crisis, whereby increasingly pro-German actions 
were accompanied by repeated public affirmations of neutrality, suggested to contemporaries 
a factional dispute within the Porte between a pro-German ‘war party’, backed by German gold 
and intrigue, against the more numerous and ‘enlightened’ statesmen in the ‘peace party’. 
Though no such struggle against German domination in Constantinople actually took place, it 
was an understandable (if misguided) inference from the available information, situated within 
broader concerns over German propaganda in neutral nations and bolstered by the apparent 
irrationality of an Ottoman intervention. It was, additionally, an interpretation much 
encouraged by Ottoman statesmen themselves. Consequently, the Ottoman fleet’s unprovoked 
attack on Russia on 29 October 1914 signalled to the press that the ‘war party’ had finally won 
this factional struggle. With all anti-German voices effectively expelled from Constantinople, 
Germany’s political subjugation of the Ottoman Empire was believed to be complete.  
With the strength of the press’ belief in this narrative of German political domination, 
despite its falsehood, now recognised, its previously dismissed ubiquity within press 
commentary on wartime events in the East, discussed in Chapters Two and Three, was properly 
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situated within a broader Germano-centric picture of the Ottoman Empire. Chapter Two showed 
that praise for the ‘clean-fighting Turk’ served primarily to highlight German ‘barbarity’ by 
contrast. This does not, alone, account for the apparently widespread chivalrous regard for the 
Ottoman foe despite its widely-documented atrocities towards Armenians and Allied prisoners. 
The narrative’s origin within first-hand testimonies of rank-and-file soldiers from Gallipoli, 
rather than the nineteenth-century Turcophilism previously assumed, was the more likely 
explanation, given the well-known reverence attached to the ‘soldier’s story’ in the UK, both 
during and after the war, as offering the definitive, and unimpeachable, account. Yet, the 
frequent contrast between the ‘clean-fighting Turk’, who upheld ‘civilised’ British values of 
athleticism on the battlefield, and the ‘barbarous’ German ‘Hun’ in soldiers’ accounts, 
reproduced in the press, suggest that its primary significance was in reinforcing popular 
convictions that the UK was fighting a ‘just war’ against Germany. This was seen also in press 
discussions of Ottoman atrocities. Belief in Germany’s complete dominance in Constantinople 
led newspapers to believe that the Armenian Genocide must have occurred with German 
acquiescence, if not outright approval. It was, therefore, Germany, not the Ottoman Empire, 
which was most blamed for the crime. Operating as a quasi-German atrocity, it provided the 
same moral justification for the Anglo-German conflict as Germany’s ‘rape of Belgium’ and 
its sinking of the Lusitania. Other Ottoman atrocities which could not be similarly tied to 
Germany attracted an accordingly muted press response. As Horne and Kramer observe, 
‘atrociousness’ in wartime discourse ‘denoted the importance of the enemy, not the crime.’1 
Like praise for the ‘clean-fighting Turk’, Ottoman atrocities were important only insofar as 
they demonstrated German ‘barbarity’. 
Likewise, Ottoman military defeat was valued mostly for its contribution to the Anglo-
German conflict, as shown in Chapter Three. Britain’s most significant Eastern venture, the 
Dardanelles (later Gallipoli) campaign, promised not only an Ottoman surrender but, 
subsequently, the entry of several Balkan states on the Allied side and a strengthened Russia, 
which could be adequately supplied via the Black Sea. While, initially, both ‘Easterners’ and 
‘Westerners’ within the press supported this expedition, they did so because they believed it 
would hasten Germany’s defeat through a new Hungarian front and on the condition that it 
would not jeopardise success in Europe. Though this consensus diverged after the Gallipoli 
landings, the press remained convinced, regardless of strategic outlook, that defeating the 
Ottoman Empire was valuable, at least in principle, as an extension of the European theatre. 
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Support for the Middle Eastern campaigns was less Eurocentric, as they offered little towards 
Germany’s military defeat, but still thoroughly Germano-centric. Present analyses of press 
discussions of these campaigns have greatly overlooked the region’s prominent association 
with German imperial ambitions through ventures like the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. In doing 
so, historians have missed the true importance newspapers ascribed to the Middle East. Pan-
German authors claimed the object of this eastward expansion was the conquest of Egypt and 
India and, ultimately, the usurpation of Britain as the global hegemon. Though numerous 
themes were present within press commentary on the Middle Eastern campaign, thwarting this 
Drang nach Osten was not simply one topic amongst many, as Fantauzzo recently suggested, 
but, for the press, their main purpose. Situating these campaigns within their previously 
unexamined Anglo-German context reveals their true significance. Conquest of the East was 
considered Germany’s central war aim. Hence, newspapers interpreted its invasion of Serbia 
in October 1915 as an effort to secure a direct route to India by subsuming Serbia, into 
Mitteleuropa, as it had supposedly done with the Ottoman Empire and its other ‘vassals’. The 
Western Front, though generally privileged over Eastern ‘sideshows’ in terms of Germany’s 
military defeat, was peripheral in this respect. For the press, steeped in the ideology of empire, 
the First World War, was, ultimately, about mastery of the East. 
The Ottoman Empire, therefore, held a significant place within the UK press’ 
conception of the war, hitherto unappreciated by historians who, too often, focus exclusively 
on Germany. In this respect, this thesis contributes towards broader desires to ‘globalise’ the 
scholarship and move beyond the Anglo-German conflict that remains so dominant. On the 
other hand, it shows that those who abandon this framework entirely when considering 
contemporary perceptions of the war’s global events overlook Germany’s inescapable 
dominance within the wartime imagination. Thus, for example, while charging Germany with 
any significant responsibility for the Armenian Genocide is unfounded and, moreover, 
‘detract[s] from the responsibility of the CUP as progenitors of the genocide’,2 such 
contemporary assertions must be analysed seriously, despite their falsehood, for the crime’s 
significance to the ‘just war’ to be properly understood. This thesis’ most important 
contribution towards the historiography of the Ottoman Empire is, therefore, in interrogating 
these claims as genuine (if inaccurate) contemporary interpretations, rather than deliberately 
false and manipulative propaganda, and to discern the Ottoman Empire’s significance for the 
wartime press. At the same time, it also provides a new perspective through which to view 
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wartime characterisations of Germany by considering well-known, but seldom interrogated, 
claims of its dominance over the other Central Powers. Such claims were not cynical efforts to 
tie its otherwise inconsequential ‘junior partners’ to Britain’s dominant enemy, as 
conventionally assumed. As argued throughout the thesis, this Germano-centrism was 
considerably more complex, presenting Germany as a truly global, rather than exclusively 
European, threat. This gave the Ottoman Empire great importance, but only as a subservient 
vassal of an expansive German Empire, stretching from Berlin to Baghdad, against which the 
press believed the British Empire’s war was fought. The thesis highlights that, for 
contemporaries, the First World War was, at its core, an Anglo-German conflict. This is a fact 
which any future ‘military history from the street’ of this global war should take into account. 
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